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Part 1
Economic Globalization and the Welfare
State: Theoretical and Empirical Approaches

1

Chapter 1
Globalization and the Welfare State: Existing Theoretical Approaches

1.1. Introduction
Economic globalization is commonly referred to as “the increasing
internationalization of the production, distribution, and marketing of goods and
services” (Harris, 1993, p. 755). Economic globalization in this sense is characterized
by the integration of financial and labor markets via trade, foreign investment and
capital transfers (Shariff, 2003). Increasing exposure to global integration has resulted
in economic dislocations for many countries throughout the world. Much of this
dislocation has come in the form of job losses, poverty, income decrease and
increasing income inequality even among advanced industrial countries (Lawrence,
1996).
Globalization’s negative externalities for the welfare state and questions
regarding what the appropriate policy responses should be have sparked passionate
debate among policy makers and have grabbed the attention of academic researchers.
However, much of the existing academic scholarship is hobbled by theoretical and
empirical limitations that conceal more than they reveal about how global economic
forces are shaping social policies. The motivation of this research is to elucidate the
conditions under which the effects of globalization on social policy are shaped by the
nature of countries’ domestic political institutions and economic structures.
The question that guides this study is: what explains states’ social
expenditures when national economies are increasingly integrated into the global
economy? In answering this question, a dominant theoretical approach in the extant
literature, often referred to as the Efficiency Theory of the welfare state, advances the
2

proposition that globalization produces a ‘race to the bottom’ effect on social
spending. As global market forces dictate national economic decision-making,
considerations of greater economic efficiency will lead policy makers to sacrifice the
welfare state in order to compete with other states by attracting mobile transnational
capital. As national economies become increasingly integrated into the global
economy, transnational capital will flow to those countries that provide the lowest
levels of social protections for their citizens (Adsera and Boix, 2002, Avelinon et al.,
2005, Cameron, 1978, Garrett, 2001, Garrett, 1998, Hicks and Swank, 1992, Huber,
1999, Iversen and Cusack, 2000b, Katzenstein, 1985, Pierson, 2001, Rodrik, 1998,
Rudra, 2002, Rudra, 2008, Rudra and Haggard, 2001, Swank, 2002).
While the efficiency theory has in some respects become the intellectual
expression of anti-globalization populists on the right and the left (Bhagwati, 2004,
pp.21-25), the theory is limited by its inability to clearly identify the primary causal
mechanisms through which economic globalization produces the ‘race to the bottom’
effect on welfare expenditures.
Notwithstanding the limitations of the efficiency theory, other scholars posit
what they claim to be an alternative theory – the Compensation theory of the welfare
state, which advances the proposition that global economic integration may in fact
produce an expansionary effect on social spending. It is argued that governments will
expand welfare spending to compensate the losers of economic globalization for the
purpose of maintaining their political legitimacy (Miller, 1986, O'Connor, 1971).
However, as it is currently configured, the compensation theory is nothing more than
a statement that global economic integration is correlated with an increase in
governments’ welfare expenditures. As a result, it is not considered a theory in this
analysis but its insights along with those drawn from the efficiency theory are used to
3

develop an integrated theory of globalization’s effects on the welfare state.
In addition to the literature’s theoretical limitations, the empirical research of
the existing literature has produced evidence that cannot be generalized across a large
sample of countries. Some studies have largely analyzed the relationship between
economic globalization and welfare spending among OECD (Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development) countries (Cameron, 1978, Garrett, 1998,
Hicks and Swank, 1992, Iversen and Cusack, 2000b), while others have based their
analyses on developing countries (Avelinon, et al., 2005, Kaufman and SeguraUbiergo, 2001, Rudra, 2002, Rudra, 2008). Studies whose samples rely on OECD
countries suggest that increasing levels of global economic integration increase
government welfare expenditures, consistent with the compensation thesis.
Meanwhile, studies with samples taken from countries in the developing world
suggest that increasing levels of economic globalization significantly reduce
government welfare spending as predicted by efficiency theories (Rudra, 2008).
Given these limitations this study contributes to the existing literature in the
following ways. First, it draws upon efficiency and compensation approaches and
develops an integrated theoretical framework that explains globalization’s effects on
social spending. Second, the study’s theory is systemically tested within the context of
a large-N cross-national pooled time-series analysis of 122 countries during the years
1970-2002. To reinforce the statistical analysis, the study also tests the theory via
comparative case study analyses of South Korea, Chile and Spain. The methodology
that motivated the selection of these countries is discussed in chapter 3. Third, relative
to existing studies, a comprehensive measure of economic globalization is utilized
that adequately captures the theoretical definition of the concept. Fourth, using
principal component analysis, an aggregate indicator that measures the institutional
4

factors of countries’ domestic politics is constructed. Economic globalization interacts
with these domestic political factors to empirically predict governments’ social
spending.
This manuscript is organized in three parts. Part I is comprised of chapters 1,
2 and 3. Chapter 1 reviews the existing literature that features efficiency and
compensation approaches to the welfare state. After discussing the theoretical
limitations of the existing literature an alternative theoretical framework is advanced
that draws upon and integrates efficiency and compensation approaches to explain
social policies under conditions of global economic integration. Chapter 2 presents a
full discussion of the various components of the study’s theoretical argument and
affixes hypotheses at the end of each discussion. Chapter 3 presents the study’s
research design. The outcome variable – welfare spending – and the various
explanatory variables are discussed and operationalized. The chapter concludes with a
discussion of the estimation procedures, which feature various time-series regressions
that are used to analyze the cross-national data as well as a discussion of the
methodology that informed the selection of countries used in the case study analysis.
Part II is comprised of chapter 4, 5 and 6. Chapter 4 presents the empirical
finding of the interactive effect of economic globalization and national capitalist firms
on states’ social spending. Chapter 5 presents the empirical findings of the interactive
effects of economic globalization and domestic political institutions on states’ welfare
spending. A number of interactions are examined. The first analyzes the interaction
between economic globalization and an index of domestic political institutions on
welfare spending. And the analyses that follow examine the interaction between
economic globalization and the disaggregated components of political institutions on
welfare spending; namely, the interaction between economic globalization and regime
5

type; the interaction between economic globalization and voter’s participation; and
the interaction between economic globalization and electoral competition. Chapter 6
shifts the analysis to a discussion of the empirical findings that feature the interactive
effects of economic globalization and domestic political affiliation on states’ welfare
spending. These include the interaction between economic globalization and labor
unions and the interaction between economic globalization and the ideology of ruling
political parties.
Part III is comprised of Chapters 7, 8, and 9, which presents the case studies
of South Korea, Chile and Spain. The case studies illustrate that the effects of global
economic integration on welfare policy in emerging economies with authoritarian
political histories are conditioned by the variation in the political institutions found in
each country. Chapter 10 concludes with a discussion of the theoretical and policy
implications that emerge from the research.

1.2. The Efficiency Theory of Welfare Spending
The fundamental proposition of the efficiency theory is that high levels of
government social spending undermine economic efficiency and the competitiveness
of domestic firms in international markets (Avelinon, et al., 2005, Garrett, 2001,
Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo, 2001). It is argued that since social spending is largely
funded from corporate taxes, any increase in social expenditures will be accompanied
by an equivalent increase in the level of taxes (Song and Hong, 2005). Increased taxes
undermine investor confidence and the competitiveness of domestic companies in
both domestic and international markets (Garrett, 2001). Increased social spending
can also result in increased government debt as the state increases its borrowing to
finance its welfare policies. Consequently, increased government borrowing results in
6

higher interest rates and the devaluation of the currency, both of which increase
production costs and discourage companies from making new investments (Garrett,
2001).
High levels of taxes brought about by increases in government welfare
policies will ultimately facilitate capital flight, as transnational corporations will begin
re-locating their investments to countries that have lower taxes and limited social
protections, hence producing a ‘race to the bottom’ effect on the welfare state (Barnet
and Cavanagh, 1994, Barnet and Muller, 1974, Brecher and Costello, 1994). Since
economic globalization increases the mobility of transnational capital, it is this threat
that forces governments to significantly reduce social expenditures in order to restore
investor confidence. In sum, the efficiency theoretical model posits that economic
globalization and the level of international competition that emerges from it constrain
and limit government welfare spending in order to attract and retain mobile capital.
Recent empirical research seems to confirm the logic of the efficiency theory
of welfare spending. One study assessed the impact of economic globalization on the
growth of government spending in OECD countries and showed that trade and
international financial openness had a negative effect on government spending
(Garrett, 2001). Consistent with this finding, recent research using a sample of Latin
American countries examined the relationship between economic globalization and
welfare spending and found that trade openness had a consistently negative effect on
aggregate social spending and social security transfers (Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo,
2001).
Razin and Sadka (2005) explain the decline of the welfare state in terms of
the changing demographic patterns and the global integration of national economies.
Under conditions of global economic integration and the growth of an aging
7

population, governments are caught between a rock and a hard place. On one hand,
increasing taxes on capital runs the risk of driving away mobile transnational capital.
On the other hand, increasing taxes on a young but increasingly small labor force is
both economically and politically unsustainable. Since young people represent an
important element of the median voter, they are likely to effectively resist the
government’s attempt to increase welfare spending. Given this dilemma, government
welfare spending is likely to decline (Razin and Sadka, 2005). To the extent that
economic globalization exerts a downward ‘race to the bottom’ effect on social
spending, the above discussion serves as this study’s theoretical baseline and
generates the following hypotheses:

HE: Increasing levels of global economic integration are associated with a decrease in
welfare spending.

1.3. The Compensation Approach
While recognizing the budgetary constraints of the state under conditions of
increased global economic integration, compensation approaches to welfare spending
emphasize the social demands for welfare allocation and the political incentives of
policy makers to respond to such demands. The welfare system, according to this
approach, is a necessary mechanism for offsetting the costs of global economic
integration (Cameron, 1978, Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo, 2001, Quinn, 1997).
Scholars in this tradition argue that efficiency theories overlook the political incentive
to increase public programs in response to international economic integration (Garrett,
2001). Since policy makers in democracies are primarily motivated by re-election,
they are more likely to increase welfare spending to offset negative economic
8

externalities, such as job losses and increased income inequality that emerge from the
competitive nature of the global economy. Hence, knowing that those who are
displaced will blame political incumbents for the negative externalities of economic
globalization, policy makers are more likely to increase welfare spending to pacify
displaced workers. In addition, policy makers will also provide welfare benefits to
insure that the negative externalities of global economic integration do not disrupt
national financial markets (Avelinon, et al., 2005).
David Cameron’s (1978) seminal research provides the first empirical and
historical analysis of the growth of the welfare state among Northern European
countries. The research was the first quantitative analysis of welfare policy that
showed that openness to trade was strongly correlated with what he referred to as the
“scope of the public economy,” which was measured in terms of the change in total
taxes as a percentage of GDP. The research showed that openness to trade was the
best predictor of the growth of government revenues. Large nations that were
economically less open experienced moderate increases in the scope of the public
economy compared to smaller nations with more open economies. While the scope of
the public economy among small Western European countries varied with the
dominance of left parties in Scandinavian countries or the dominance of centrist or
conservative parties in countries like Belgium and Ireland, the best explanation for the
expansion of government expenditures is the degree to which national economies had
been integrated into the global economy (Cameron, 1978).
In his classic, Small States in World Markets, Peter Katzenstein’s (1985)
analysis is consistent with the compensation approach to welfare policy. By
employing a comparative case study analysis of Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the
Netherlands and Belgium, Katzenstein demonstrates that global economic integration
9

is causally related to welfare expenditures as well as to the various state interventions
that are designed to increase economic growth and productivity. According to
Katzenstein, what distinguishes the small states of Western Europe from larger nations
is the ways in which they have combined liberal policies that are designed to leverage
greater global economic integration with a policy of domestic compensation through
which the country’s national economy is protected from the negative consequences of
liberal openness (Katzenstein, 1985).
In pursuing an effective industrial policy, the mix of international liberalism
and domestic compensation varies widely among small Western European states.
Moreover, the development of an industrial policy is not dependent on size but what
Katzenstein refers to as democratic corporatism, which is the way in which
conflicting economic interests are mediated domestically. Democratic corporatism is
characterized by an “ideology of social partnership expressed at the national level; a
relatively centralized and concentrated system of interest groups; and voluntary and
informal co-ordination of conflicting objectives through continuous political
bargaining between interest groups, state bureaucracies, and political parties”
(Katzenstein, 1985, 32). It is, therefore, the democratic corporatist nature of small
European states that makes it possible to develop an industrial policy that is based on
effectively integrating national economies into the global economy, while at the same
time developing a robust system of domestic compensation (Katzenstein, 1985).
In building on the work of Cameron (1978) and Katzenstein (1985), Rodrik
(1998) developed a cross-national study of the relationship between economic
globalization and the size of government. This study was motivated by a simple
question: is the relationship between trade and government spending negative as
efficiency theory predicts or is the relationship positive as predicted by the
10

compensation approach? The research shows a positive correlation between countries’
exposure to international trade and the size of government. These results are robust to
most measures of government spending and the inclusion of a wide range of control
indicators as well as various sample selections. According to Rodrik, government
spending reduces societal-risk for countries whose economies are increasingly
vulnerable to global economic integration, and the relationship between trade
openness and the size of government is strongest when the terms-of-trade risk is the
highest (Rodrik, 1998).
Other scholars within this research tradition consider the effects of other
aspects of economic globalization on government welfare spending. Quinn’s (1997)
cross-national study of 38 nations estimated the effects of capital mobility on
government spending and found that greater capital mobility is associated with higher
levels of spending. Other research on the effect of capital mobility on welfare
spending has shown that the integration of capital markets has been associated with
increases in welfare spending as well as higher corporate taxes (Swank, 1998). A
recent empirical treatment of Latin American countries provided additional support
for the compensation thesis. Using a measure of financial openness as well as
measures of trade openness, Avelinon, Brown and Hunter’s research suggests that
trade openness has a positive relationship with education and social expenditures, and
financial openness does not reduce government expenditures for social programs as
predicted by the efficiency theory (Avelinon, et al., 2005).

1.4. Theoretical Limitations of the Existing Literature
A significant limitation of efficiency theory’s ‘race to the bottom’ approach to
social policy is that the central mechanism through which economic globalization is
11

said to have a reductive effect on welfare spending is not clearly specified. Different
authors in this tradition identify different causal mechanisms. Some identify global
corporations as the central mechanism through which economic globalization
produces a ‘race to the bottom’ effect on welfare spending. These scholars argue that
since economic globalization increases the mobility of transnational capital, it is the
threat of corporate divestment and re-location to other countries that forces
governments to slash welfare expenditures in order to reduce costs and restore
investor confidence (Barnet and Cavanagh, 1994, Barnet and Muller, 1974). Others
point to states as the central mechanism and argue that governments regardless of
their ideological orientation are increasingly willing to sacrifice the interests and
rights of workers and the poor in order to promote an investor friendly environment
(Holman, 1993). And still others point to the structural adjustment policies (SAPs) of
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank as the central mechanism
and argue that the conditionalities associated with SAPs force governments to
retrench welfare expenditures in order to improve economic efficiency by reducing
public sector and balance of payments deficits (Bartilow, 1997).
The various mechanisms that scholars identify either directly or indirectly
involve the role of corporate capital. As a result, the theoretical discussion in the next
chapter draws upon Marxist theories of the welfare state to construct the conditions
under which the integration of national capitalist firms into the global production
process establishes the causal mechanism through which globalization exerts a
downward pressure on states’ welfare policies.
A significant limitation of the compensation thesis is that it is based on the
assumption that the welfare state is a necessary mechanism for offsetting the negative
externalities of economic globalization (Cameron, 1978, Kaufman and Segura12

Ubiergo, 2001, Quinn, 1997). In fact, the Keynesian welfare state is not a creature of
global capitalism but was created to stabilize the economic contradictions of
capitalism in its national form. In many respects the Keynesian welfare state, as
discussed in chapter 2, is naturally incongruent with the logic of global capitalism
(Teeple, 1995). Therefore, if it is observed that the welfare state offsets globalization’s
negative externalities, then this outcome is not natural to the operations of the
Keynesian welfare state (Miliband, 1969); but is a function of the ways in which
endogenous political institutions, which are absent from the compensation perspective,
averts globalization’s natural tendencies to retrench the welfare state.
The compensation thesis, as it is currently configured, is less theory and
more an observation that the global integration of national economies is correlated
with an increase in governments’ welfare expenditures. The conditions under which
this correlation takes place are never specified. As a result, the compensation thesis is
not considered a theory because it fails to specify the necessary endogenous political
factors that offset globalization’s negative externalities.
On this note, empirical studies in the existing literature have largely overlooked
the importance of how economic globalization’s effect on states’ welfare spending is
conditional on the nature of domestic political institutions. It is only in the past few
years where a handful of scholars have attempted to address this deficit. In their
research, Boix (1998) and Garrette (1998) demonstrate that the impact of global
economic integration on governments’ welfare expenditures is conditional on the
nature of partisan politics. Domestic political variables also feature prominently in the
research of Asera and Boix (2002). They argue that the relationship between the
openness of national economies and the size of the public sector’s welfare spending is
heavily conditional on the nature of the political regime. They contend that
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governments strategically provide welfare compensation to build domestic political
coalitions that support free trade, and democratic governments relative to
authoritarian regimes are more likely to use welfare spending to compensate the losers
of economic globalization.
While recent studies have attempted to bring greater theoretical precision by
identifying the mechanisms through which globalization operates in determining
social policies, the mechanisms that are tested in such studies are limited to partisan
politics and political regimes. These studies do not provide a comprehensive analysis
of how the interactions of economic globalization and other domestic political
variables affect states’ welfare spending.
This study argues that government welfare spending is a function of the ways in
which the pressures of economic globalization is conditioned by domestic politics.
Domestic politics consists of political affiliation and political institutional factors that
refer respectively to the willingness and capacity of political systems to initiate
changes in public policy (Glatzer and Rueshemeyer, 2005). Political institutional
factors, which include the characteristics of political regimes and the levels of
electoral competition and political participation, determine the political environment
that shapes the incentives and preferences of government officials who make welfare
policy. Political affiliation factors, which include organized labor and political parties,
determine how government resources - specifically welfare expenditures - are
distributed. This study, therefore, builds on the existing literature by examining the
ways in which economic globalization’s effect on welfare policy is conditional on the
domestic political environment that shapes welfare policy and the political affiliations
of domestic political actors who distribute social benefits.
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1.5. Towards an Integrated Theory of the Welfare State
The theoretical limitations of the extant literature present an opportunity to
construct a robust theoretical framework that integrates efficiency and compensation
approaches to the welfare state. While the existing literature treats these approaches as
competing or mutually exclusive ‘theories’ of the welfare state, they are considered
here to be mutually inclusive processes in the development of social policy.
Government welfare policy emerges from the tension of globalization’s proclivity to
retrench social spending and the proclivity of domestic political actors and institutions
to compensate. In essence, the construction of social policy, under conditions of
global economic integration, is a function of the dialectical pressures for greater
economic efficiency and domestic political preferences for greater compensation.
It is postulated that in a world absent of domestic political institutions and
where transnational corporations completely dominate countries’ political economy,
by default, economic globalization will exert a downward pressure on social spending.
However, in the presence of domestic politics, globalization’s natural proclivity for
welfare retrenchment will be averted since its effect on social spending is conditional
on the nature of political institutions and the political preferences of labor unions and
political parties that set a floor against further retrenchment. The dialectical tension
between globalization’s tendency to retrench the welfare state and the tendency of
domestic political institutions to resist retrenchment is fully developed and
empirically tested in the chapters that follow.

Copyright © Hanbeom Jeong 2010
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Chapter 2
Globalization’s Effect on the Welfare State: Economic Efficiency by
Default but Compensation by Design

In the previous chapter it was argued that, by default, economic globalization
exerts a downward pressure on welfare expenditures through the operations of
transnational corporations. However, since globalization’s effect on social policy is
conditional on the nature of endogenous political forces, its proclivity to retrench
welfare expenditures is averted by the preferences of domestic institutions and
political actors to compensate. In developing this integrated theoretical explanation of
welfare policy, this chapter asks the following questions: under what structural
conditions of corporate capitalism will economic globalization produce a ‘race to the
bottom’ effect on states’ social spending? And under what domestic political
conditions will institutions and political actors avert globalization’s ‘race to the
bottom’ effect on social spending? In answering these questions, the discussion that
follows draws upon Marxist and political democratic theories of the welfare state.

Transnational Corporations and the Race to the Bottom
2.1. Marxist theory of the Welfare State
Marxist scholars have consistently argued that the dynamics of the modern
welfare state cannot be understood apart from the historical development of
capitalism. For Marxists, the productive relations of national capitalism depended on
the welfare state. State intervention was endemic to the birth of capitalism, guided its
early development and has been crucial to the history of capital accumulation, even in
the U.S., a country that prides itself as exceptionally and fiercely committed to rugged
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individualism and laissez faire (Manley, 2008, Miliband, 1969, 9). The intervention of
the welfare state was promoted by corporate capital when labor markets were
constrained by national boundaries and capital was largely immobile due to the fact
that national economies were relatively closed before the 1970s. Corporate capital’s
promotion of state intervention emerged from the desire to socialize the costs of the
business cycle whose economic booms and busts created uncertainty, social disruption
and political instability. In addition, corporate capital’s promotion of the welfare state
represented an attempt to diminish the growing interest in socialism that emerged as a
result of the 1930s’ depression. The desire to socialize the costs of capital
accumulation has historically led countries to introduce old age pensions, hospital
insurance and public education. While industrial accident insurance schemes were
partly won by labor unions, they largely emerged from the efforts of corporations to
create a system that would limit corporate liability for industrial accidents as well as
socialize the costs via industry-wide insurance premiums (Teeple, 1995, 13-14).
Marxist scholars argue that the intervention of the welfare state was necessary to
the very survival of national capitalism. State intervention helped to mitigate class
conflict and managed the internal contradictions of capital accumulation, which given
the business cycle produces massive unemployment and economic dislocations for
which capitalism in itself has no mechanism to accommodate. In the attempt to
rationalize capitalism the welfare state subsidizes the costs of capital accumulation by
reproducing the working class, by intervening into labor markets to offset the
dominant leverage that capital has over labor, and by intervening into the production
process. The state’s provision of health care, education, subsidized childcare, child
and family allowances, and food stamps has always been associated with attempts to
propagate the working class and prepare them for the national labor market. The
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regulation of minimum wage and the enactment of child labor laws, education and job
training, pensions and unemployment assistance have always been associated with
attempts to bring equity in national labor markets. In addition, for Marxists, the
welfare state’s provision of collective bargaining is nothing more than an institutional
framework that manages class conflict between workers and the owners of capital
(Milward, 2003, 106-110, Teeple, 1995, 15). The scale and scope of the welfare state’s
intervention, for Marxists scholars, underscores the fact that capitalism in its national
form:
“Depends to an ever-greater extent on the bounties and direct support of the state, and
can only preserve its ‘private’ character on the basis of such public help. State
intervention in economic life in fact largely means intervention for the purpose of
helping capitalist enterprises. In no field has the notion of the ‘welfare state’ had a
more precise and apposite meaning than here: there are no more persistent and
successful applications for public assistance than the proud giants of the private
enterprise system” (Miliband, 1969, 78).
While corporate capital in its national form depended on the welfare state,
Marxists scholars argue that under conditions of global economic integration the
welfare state is increasingly at variance with the logic of capital accumulation.
Essentially, the conditions that gave rise to the welfare state have been eroded by the
integration of global markets. As capital became increasingly internationalized and
was no longer limited to the national labor market, it no longer required the welfare
state’s intervention to facilitate political compromise with the national working class.
The growth of the global labor market undermined national labor markets and thereby
undermined the state’s raison d’être to provide welfare benefits and collective
bargaining for the working class. Furthermore, since labor unions are unable to
accompany capital into the global labor market, they have now become anachronistic
relics of an earlier era of capitalism. National jurisdictions have now become less
important in corporate decision-making since transnational corporations can now
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secure greater tax concessions from states who increasingly compete for corporate
investment in a never-ending race to the bottom where state revenues dwindle and the
priorities of the welfare state are abandoned (Milward, 2003, 112-115, Teeple, 1995,
69-74). To the extent that Marxist scholars claim that globalization’s ‘race to the
bottom’ effect on social spending is conditional on changes in the structure of
corporate capitalism, Marxist theory, in this respect, is a variant of efficiency theories
and as such the above discussion generates the following hypothesis:

HE1: Increasing levels of global economic integration are associated with a decrease
in welfare spending when the structure of corporate capital is transnational.

Institutions and the Politics of Compensation
2.2. Democratic Regimes and Social Generosity
The authority characteristics of political regimes simultaneously influence
both the pace at which national economies are integrated into the global economy and
the scale of government welfare spending. Relative to authoritarian regimes,
democratic governments who face public pressure have a strong incentive to
compensate economic dislocations that arise from global integration (Garrett, 2001).
Several scholars have examined how political regimes affect social spending and
argue that political regimes play a crucial role when governments decide social
welfare policies under the conditions of increasing economic globalization (Adsera
and Boix, 2002, Avelinon, et al., 2005, Hicks and Swank, 1992, Kaufman and SeguraUbiergo, 2001). Since policy makers in democracies are subject to pressures from
elections and interest groups, they are more likely to allocate a larger portion of their
budgets for social welfare spending than those in authoritarian regimes. Research on
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Latin America demonstrates that in the face of trade expansion, democratic
governments are more likely to provide social welfare programs than non-democratic
regimes (Avelinon, et al., 2005, Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo, 2001).
Other researchers, however, caution that democracies do not affect all types of
social spending equally. Segura-Ubiergo (2007) argues that lower income groups in
Latin America are likely to pressure governments to increase social spending only to
the extent that they are the direct beneficiaries of such spending. Results from his
research have shown that democracies in Latin America tend to be negatively
associated with social security expenditures but positively associated with health and
education expenditures (Segura-Ubiergo, 2007, 169). These results reflect the fact that
social security beneficiaries in Latin America must be legally employed in the formal
sector, and since lower incomes groups who are largely unemployed have no access to
these benefits, they have no incentive to press their governments to receive them.
Health and education expenditures reach a much larger segment of the population and
lower income groups are more likely to press government to increase such
expenditures (Segura-Ubiergo, 2007). To the extent that economic globalization’s
effect on welfare spending is conditional on the authority characteristics of political
regimes, the above discussion generates the following hypotheses:

H2: Increasing levels of global economic integration are associated with an increase
in welfare spending when political regimes are democratic.

2.3. Competitive Elections and Social Spending
Political democratic theories emphasize the effect that political competition
among political parties has on government welfare policies (Hicks and Swank, 1992,
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Kite, 2004). Given the clientelistic nature of competitive electoral politics in many
countries throughout the world, political parties are more likely to propose generous
welfare allotments such as pensions, unemployment insurance, job training, health
care, and social security in order to secure votes. As the global economic integration
of national economies increases, the clientelistic nature of competitive electoral
politics is also expected to increase since parties increasingly seek to provide welfare
benefits for constituent voting districts adversely affected by economic globalization
(Cammack et al., 1988). This discussion generates the following hypothesis:

H3: Increasing levels of global economic integration are associated with an increase
in welfare spending when the level of electoral competition is high.

2.4. Political Participation and Welfare Expansion
Political democratic theories argue that the level of political participation also
affects government welfare expenditures (Hicks and Swank, 1992, Kite, 2004). High
voter turnout is reflective of the political entrance of first time and working class
voters who will most likely to terminate the political careers of incumbents that they
hold responsible for the negative externalities of global economic integration. And
since re-election matters to incumbents, they are more likely to promise increasing
welfare expenditures to appease the wrath of the voters. To the extent that economic
globalization’s effect on welfare spending is conditional on the level of political
participation, the above discussion generates the following hypothesis:

H4: Increasing levels of global economic integration are associated with an increase
in welfare spending when the level of political participation is high.
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2.5. Democratization and Welfare Expansion
The above discussions considered the interactive effect of economic
globalization and the institutional factors of domestic politics on states’ welfare
spending. However, because the domestic political system is more than the sum of its
parts, it is also important to consider the interaction between economic globalization
and the aggregate effect of political institutions (which is an index that is comprised
of indicators that measure regime type, the level of electoral competition and political
participation) on states’ welfare spending. When regimes are democratic and the level
of electoral competition and political participation is high, then democratization
defines the nature of political institutions (Vanhanen, 1984, Vanhanen, 1990,
Vanhanen, 1997).
To fully account for the cross-national variation in states’ welfare spending it is
also necessary to estimate the interactive effect of global economic integration and the
aggregate and disaggregate political environmental factors that shape states’ welfare
spending. In estimating the aggregate effect of institutions an index is constructed via
principal components analysis. This discussion generates the following hypotheses:

H5: Increasing levels of global economic integration are associated with an increase
in welfare spending when democratization of political institutions is high.

Political Affiliations and the Politics of Compensation
2.6. Labor Unions and Welfare Expansion
Social democratic corporatist theories emphasize the ways in which organized
labor can directly affect government welfare policies. Although governments in free
market economies tend to be more responsive to the preferences of the business sector,
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they will also respond to pressure from labor unions that demand the provision of
social protection benefits to union members who have been adversely affected by
global economic integration. With the threat of strikes, which undermine investor
confidence and economic growth, governments are more likely to provide social
welfare programs such as pensions, unemployment insurance, job training, health care,
and social security under the organized collective power of labor unions (EspingAnderson, 1990, Garrett, 1998, Hicks, 1999, Kite, 2004, Rodrik, 1998).
Organized labor can also exert indirect pressure on governments to increase
welfare spending. In recent years, the labor movement has effectively lobbied the
World Trade Organization (WTO) to link labor standards to free trade agreements.
The Social Clause, as it is commonly called, would require trading countries to
observe a series of labor standards, which guarantees minimum wages, the right of
labor to engage in collective bargaining, and the prevention of child labor. In addition,
global institutions like the WTO would be given the authority to impose sanctions
against countries that fail to observe these standards (Hughes and Wilkinson, 1998,
Wachtel, 1998, Wet, 1995, Wilkinson and Hughes, 2000).
International agreement on the Social Clause would potentially force
governments to implement labor standards, which would increase the negotiation
power of unions to elicit further concessions from governments to increase welfare
spending. Therefore, to the extent that economic globalization’s effect on welfare
spending is conditional on the strength of organized labor, the above discussion
generates the following hypothesis:

H6: Increasing levels of global economic integration are associated with an increase
in welfare spending when labor unions are strong.
23

Other scholars argue that globalization has weakened organized labor and
therefore challenge the notion of labor unions’ influence in shaping states’ welfare
policies. Charles Lindblom’s Politics and Markets is a classic treatise on this issue.
Lindblom argues that corporate capital, relative to labor unions, occupies a privileged
position in government. Since economic recession and high inflation can topple
governments, the legitimacy of governments largely depends on private corporations’
providing jobs, generating economic growth and increasing living standards.
Consequently, public policy is always geared towards supporting corporate priorities
and not those of organized labor (Lindblom, 1977, 172-173). Increasing levels of
global economic integration only serve to deepen organized labor’s inferior position
in government and significantly weaken its political influence to extract welfare
allocations from the state.
Case study research about the politics of the labor movement in emerging
economies has corroborated Lindblom’s basic thesis. Since the 1950s the labor
movements in many of these countries have been transformed from being militant
organizations that pressed for the rights of working people, to being increasingly coopted into the free market priorities of transnational capitalism. Given the fact that
unions in emerging economies increasingly see themselves as a responsible partner to
government and capital they are less likely to press governments to increase welfare
allocations (Gray, 2008, Gray, 2007).
Recent empirical research also shows that with increasing global economic
integration labor unions in the less developed countries (LDCs) have been unable to
prevent the decline of the welfare state. Collective action problems of labor unions in
countries with large pools of low-skilled workers tend to weaken the political
bargaining power of labor unions vis-à-vis the state and transnational corporations.
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Therefore, global economic integration is expected to decrease government welfare
spending because labor unions in developing countries are politically too weak to
effectively engage the state to provide societal safety nets against the negative
externalities of economic globalization (Rudra, 2002).
Still other scholars are quick to remind us that the phenomenon of weak labor
unions in LDCs is also taking place in advanced industrial economies, albeit for
different reasons. Teeple (1995) argues that global economic integration has
significantly reduced government welfare spending in advanced industrial economies
largely because governments have consistently enacted legislation intended to curb
the political power that labor unions had progressively won since the late nineteenth
century. Since the 1980s, advanced industrial countries have enacted legislation that
has limited the rights and security of labor unions and consequently has reduced their
legal status, and restricted the ways in which labor unions are financed. All these
factors make it increasingly difficult for unions to organize and lobby the state in
defense of welfare allocations (Teeple, 1995). Therefore, to the extent that increasing
global economic integration has weakened the ability of organized labor to extract
welfare expenditures from the state, the discussion generates the following
hypothesis:

H7: Increasing levels of global economic integration are not associated with an
increase in welfare spending regardless of the strength of labor unions.

2.7. Political Parties and Social Policy
Social democratic corporatist theories also focus on the power of the political
left; namely, leftist parties in shaping the welfare policies of the state (Hicks and
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Swank, 1992, Katzenstein, 1985, Kite, 2004). The core theoretical proposition of this
perspective is that the political orientation of leftist parties and their supporters affects
the ways in which the governments respond to economic globalization. It is argued
that the effect of global economic integration on states’ welfare spending is
conditional on the nature of party politics. Governments led by left or centrist political
parties (labor, social democratic, or Christian democratic parties) are more likely to
support robust welfare policies than governments led by parties to the political right
(Huber and Stephens, 2001, Stephens, 2005). Kite (2004) argues that in countries
where social democratic parties are strong the public is less tolerant of economic
inequality and holds government accountable for providing welfare benefits. This
discussion generates the following hypotheses:

H8: Increasing levels of global economic integration are associated with an increase
in welfare spending when ruling political parties are on the left.

2.8. The Null Effect on Social Spending
Some scholars argue that the extent of countries’ integration into the global
economy is exaggerated. It is argued that the great expansion of international trade is
grossly exaggerated since world trade, as a percentage of countries’ gross domestic
product, is roughly the same today as it was before World War 1 (Serrano, 2002).
International trade is not a global phenomenon but largely confined to geographical
regions, and the foreign investments of transnational corporations are not dispersed
globally but largely flow to a few countries. Moreover, since developing countries’
participation in the global economy is limited by civil war and mounting debt, the
extent of their economic integration and its supposed effect on government welfare
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spending should be minuscule (Hirst, 1997, Hirst and Thompson, 1996, Jones, 1995,
Scarpf, 1991, Wade, 1996).
Another reason why economic globalization does not affect the welfare state is
that states still maintain considerable control over their economies and frequently use
government expenditures to provide collective goods (social stability and
infrastructure) that are under-supplied by the market but are nevertheless vital to the
process of capital accumulation (Friden and Rogowski, 1996, Garrett, 1999, Kurzer,
1993, Vernon, 1971). This discussion generates the following hypothesis:

H9: Increasing levels of global economic integration has no effect on states’ welfare
spending.

The previous discussions presented an integrated theoretical explanation of
globalization’s effects on social policy that is informed by efficiency and
compensation perspectives. Drawing on Marxist theory, it was shown that the natural
tendency of economic globalization, as it operates through transnational corporations,
is to exert a downward pressure on social spending. However, given the preferences
and interests of domestic institutions and political actors, globalization’s proclivity to
retrench the welfare state is resisted and averted as it operates through the forces of
domestic politics. The study’s integrated theory treats the efficiency and compensation
perspectives as mutually inclusive processes that determine welfare expenditures
under conditions of economic globalization. The subsequent chapter discusses the
study’s design and data estimation procedures used to empirically test the hypotheses
that emerge from the study’s theory.
Copyright © Hanbeom Jeong 2010
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Chapter 3
Research Design and Methodology

The Empirical Determinants of Welfare Spending 1
3.1. Measuring the Dependent Variable
The existing literature has defined and measured governments’ welfare
expenditures in terms of countries’ social spending as a percentage of GDP, countries’
per-capita social spending, or total government spending as a percentage of GDP
(Hicks and Swank, 1992, Rudra, 2002). Much of the research on the relationship
between economic globalization and government welfare spending has used total
central government spending or total government revenues as the dependent variable
(Cameron, 1978, Garrett, 2001, Iversen and Cusack, 2000a, Quinn, 1997, Rodrik,
1998). However, measuring the dependent variable in these ways could produce
measurement error. This is because central government spending or total government
revenues contain numerous items that are not related to welfare spending but include
spending for national security, various government subsidies and government
employment spending. Total central government spending or revenues can increase
without expanding welfare spending. Some governments, in response to
globalization’s negative externalities, may choose to provide subsidies to domestic
corporations (Drunberg, 1998). Others may choose to increase spending on national
security in order to put down public riots and protests against global economic
integration (Looney, 1993). Therefore, operationalizing the dependent variable in
terms of total central government spending or revenues incorrectly conflates welfare
spending with other spending priorities of the state (Rudra, 2002).
1

A full description of the data sources and the operationalization of the variables used in this
study are found in this chapter’s data appendix.
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To correct this type of measurement error, the dependent variable that is used
in this study is measured in terms of governments’ social spending as a percentage of
total government spending (Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo, 2001, Nooruddin and
Simmons, 2009, Rudra, 2002, Rudra, 2008). The dependent variable is calculated
from data adopted from the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD) of National
Account Official Country Data. 2 Government welfare spending is calculated via the
formulae:

Social Protection Expenditure +Education Expenditure + Health Expenditure
Total Government Expenditure 3

Social protection expenditure includes social security and welfare affairs
services. Social security is composed of income transfers and in-cash benefits for the
elderly, death survivors, sickness and maternity, work injury, unemployment and
family allowances. Welfare affairs and services are defined as assistance delivered to
clients or groups of clients with special needs, such as the young, the old, and the
disabled (Rudra, 2002). This measurement of the dependent variable eliminates other
types of non-governmental welfare spending that is so often conflated into aggregate
measures of government expenditures. Moreover, this measurement reflects where
governments place their allocative priorities within the national economy (Kaufman
and Segura-Ubiergo, 2001). 4
2

This UNSD data is available from 1970 for most countries in the world.
Government welfare spending (Social Protection Expenditure + Education Expenditure +
Health Expenditure) is also calculated as a percentage of countries’ GDP and used as an
alternative measure to check the robustness of the study’s results.
4
The adoption of GDP measure follows the research tradition in this literature. However, it
should be acknowledged that this measure is not without limitations. For one thing the growth
in a country’s GDP may result in more resources being available for welfare expenditures
even if the rate of extraction for social benefits does not change. It is not clear from the
3
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3.2. Measuring the Primary Explanatory Variables
For the empirical test of the study’s theory, which integrates efficiency and
compensation approaches to social policy, the central explanatory variables are
operationalized as follows. The first, which captures Marxist theory of globalization’s
‘race to the bottom’ effect on social spending, is an interaction between the structure
of corporate capital within countries’ political and economic systems and the extent to
which they are integrated into global economy. The second, which captures the
tendency of domestic political forces to resist globalization’s downward pressures on
social spending, is an interaction between countries’ domestic politics (which includes
disaggregate measures of political institutions and political affiliations) and their level
of integration into the global economy. In addition, principal component analysis is
used to generate an aggregate index - Domestic Political Institutions - that is
comprised of indicators that measure regime type, the level of electoral competition
and political participation. Domestic Political Institutions also interacts with the level
of countries’ integration into the global economy. Further details regarding the
construction of this index appear in the appendix.
As a constituent element of the interactive term - economic globalization is an
index that measures actual financial flows into countries and government reactions to
such flows (Dreher, 2006). Actual financial flows include trade as a percentage of
GDP, foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP, portfolio investment as of
percentage of GDP, and income payments to foreign nationals as a percentage of GDP.
Government restrictions of these flows are composed of hidden import barriers, the
mean tariff rate, taxes on international trade as a percentage of current revenue, and

existing theories if globalization is expected to alter the amount of resources available for
welfare or the portion of a nation’s productivity that goes towards such policies.
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capital account restrictions. Larger numbers in the index indicate higher levels of
integration into the global economy (Dreher, 2006, Dreher et al., 2008).

The Empirical Determinant of the Race to the Bottom
3.3. Marxist Measures of Corporate Power
In Marxist theory, human society is composed of two parts: the substructure and
the superstructure. In capitalist societies the substructure corresponds to the structure
of corporate capitalism that gives rise to society’s superstructure, which is the
political structure of the state with its corresponding laws that define and regulate the
economics of the market. While the structure of corporate capital (the substructure)
exerts a predominant influence over the state and the nature of the market (the
superstructure), the ideas and policies that are produced by the superstructure also
influence the substructure and are reinforced in its operations (Marx and Stone, 1904).
Since Marxist theory suggests that the structure of corporate capital
determines the political superstructure of the state as well as the economic
superstructure of markets (Miliband, 1982, Miliband, 1983, Miliband, 1969), the
power of corporate capital is calculated in terms of:

The Openness of Political Institutions x The Level of Economic Freedom
The Market Capitalization of Domestic Corporation as a % of GDP

The relative openness of political institutions and the level of economic
freedom, which define the regulatory mechanism of the market, capture the political
and economic superstructure. Measures of the openness of countries’ political
institutions and economic freedom are taken, respectively, from the Polity IV index
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and the Economic Freedom of the World index (EFW). The Polity IV index measures
the political characteristics of governments, capturing the nature of a country’s
political superstructure. 5 The EFW index measures the degree of economic freedom
that is present in five major areas of a country’s economic superstructure: the size of
government; legal structures and the security of property rights; access to sound
money; freedom to trade internationally; and the regulation of credit markets, labor,
and business. 6 The denominator represents the substructure of corporate capital. It is
captured by the capitalization or the market value (as a percentage of GDP) of
domestically incorporated corporations listed on countries’ stock exchanges.
The more open countries’ political institutions are and the greater the level of
economic freedom, the more likely it is that the interest and influence of the corporate
substructure will be firmly reflected in the political superstructure of the state as well
as in the economic superstructure of the market (Lindblom, 1977, Mills, 1956).
Countries with open political institutions, as discussed in the previous chapter, and by
extension those with greater economic freedoms are more likely to increase welfare
spending. However, when a larger share of a country’s GDP comes under the control
of corporate capital, open political institutions and economic freedom will affect
welfare spending only through its substructure, which is the level of corporate
capitalization of the domestic economy. 7

5

Details regarding the construction of the Polity IV index are provided in the next section that
discusses the measurement of Regime Type.
6
Gwartney, James and Robert Lawson with Herbert Grubel, Jakob de Haan, Jan-Egbert Stur
m, and Eelco Zandberg (2009). Economic Freedom of the World: 2009 Annual Report. Vanc
ouver, BC: The Fraser Institute. Data retrieved from www.freetheworld.com
7
Diagnostic test were performed to test whether the underlying theoretical assumptions that
guided the calculation of this variable are correct. The test results are reported in Table 3.2 in
the data appendix. Consistent with Marxist theory, the openness of political institutions
(POLITY) and economic freedom – the superstructure - has no independent effect on welfare
spending but only indirectly through the substructure – the corporate capitalization of the
domestic economy.
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Measuring Political Institutions
3.4. Political Regime Type
The data for countries’ political regime type is adopted from the Polity IV
data set, which measures the institutional authority characteristics of governments.
The measure includes the recruitment of the executive, the constraints on executive
authority, and political competition. The Polity IV data is an index that ranges from 10 (autocratic regimes) to 10 (democratic regimes). The indicator is categorized as
follows: consolidated autocracies range from -10 to -6, anocracies, which are regimes
with weakly constituted political authority range from -5 to +5, and consolidated
democracies that range from +6 to +10 (Marshall and Jaggers, 2000).

3.5. Electoral Competition
The variable that measures the level of countries’ electoral competition is
adopted from Vanhanen’s democratization database. Electoral competition is
measured by the portion of votes received by smaller parties in presidential or
parliamentary elections, or both. The variable is calculated by subtracting the
percentage of votes received by the largest party from 100. If the largest party’s
portion is 45%, the electoral competition value is 55 (= 100-45). Calculating the
distribution of seats in parliament is used to generate the variable when vote
percentages are not available. And in cases where the composition of the government
is not based on popular elections, then electoral competition is zero (Vanhanen, 1990).

3.6. Political Participation
The variable that measures countries political participation is adopted from the
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. The level of political
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participation is measured by the percentage of the voting age population who actually
voted in Parliamentary and Presidential Elections. Theoretically, the value can range
from 0 (no participation) to 100 (full participation). 8

Measuring Political Affiliations
3.7. The Strength of Labor Unions
Some studies measure the strength of organized labor in terms of the level of
unionization. However, unionization is not comparable across countries. In some
developing countries, like China, unionization rates are high because labor laws make
union membership compulsory. And yet, unions in these countries have little power to
represent the interest of their members (Chan and Senser, 1997). In this sense,
unionization rates in developing countries “exaggerate labor’s independent political
strength” (Rudra, 2002, 425), which weakens its ability to adequately capture the
strength of unions in the developing world (Banuri and Amadeo, 1991, McGuire,
1997, Valenzuela, 1989, 449). Rudra (2002) resolves this problem by creating the
Potential Labor Power (PLP) indicator that measures unions’ strength as the ratio of
skilled labor to unskilled labor divided by the level of surplus workers as a percentage
of the work force. This study adopts the PLP to measure the strength of labor unions
for all the countries in the data set. 9

8

The database can be accessed at http://www.idea.int/vt/index.cfm
PLP decreases as surplus labor expands and the number of low-skilled workers increases
relative to skilled workers. To the extent that the surplus labor pool shrinks and labor markets
become tighter, PLP increasingly depends on the ratio of skilled to low-skilled workers. This
assessment of PLP is limited to the manufacturing sector, since data are not available for most
countries outside this sector. See Rudra, Nita. (2002) Globalization and the Decline of the
Welfare State in Less-Developed Countries. International Organization 56:411-45.
9
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3.8. The Ideology of Political Parties
In measuring the ideology of political parties, the primary focus is on the
ideology of the ruling party in government. And as such, the operational definition of
party ideology follows Castes and Mair’s (1984) typology as leftist, centrist, or
rightist parties. If the ruling party’s ideology is left, then party ideology is coded 1. If
the ruling party’s ideology is centre, then party ideology is coded 0. And if the ruling
party ideology is right, then party ideology is coded -1 (Castles and Mair, 1984).

3.9. Confounding Variables
A survey of the literature shows that a set of important variables affects states’
welfare spending. These variables are summarized in Table 1. They include a lagged
endogenous variable to control for serial correlation (Baltagi, 2005), 10 logged GDP
per capita, GDP growth rate, the number of dependents in countries, the level of
urbanization, logged inflation, logged population and decade dummy variables that
are used to account for important international conditions; namely the oil crisis of the
1970s and the economic recession and debt crisis of the 1980s, that could affect
welfare spending rather than economic globalization.
Following Wagner’s law GDP per capita, which proxies countries’ economic
development, is expected to have a positive effect on welfare spending (Adsera and
Boix, 2002, Avelinon, et al., 2005, Cameron, 1978, Garrett, 2001, Kaufman and
Segura-Ubiergo, 2001, Rodrik, 1998, Rudra, 2002). German economist Adolph
Wagner (1835-1917) postulated that the development of an industrial economy is
accompanied by an increased share of government expenditure in countries’ GDP

10

Students of welfare policy traditionally include a lagged endogenous variable in their
econometric models to control for serial correlation. In this analysis, I do not break with this
tradition nor challenge the logic for the use of the lagged endogenous variable.
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(Halicio, 2003, Youseif and Abizadeh, 1992). However, the growth rate of countries’
GDP is expected to have a negative effect on welfare spending as economic
expansion reduces the need for social spending (Avelinon, et al., 2005, Cameron,
1978, Garrett, 2001, Rudra, 2002).
The dependency ratio (sum of young and old in the total population) is
expected to have a positive effect on welfare spending. However, since this variable is
featured in only one study and was reported not to have a statistically significant
effect on welfare spending (Garrett, 2001), it is used in this study to test the
robustness of the empirical results.
Urbanization captures the concentration of the working class and poor and is
expected to have a positive effect on welfare spending. In countries with urban
industrial cities the high concentration of poor and the working class people increases
demand for welfare spending (Avelinon, et al., 2005, Garrett, 2001, Rodrik, 1998,
Rudra, 2002). The level of inflation is expected to have a negative effect on welfare
spending. As inflation increases governments are pressured to cut public spending,
especially social welfare. However, the reported direction of the coefficient is not
consistent in existing research. Some researchers report that inflation has a negative
effect on welfare spending (Avelinon, et al., 2005), while others report a positive
effect (Hicks and Swank, 1992). This study also control for population size although a
survey of the literature has shown that the variable is used in only one study and its
reported effect on welfare spending is zero (Garrett, 2001).
Following Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001), two-decade dummy variables
are incorporated into the analysis to control for international systemic forces that may
impact states’ welfare expenditures that are independent from economic globalization.
One variable captures the oil crisis years from 1970 to 1981. By the late 1960s world
36

petroleum production peaked and subsequent production entered into a severe decline.
And as the world’s demand for petroleum remained high, the steep shortfall in
production led to sharp increases in oil prices, which led to extreme price inflation. In
1973, petroleum prices experienced further increases as a result of OPEC’s oil
embargo against the West. And in 1979, oil prices again increased as a result of the
Iranian revolution that severely damaged Iran’s oil fields, which further reduced oil
supplies (Spero, 1981, Chapter 8). The oil crisis of the 1970s, which produced high
levels of inflation, exploded government’s energy expenditures and deteriorated
countries’ balance of payments, is expected to have a negative effect on welfare
spending (Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo, 2001).
The other decade variable captures the global recession and debt crisis years
from 1982 to 1990, which is often referred to as Latin America’s lost decade. As a
consequence of the oil price shocks and inflation of the 1970s, the world economy, by
the early 1980s, went into recession whereby the GDP growth rates of the developed
and developing world plummeted. For most developing countries the recession
created a breaking point as many experienced a liquidity crisis. Petroleum exporting
countries flush with petrodollars invested their money in international banks, which
'recycled' a major portion of the capital as loans to developing countries, especially to
governments in Latin America. As interest rates increased in the U.S. and in Europe in
1979, debt payments also increased making it harder for borrowing countries to pay
back their debts, which ultimately precipitated the debt crisis of the 1980s (Lomax,
1988, Nunnenkamp, 1986). The global recession and the Third World’s debt crisis of
the 1980s are also expected to have a negative effect on welfare spending.
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3.10. The Data Estimation Procedures
To empirically test the hypotheses of this study, seven regression models are
employed. Model one features the interactive effect of economic globalization and
corporate capital on governments’ social spending. Model two features the interactive
effect of economic globalization and the index of political institutions on
governments’ social spending. Models three through five feature the interactive
effects of economic globalization and regime type, electoral competition and voter
participation on governments’ social spending. The interactive effects of economic
globalization and labor unions and the ideology of the ruling political party on
governments’ social spending are featured in models six through seven. The pooled
time-series cross-sectional regressions are expressed as:
Model 1: Economic Globalization and Corporate Capital
W = α +β1W_1 + β2G + β3CC + β4G*CC + β5CV + …. +ε
Model 2: Economic Globalization and Political Institutions
W = α +β1W_1 + β2G + β3PI + β4G*PI + β5CV + …. +ε
Model 3: Economic Globalization and Political Regime
W = α +β1W_1 + β2G + β3R + β4G*R + β5CV + …. +ε
Model 4: Economic Globalization and Electoral Competition
W = α + β1W_1 + β2G + β3E + β4G*E + β5CV + .... +ε
Model 5: Economic Globalization and Voter Participation
W = α +β1W_1 + β2G + β3V +β4G*V + β5CV + …. +ε
Model 6: Economic Globalization and Labor Unions
W = α +β1W_1 + β2G + β3L+ β4G*L + β5CV + …. +ε
Model 7: Economic Globalization and Political Parties
W = α +β1W_1 + β2G + β3P + β4G*P + β5CV + …. +ε
38

Where W, represents governments’ social spending; W_1, represents a one year lag of
governments’ social spending; G, represents economic globalization; CC, represents
Corporate Capital; G*CC, represents the interactive term for economic globalization
and corporate capital; PI, represents the index of Political Institutions; G*PI,
represents the interactive term for economic globalization and the index of Political
Institutions; R, represents political regime type; G*R, represents the interactive term
for economic globalization and political regime type; E, represents the level of
electoral competition; G*E, represents the interactive term for economic globalization
and the level of electoral competition; V represents the level of voter participation;
G*V, represents the interactive term for economic globalization and the level of voter
participation; P, represents the ideology of the ruling political party; G*P, represents
the interactive term for economic globalization and the ideology of the ruling political
party; L, represents the strength of labor unions; G*L, represents the interactive term
for economic globalization and labor unions’ strength; and CV, represents the control
variables that are included in the study.

3.11. Case Study Selection Method
A comparative case study design is also utilized to further test the study’s
integrated theory. There are two advantages of case study research designs over large
N-statistical analyses. First, case study designs allow for detailed examination of the
causal mechanisms through which government social policy is generated by the
interactions between economic globalization and the various domestic political and
economic variables. Although statistical analyses allow for greater theoretical
generalization, they are limited in their ability to describe the ways in which variables
of theoretical interest interact under specific political conditions. The case study
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component of this research will uncover the specific causal processes through which
the interaction of domestic political factors with economic globalization produces
social welfare policies. Second, case studies allow us to see how the causal
relationships between the independent and dependent variables change over time.
Although large N-statistical analyses allow us to generate theoretical generalizations
about these relationships, they may not explain social welfare outcomes in specific
countries.
The methodology that informs the selection of cases in this research is based on
the most similar systems design. Cases are selected that have similar values for the
confounding variables, while having different values for the central explanatory
variables (King et al., 1994). Following this method, case studies of South Korea,
Chile and Spain are used to test the hypotheses that welfare spending is conditional on
the ways in which countries’ domestic politics and institutions interact with global
economic integration. All three countries transitioned from authoritarian regimes and
therefore share a similar political history. All three countries are similar in terms of
their per-capita wealth. Both Spain and South Korea are high-income OECD member
countries and Chile is classified as an upper-middle income country. 11 The agedependency ratios in all three countries are also similar. In 2005, the age-dependence
ratios in South Korea, Spain and Chile were respectively 40, 45, and 49 dependents
for every 100 working age persons. 12 In addition, all three countries are non-oil
producers and were similarly affected by the oil price shocks of the 1970s.
However, in these countries there are significant variations in the key explanatory
11

The country classifications are based on the World Bank’s Data. The data base can be
accessed at http://web.worldbank.org
12
This data can be accessed at
http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/peo_age_dep_rat_dep_to_wor_pop-dependency-ratiodependents-working-population
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indicators. In all three countries there has been significant variation in the nature of
their external trade policies and regime type. As Table 3.3 shows, these variations can
be sorted into four categories: statist protectionism under military authoritarianism
(South Korea under Park Chung-hee and Spain under Franco); statist protectionism
under democracy (Chile under the socialist government of Salvador Allende);
economic liberalism under military authoritarianism (Chile under the Pinochet
regime); and economic liberalism under democracy (South Korea under Kim Daejung, Chile under the Concertación coalition government and Spain under the socialist
government of Manuel Chaves González). In addition, case studies of these countries
allow for greater cross-regional variation, which also provides a strong robust test of
the study’s hypotheses. A full discussion of these cases is provided in chapters seven,
eight and nine.
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3.12. Tables
Table 3.1: Control Variables of Welfare Spending
Variable
Lagged Endogenous Variable
Rudra 2002
Avelino Brown, and Hunter 2005
Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo
2001
Logged Per Capita GDP
Rudra 2002
Cameron 1978
Avelino Brown, and Hunter 2005
Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo
2001
Adsera and Boix 2002
Rodrik 1998
Garrett 2001
GDP Growth Rate
Avelino Brown, and Hunter 2005
Cameron 1978
Garrett and Mitchell 2001
Rudra 200
Dependents
Garrett and Mitchell 2001
Garrett 2001
Urbanization
Rudra 2002
Avelino, Brown, and Hunter 2005
Rodrik 1998
Garrett 2001
Logged Inflation
Hicks and Swank 1992
Avelino, Brown, and Hunter 2005
Population
Garrett 2001
Dummy Decade 1970-1981
(Oil crisis Years)
Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo
2001
Dummy Decade 1982-1990
(Economic
Recession-Debt
Crisis Years)
Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo
2001

Hypothesized
Theoretical Direction
positive

Reported
Direction
positive
positive
positive

positive
positive
zero
zero
zero
positive
zero
zero
negative
negative
negative
negative
zero
positive
positive
zero
positive
zero
positive
negative
zero
negative
positive
negative
Not Determined
zero
negative
negative
negative
negative
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Table 3.2: Corporate Market Capitalization and Welfare Spending
Lagged Welfare Spending

0.937*
(0.026)

POLITY

0.003
(0.005)

Index of Economic Freedom

0.002
(0.009)

Market Capitalization % GDP

11334427.769*
(4277302.936)

POLITY*Market Capitalization

0.009
(0.005)

Index of Economic Freedom*
Market Capitalization % GDP

-0.002
(0.006)

POLITY*Index of Economic Freedom

-0.000
(0.001)

Corporate Power

-378279.352**
(156,283.603)

Economic Globalization

-0.000
(0.000)

Urbanization

-0.000
(0.000)

Dependency

0.006
(0.020)

Growth

0.001
(0.001)

Ln GDP per capita

0.012**
(0.006)

Ln population

-0.001
(0.001)

Ln inflation

0.001
(0.002)
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Table 3.2: Corporate Market Capitalization and Welfare Spending (continued)
Growth
0.001
(0.001)
Ln GDP per capita

0.012**
(0.006)

Ln population

-0.001
(0.001)

Ln inflation

0.001
(0.002)

Oil shock (70’s)

0.000
(0.000)

Debt crisis (80’s)

-0.004
(0.004)

Constant

-0.087
(0.061)

Observations

296

R-squared

0.96

___________________________________________________________________

Panel correct standard errors in parentheses ** significant at 1%; *significant at 5%
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Table 3.3: Case Study Selection

Military
Authoritarian
Regimes

Economic
Liberalization

Statist
Protectionism

Park Chung-hee (Korea)
1961-1979

Pinochet (Chile)
1973-1990

Chun Doo-hwan
1980-1988
Franco (Spain)
1939-1975
Allende (Chile)
1971-1973

Kim Dae-jung (Korea)
1988-2003

Democratic
Regimes

Concertación (Chile)
1990-present
Manuel Chaves González
(Spain)
1982-1996

Copyright © Hanbeom Jeong 2010
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Chapter 4
The Race to the Bottom: Globalization, Transnational Capital and Social
Policy

4.1. Corporate Capital and Social Spending
Marxist theories of the welfare state argue that capitalism in its
national form depends on a robust welfare state to socialize the cost of capital
accumulation and manage class conflict between the owners of capital and the owners
of labor. However, as capital became increasingly internationalized and was no longer
limited to the national labor market, it no longer required the welfare state’s
intervention to facilitate political compromise with the working class. Under
conditions of global economic integration, transnational corporations can now secure
greater tax concessions from states that increasingly compete for corporate
investments in a never-ending race to the bottom, where state revenues dwindle and
the priorities of the welfare state are abandoned (Manley, 2008, Miliband, 1969,
Teeple, 1995). To the extent that Marxist theory provides the causal mechanism
through which economic globalization exerts a downward pressure on social spending,
it is a variant of efficiency theory and as such generated hypothesis HE1, which stated:
Increasing levels of global economic integration are associated with a decrease in
welfare spending when the structure of corporate capital is transnational.
Table 4 presents estimates of the control variables as well as the economic
globalization variable to assess the stability of the empirical platform on which the
study’s welfare expenditure models are built. Model 4a presents estimates for the
main control variables without the variable for economic globalization. Model 4b
presents estimates for economic globalization along with the controls.
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The direction of the coefficients for most of the control variables is consistent
with the theoretical predictions and the reported findings of previous empirical
research. In both models, prior levels of welfare spending (the lagged dependent
variable) are positively associated with current levels of welfare spending. And
consistent with Wagner’s Law, higher levels of economic development is positively
associated with welfare spending. Economic growth, urbanization, population (model
4a only), inflation and the debt crisis of the 1980s are all negatively associated with
welfare spending. The oil shocks of the 1970s and dependency fails to reach statistical
significance. Economic globalization is positively associated with welfare spending in
model 4b.

[Table 4 about here]

Table 4.1 presents the findings of the effect on welfare spending from the
interaction between corporate capital and economic globalization. Model 4.1a
presents the results with the main explanatory variables - corporate capital and
economic globalization – without the interaction term. Model 4.1b presents the main
results with the interaction term.

[Table 4.1 about here]

In models 4.1a and 4.1b, prior levels of welfare spending (the lagged
dependent variable) are positively associated with current levels of welfare spending.
While higher levels of economic development are positively associated with welfare
spending, all other control variables fail to reach statistical significance. In model 4.1a,
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corporate capital (the constitutive element of the interaction term) is positively
associated with welfare spending. However, since the coefficient on the interaction
term – Corporate Capital*Globalization - is negative, this positive effect diminishes as
corporate capital integrates into the global economy as predicted by Marxist theory. In
figure 4.1, the sloping line indicates the marginal effect of corporate capital on
welfare spending for meaningful changes in countries’ integration into the global
economy. The 95% confidence intervals around the line show the conditions under
which corporate capital has a statistically significant effect on welfare spending – and
it has a statistically significant effect whenever the upper and lower bounds of the
confidence interval are both above (or below) the zero line. It can be observed from
figure 4.1 that corporate capital’s influence on countries’ political economy has a
significant positive effect on welfare spending when its integration into the global
economy is low. However, this positive effect diminishes as its integration into the
global economy increases. Once global economic integration exceeds a score of 50 on
the KOF index, then corporate capital’s influence on countries’ political economy no
longer has a significant positive effect on welfare spending.

[Figure 4.1 about here]

4.2. Robustness Checks: Alternate Measures of Globalization and Social Spending
Alternative measures of social spending and economic globalization, as
featured in the research of other scholars, are used to provide additional empirical test
for hypothesis HE1. These scholars measure welfare spending as a percentage of
countries’ GDP and use trade openness and openness to foreign direct investment
(FDI) as proxies for economic globalization (Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo, 2001,
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Rudra, 2002, Segura-Ubiergo, 2007). Table 4.2 presents the findings of the effect on
welfare spending from the interaction between corporate capital and openness to trade
and FDI. Model 4.2a presents the results with the main explanatory variables – trade,
FDI and corporate capital – without the interaction terms. Model 4.2b presents the
main results with the interaction terms.

[Table 4.2 about here]

Models 4.2a and 4.2b show that prior levels of welfare spending (the lagged
dependent variable) are again positively associated with current levels of welfare
spending. Urbanization, economic growth, economic development (only in model
4.2a) and the debt crisis of the 1980s are all positively related to welfare spending.
Population and inflation are negatively associated with welfare spending. In Model
4.2a, while corporate capital fails to reach statistical significance, trade openness is
negatively associated with welfare spending. In Model 4.2b, FDI (the constitutive
element of the interaction term) is positively associated with welfare spending.
However, since the coefficient on the interaction term – FDI*Corporate Capital - is
negative, this positive effect diminishes, a finding that is again consistent with
Marxist theory.
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 examine these issues from an alternate vantage point. In
Figure 4.2, the sloping line indicates the marginal effect of FDI on welfare spending
for meaningful changes in corporate capital. And 95% confidence intervals around the
line show the conditions under which FDI has a statistically significant effect on
welfare spending. It can be observed that once corporate capital’s influence within
countries’ political economy is greater than 13%, then openness to FDI no longer has
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a significant positive effect on welfare spending.

[Figure 4.2 about here]

In Model 4.2b, openness to trade (the constitutive element of the interaction
term) is negatively associated with welfare spending. However, since the coefficient
on the interaction term – Trade*Corporate Capital - is positive, this reductive effect
diminishes, a finding that is not consistent with Marxist theory. In figures 4.3, the
sloping line indicates the marginal effect of trade openness on welfare spending for
meaningful changes in corporate capital. And 95% confidence intervals around the
line show the conditions under which trade openness has a statistically significant
effect on welfare spending. It can be observed that trade openness has a significant
reductive effect on welfare spending at low levels of corporate capital. However, once
corporate capital’s influence within countries’ political economy is greater than 15%,
then openness to international trade no longer has a significant reductive effect on
welfare spending.

[Figure 4.3 about here]

4.3. Summation
The findings presented in this chapter suggest that economic globalization, as
measured by the comprehensive KOF index, will produce a “race to the bottom effect’
on welfare expenditures as it interacts with corporate capital. When the structure of
corporate capital is national, economic globalization has a positive effect on welfare
spending. However, when corporate capital is integrated into the global economy,
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economic globalization has a negative effect on welfare spending, as predicted by
Marxist theory. This finding received additional confirmation when FDI was used as a
proxy for economic globalization. When corporate capital is integrated into the global
economy, openness to FDI has a negative effect on welfare spending, which is also
consistent with the Marxist variant of efficiency theory.
However, when corporate capital is integrated into the global trading system,
openness to trade has a positive effect on welfare spending, a finding that is
inconsistent with the Marxist variant of the ‘race to the bottom’ theory. The fact that
trade flows produce the opposite effect suggests that there are other forces at play in
determining social policy and that global economic integration does not have to run
rough shod over the welfare state. It is possible that policy makers could offset
economic globalization’s ‘race to the boom’ effect by carefully choosing how their
countries are integrated into the global economy as well as carefully negotiating the
terms of their countries integration. Negotiating the terms of economic integration
will invariably introduce domestic political forces into global processes that are
driven by market forces. The empirical findings that are presented in the next chapter
suggest that domestic political institutions and political actors play an important role
in averting globalization’s proclivity to retrench the welfare state.
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4.4. Tables and Figures

Table 4: Economic Globalization and Welfare Spending
_______________________________________________________________________
Base Model 4a
Base Model 4b
Without
with
Economic Globalization Economic Globalization
_______________________________________________________________________
Lagged Welfare Spending

0.002*
(0.001)

Economic Globalization

0.002*
(0.001)
0.002**
(0.000)

Urbanization

-0.001*
(0.000)

-0.001*
(0.000)

Dependency

0.078
(0.051)

0.095
(0.055)

Growth

-0.004**
(0.002)

-0.005**
(0.002)

Ln GDP per capita

0.095**
(0.010)

0.071**
(0.013)

Ln population

-0.007**
(0.002)

-0.001
(0.003)

Ln inflation

-0.016**
(0.004)

-0.009*
(0.004)

Oil shock (70’s)

0.000
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)

Debt crisis (80’s)

-0.020**
-0.006*
(0.003)
(0.004)
______________________________________________________________________________
Constant
-0316**
-0.294*
(0.108)
(0.120)
Observations
451
451
R-Squared
0.42
0.46
______________________________________________________________________________
Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses. ** significant at 1%; *significant at 5%
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Table 4.1: Economic Globalization, Corporate Capital and Welfare Spending
_______________________________________________________________________
Model 4.1a
Model 4.1b
Without
With
Interaction
Interaction
_______________________________________________________________________
Lagged Welfare Spending

0.953**
(0.023)

0.958**
(0.023)

Economic Globalization

-0.000
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)

Corporate Capital

0.001
(0.000)

0.002*
(0.021)

Globalization * Corporate Capital

-0.00004*
(0.000)

Urbanization

-0.000
(0.000)

-0.000
(0.000)

Dependency

-0.007
(0.020)

0.003
(0.019)

Growth

0.001
(0.001)

0.000
(0.001)

Ln GDP per capita

0.009*
(0.004)

0.009*
(0.004)

Ln population

0.001
(0.001)

0.000
(0.001)

Ln inflation

-0.001
(0.002)

-0.000
(0.002)

Oil shock (70’s)

0.000
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)

Debt crisis (80’s)

0.000
0.001
(0.004)
(0.004)
______________________________________________________________________________
Constant
-0.069
-0.066
(0.036)
(0.035)
Observations
296
296
R-Squared
0.96
0.96
______________________________________________________________________________
Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses. ** significant at 1%; *significant at 5%

54

Marginal Effect of Corporate Capital on Welfare Spending
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Fig.4.1. Corporate Capital, Economic Globalization and Welfare Spending
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Table 4.2: Trade, FDI, Corporate Capital and Welfare Spending
______________________________________________________________________________________
Model 4.2a
Model 4.2b
Without
with
Interaction
Interaction
______________________________________________________________________________________
Lagged Welfare Spending
0.435**
0.468**
(0.109)
(0.098)
Trade

-0.0002**
(0.000)

-0.0004**
(0.000)

FDI

-0.001
(0.001)

0.003**
(0.001)

Corporate Capital

0.000
(0.000)

-0.002**
(0.000)

Corporate Capital *Trade

0.00008**
(0.000)

Corporate Capital *FDI

-0.002**
(0.000)

Urbanization

0.0003**
(0.000)

0.0003**
(0.000)

Dependency

0.024
(0.016)

0.030*
(0.015)

Growth

0.001**
(0.000)

0.001*
(0.000)

Ln GDP per capita

0.008**
(0.004)

0.005
(0.004)

Ln population

-0.005**
(0.001)

-0.005**
(0.001)

Ln inflation

-0.003**
(0.002)

0.003**
(0.001)

Oil shock (70’s)

0.000
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)

Debt crisis (80’s)

0.006**
0.006**
(0.003)
(0.003)
______________________________________________________________________________
Constant
-0.001
0.021
(0.035)
(0.040)
Observations
338
338
R-Squared
0.60
0.63
______________________________________________________________________________
Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses. ** significant at 1%; *significant at 5%
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Marfinal Effect of Foreign Direct Invest on Welfare Spending
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Figure 4.2: FDI, Corporate Capital and Welfare Spending
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Marginal Effect of Trade Openness on Welfare Spending

Figure 4.3: Trade, Corporate Capital and Welfare Spending
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Chapter 5
The Political Environment of Welfare Compensation: Globalization,
Institutions and Social Policy
The evidence that was presented in the previous chapter lends support to the
argument that economic globalization exerts a downward pressure on welfare
expenditures through the operations of transnational corporations. While the use of
alternate measures of social spending and globalization, specifically openness to FDI,
confirms the predictions of efficiency theory, openness to trade does not. And it was
suggested that endogenous political forces might also be at work negotiating the terms of
countries’ integration into the global economy and in the process avert globalization’s
proclivity to retrench the welfare state. This chapter presents the findings that lend
empirical support to this argument.

5.1. The Social Generosity of Democratic Governments
It was argued in chapter 2 that the authority characteristics of political regimes
simultaneously affect the pace at which national economies are integrated into the global
economy and the scale of social spending. Since policy makers in democracies are
subject to pressures from elections and interest groups, they are more likely to allocate a
larger portion of their budgets for social welfare spending than those in authoritarian
regimes. And to the extent that economic globalization’s effect on welfare spending is
conditional on the authority characteristics of political regimes, the argument generated
hypothesis 2, which stated: Increasing levels of global economic integration are
associated with an increase in welfare spending when political regimes are democratic.
Table 5.1 presents the findings of the interactive effect of economic globalization
and political regime type on welfare spending. Model 5.1a presents the results with the
main explanatory variables – economic globalization and political regime type – without
the interaction term. And Model 5.1b presents the main results with the interaction term.

[Table 5.1 about here]
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The direction of the coefficients for most of the control variables in models 5.1a
and 5.1b are also consistent with the theoretical predictions and the reported findings of
previous empirical research. Prior levels of welfare spending (the lagged dependent
variable) are positively associated with current levels of welfare spending in both models.
Urbanization is negatively associated with welfare spending in both models. Increasing
levels in the ratio of countries’ young and old dependents are positively associated with
welfare spending in both models. Economic growth is negatively associated with welfare
spending in both models. And consistent with Wagner’s Law, higher levels of economic
development is positively associated with welfare spending in both models. Inflation is
negatively associated with welfare spending in both models. While the oil shocks of the
1970s fail to reach statistical significance, the debt crisis of the 1980s is negatively
associated with welfare spending in model 5.1a but fails to reach statistical significance
in model 5.1b. And while population size fails to reach statistical significance in model
5.1a, it is negatively associated with welfare spending in model 5.1b. Economic
globalization and political regime type are both positively associated with welfare
spending in model 5.1a.
Model 5.1b shows that the interactive effect of economic globalization and
political regime type is positively associated with welfare spending. The sloping line in
figure 5.1 indicates the marginal effect of economic globalization on welfare spending for
meaningful changes in the authority characteristics of political regimes. And 95%
confidence intervals around the line show the conditions under which economic
globalization has a statistically significant effect on welfare spending. It can be observed
from figure 5.1 that economic globalization has a reductive effect on welfare spending
when political regimes are autocratic. However, this reductive effect declines as the
authority characteristics of regimes become more democratic. When the polity score of
political regimes is greater than -3, then economic globalization no longer has a reductive
effect on welfare spending. Hypothesis 2 is supported by the data.

[Figure 5.1 about here]
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While this finding shows that the marginal effect of economic globalization on
welfare spending is greater among democracies relative to autocracies and is therefore
lends support to hypothesis 2, additional observations are in order. It is interesting to note
that autocracies whose economies are integrated into the global economy also provide
welfare benefits to their citizens, although at much lower levels than democracies. Table
5.1a, shows the average welfare spending and the average level of economic
globalization from 1971 to 2004 for several regimes with autocratic polities. These
regimes have high levels of welfare spending and they are also all highly integrated into
the global economy. One common characteristic among most of these regimes is that they
are all one party leftist or former Soviet Republic regimes that have traditionally provided
generous welfare benefits to their citizens. Algeria’s National Liberation Front (FNL), the
revolutionary organization that directed its war of independence against France that
ended in 1962 (Fanon, 1965), ruled the country for four decades and during these years
developed Algeria’s welfare state. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are all former
Soviet Republic states with a Marxist tradition for expansive welfare subsidies, which
have been eroded in recent years.

[Table 5.1A about here]

Throughout the 1970s, Bolivia was ruled by a military regime headed by left
leaning generals Alfredo Ovando and his successor Juan José Torres. During this period
the Bolivian military regime promoted welfare reforms that were aimed at changing the
deplorable living conditions for the vast majority of Bolivians. The regime also
nationalized the Bolivian operations of the U.S.-based Gulf Oil Corporation (Klein,
2003). Throughout the early 1970s to the late 1980s, Panama was also ruled by populist
military regimes. While the regime led by General Omar Torrijoss was corrupt, the
regime expanded welfare programs and its nationalist foreign policy appealed to the rural
and urban constituencies that were traditionally ignored by the economic elite. After
Torrijoss’s death in 1981 the populist direction of military government was continued
under general Manuel Noriega (Robert C. Harding II, 2001).
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While the above regimes were autocratic and presided over economies that were
heavily integrated into the global economy, what motivated their extensive welfare
allocations was not the pressure from democratic elections but a socialist or populist
ideological ethos, which defined and shaped the priorities of public policy.

5.2. Tight Elections and Welfare Expansion
With the attempt to increase countries’ integration into the global economy the
clientelistic nature of competitive electoral politics is expected to increase as political
parties will increasingly seek to provide welfare benefits to constituent voting districts
adversely affected by economic globalization. In chapter 2, this argument generated
hypothesis 3, which stated: Increasing levels of global economic integration are
associated with an increase in welfare spending when the level of electoral competition is
high. Table 5.2 presents the findings of the interactive effect of economic globalization
and electoral competition on welfare spending. Model 5.1a presents the results with the
main explanatory variables - economic globalization and electoral competition – without
the interaction term. And model 5.2b presents the main results with the interaction term.

[Table 5.2 about here]

Similar to Table 5.1, the direction of the coefficients for most of the control
variables in models 5.2a and 5.2b are consistent with the theoretical predictions and the
reported findings of previous empirical research. Prior levels of welfare spending (the
lagged dependent variable) are positively associated with current levels of welfare
spending in both models. Urbanization failed to rise to the level of statistical significance
in both models. Economic growth, population size, the ratio of countries’ young and old
dependents, and inflation are all negatively associated with welfare spending. Higher
levels of economic development are positively associated with welfare spending in both
models. While the oil shocks of the 1970s fail to reach statistical significance, the debt
crisis of the 1980s is negatively associated with welfare spending. And while economic
globalization fails to reach statistical significance in model 5.2a, electoral competition is
positively associated with welfare spending.
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Model 5.2b shows the interactive effect of economic globalization and electoral
competition. Economic globalization (the constitutive element of the interaction term) is
negatively associated with welfare spending. However, since the coefficient on the
interaction term – Economic Globalization*Electoral Competition - is positive, this
reductive effect diminishes. In figure 5.2, the sloping line indicates the marginal effect of
economic globalization on welfare spending for meaningful changes in the level of
countries’ electoral competition. And 95% confidence intervals around the line show the
conditions under which economic globalization has a statistically significant effect on
welfare spending. As predicted, it can be observed from figure 5.2 that economic
globalization has a significant reductive effect on welfare spending when electoral
competition is low. However, this reductive effect diminishes as electoral competition
increases. Once the percentage of votes gained by smaller parties in parliamentary and or
presidential elections is greater than 29%, then economic globalization no longer has a
significant reductive effect on welfare spending. Hypothesis 3 is supported by the data.

[Figure 5.2 about here]

5.3. Voter Turnout and Social Generosity
It was argued that high voter turnout is reflective of the political entrance of first
time and working class voters who hold political incumbents responsible for the negative
externalities of global economic integration. And since incumbent politicians are largely
motivated by re-election, they are more likely to expand welfare expenditures to appease
the wrath of voters. In chapter 2 this argument led to hypothesis 4, which stated:
Increasing levels of global economic integration are associated with an increase in
welfare spending when the level of political participation is high.
In testing this hypothesis, table 5.3 presents ordinary least square estimates (OLS),
which assume that political participation - the percentage of the voting age population
who actually voted in parliamentary and presidential elections - is exogenous of welfare
spending. However, some scholars argue that political participation and welfare spending
are endogenous and therefore including the variable in equations that predict welfare
spending will generate biased estimates (Segura-Ubiergo, 2007). It is argued that in the
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attempt to prevent conflict and increase social cohesion, governments in some countries
may actually increase welfare spending when political participation is low. In conflict
prone countries like Colombia and Guatemala where voter turnout rarely exceeds 35% to
45%, governments in these countries have a stronger incentive to increase welfare
spending than governments in Uruguay and Costa Rica, where voter turnout is over 80%
of the voting age population (Segura-Ubiergo, 2007, pp. 121-123).
Given this argument, Tables 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 present estimates from a two-stageleast-squares instrumental variable model (IV), which assumes that political participation
and welfare spending are endogenous. The IV estimates utilize variables that instrument
for political participation. These include indicators that measure the number of legislative
chambers in countries as well as indicators that measure whether elections are governed
by proportional representation. Theoretically, these variables are considered important
determinants of voter turnout. It is argued that an increase in the number of legislative
chambers slows legislation, which in turn reduces turnout because citizens are more
likely to perceive their votes to be less decisive (Jackman, 1987). This indicator is a
dichotomous variable that measures the number of legislative chambers in each country.
The variable is coded 1 if countries’ legislative structure is bicameral and 0 otherwise
(Johnson and Wallack, 2006). Moreover, it is argued that elections that are governed by
proportional representation will increase voter turnout since votes are not wasted and
political parties have a greater incentive to mobilize voters even when their electoral base
is weak (Jackman, 1987, Lijphart, 1994). This variable is coded 0 for majoritarian
electoral systems; 1 for mixed-member majority systems; and 2 for closed-list
proportional representative systems (Gerring and Thacker, 2008, Gerring et al., 2005).
Table 5.3 presents OLS estimates of the interactive effect of economic
globalization and voter turnout on welfare spending. Model 5.3a presents the results with
the main explanatory variables - economic globalization and voter turnout – without the
interaction term. And model 5.3b presents the main results with the interaction term.

[Table 5.3 about here]

The direction of the coefficients for most of the control variables in models 5.3a
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and 5.3b are again consistent with the theoretical predictions and findings that are
reported in previous empirical research. Prior levels of welfare spending (the lagged
dependent variable) are positively associated with current levels of welfare spending in
both models. Urbanization and the ratio of countries’ young and old dependents fail to
rise to the level of statistical significance in both models. Economic growth, population
size and inflation are all negatively associated with welfare spending. Higher levels of
economic development are positively associated with welfare spending in both models.
The oil shocks of the 1970s are negatively associated with welfare spending in model
5.3a, but fail to reach statistical significance in model 5.3b. And the debt crisis of the
1980s is negatively associated with welfare spending in both models. Both economic
globalization and voter turnout are positively associated with welfare spending in model
5.3a. While these variables fail to reach statistical significance in model 5.3b, the
coefficient on the main interaction term – Economic Globalization*Voter Turnout - is
positive.
Since the possible endogeneity between political participation and welfare
spending could bias OLS estimates, it is necessary to estimate the data via an IV model,
which corrects for endogeneity. Table 5.3.2 presents IV estimates of the interactive effect
of economic globalization and voter turnout on welfare spending. Model 5.3.2a presents
the IV results with the main explanatory variables - economic globalization and voter
turnout – without the interaction term. And model 5.3.2b presents the main IV results
with the interaction term. However, before discussing these results, it is necessary to
examine the first stage regression results, which evaluate the relevance, the strength and
the validity of the instruments used in the IV models. More importantly, the discussion of
the first stage regression will also provide results from the empirical test for endogeneity
and whether OLS estimates in Table 5.3 are inconsistent.

5.3.1. Voter Turnout: First Stage Regression Results
Table 5.3.1 presents statistics from the first stage equations to assess the quality of
the instrumentation procedure. First, the underidentification test, as reported by the
Kleibergen-Paap statistic, is a test of whether the equations are identified. The test checks
the relevance of the excluded instruments (the exogenous instrumental variables that are
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not included in the second stage regression). The statistic is a measure of the instruments’
relevance (i.e. the correlation with the endogenous variable – voter turnout - that cannot
be explained by other control variables), so a rejection of the null indicates that the
equations are identified and that the instruments are relevant (Maddala, 1992: 383-389).
In models 5.3.1a and 5.3.1b the small p-values of the Kleibergen-Paap statistic strongly
indicates that the equations are identified and that the instruments (bicameralism and
proportional representation) are relevant.

[Table. 5.3.1 about here]

Second, the weak identification test, as reported by the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F
statistic and Stock-Yogo critical values test, measures the strength of the instruments’
correlation with the endogenous variable – voter turnout. Weak identification arises when
the instruments are correlated with the endogenous variable, but only weakly. While
different instrumental variable estimators are more robust to weak instruments, two-stage
least square can perform poorly when instruments are weak (Stock and Yogo, 2002).
Instruments are deemed weak if the first-stage F statistics is less than ten (Staiger and
Stock, 1997). In models 5.3.1a and 5.3.1b the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistics suggests
that the models do not suffer from weak instrumentation. This is also confirmed by the
Stock-Yogo critical values test, which compares the F statistic with the critical values for
the nominal bias and size distortion of TSLS. If the F statistic is larger than the critical
values, then the instruments are strong. In models 5.3.1a and 5.3.1b the critical values test
at 10% nominal bias as well as 10% size distortion is less than the F statistic, confirming
that the models do not suffer from weak instruments (Stock and Yogo, 2002).
Third, the overidentification test, as reported by the Hansen J statistic, assesses
the validity of the instruments. Specifically, the Hansen J statistic tests whether the
instruments are correlated with the equation’s error term. The null hypothesis is that the
instruments are not correlated with the error term (i.e. that they are correctly excluded
from the equations). Rejecting the null hypothesis indicates that the instruments are not
valid (Davidson and MacKinnon, 2004: 336-338). In models 5.3.1a and 5.3.1b the large
p-values of the Hansen J statistic preclude rejecting the null and suggest that the
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instruments are indeed valid.
Fourth, a test for endogeneity in a regression estimated via instrumental variables,
as reported by the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, evaluates whether voter turnout is
endogenous to welfare spending as suggested by recent research. The null hypothesis
states that any endogeneity among the regressors would not have deleterious effects on
OLS estimates. A rejection of the null indicates that the endogenous regressors' effects on
the estimates are meaningful and instrumental variable techniques are required (Davidson
and MacKinnon, 2004: 338-342). In models 5.3.1a and 5.3.1b the small p-values of the
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test reject the null and clearly indicate that endogeneity exists
between voter turnout and welfare spending and that both models are best estimated via
TSLS instrumental variable procedure.

5.3.2. Voter Turnout: Second Stage Regression Results
Table 5.3.2 presents estimates from the second stage regression. The direction of
the coefficients for most of the control variables in models 5.3.2a and 5.3.2b remain
consistent with the reported findings of previous empirical research. Prior levels of
welfare spending (the lagged dependent variable) are positively associated with current
levels of welfare spending in both models. Economic growth is again negatively
associated with welfare spending in both models. Higher levels of economic development
are positively associated with welfare spending in both models. Urbanization and the
ratio of countries’ young and old dependents fail to rise to the level of statistical
significance in model 5.3.2a but is negatively associated with welfare spending in model
5.3.2b. Population fails to rise to the level of statistical significance in model 5.3.2a but is
negatively associated with welfare spending in model 5.3.2b. Inflation is negatively
associated with welfare spending in model 5.3.2a but fails to reach statistical significance
in model 5.3.2b. The oil shocks of the 1970s fail to reach statistical significance in both
models. And the debt crisis of the 1980s is negatively associated with welfare spending in
model 5.3.2a but fails to reach statistical significance in model 5.3.2b. Both economic
globalization and voter turnout are positively associated with welfare spending in model
5.3.2a.
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[Table. 5.3.2 about here]

In model 5.3.2b economic globalization (the constitutive element of the
interaction term) is negatively associated with welfare spending. However, since the
coefficient on the interaction term – Economic Globalization*Voter Turnout - is positive,
this reductive effect diminishes. In figure 5.3, the sloping line indicates the marginal
effect of economic globalization on welfare spending for meaningful changes in the level
of voter turnout. And 95% confidence intervals around the line show the conditions under
which economic globalization has a statistically significant effect on welfare spending. It
can be observed from figure 5.3 that economic globalization has a significant reductive
effect on welfare spending when voter turnout is low. However, this reductive effect
diminishes as voter turnout increases. Once voter turnout is greater than 35% of the
voting age population, then economic globalization no longer has a significant reductive
effect on welfare spending. Even after correcting for endogeneity, the results from the IV
model support hypothesis 4.

[Figure 5.3 about here]

5.4. Democratization and Higher Social Spending
Since countries’ domestic political systems, as noted in Chapter 2, is more than
the sum of their parts, it is also important to consider that globalization’s effect on social
spending is conditional on the nature of political institutions (which is an index that is
comprised of indicators that measure regime type, the level of electoral competition and
political participation). When regimes are democratic and the level of electoral
competition and political participation is high, then democratization defines the nature of
political institutions. The discussion generated hypothesis 5, which stated: Increasing
levels of global economic integration are associated with an increase in welfare spending
when democratization of political institutions is high.
Table 5.4 presents the findings of the aggregate interactive effect of economic
globalization and political institutions on welfare spending. Model 5.4a presents the
results with the main explanatory variables - economic globalization and political
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institution – without the interaction term. And model 5.4b presents the main results with
the interaction term.

[Table 5.4 about here]

In both models the direction of the coefficients for most of the control variables
are consistent with the theoretical predictions and the reported findings of previous
empirical research. Prior levels of welfare spending (the lagged dependent variable) are
positively associated with current levels of welfare spending. Higher levels of economic
development are positively associated with welfare spending. Economic growth, inflation
and urbanization are all negatively associated with welfare spending. While population is
negatively associated with welfare spending in model 5.4a, it is positively associated with
welfare spending in model 5.4b. The ratio of countries’ young and old dependents is
positively associated with welfare spending in both models. The oil shocks of the 1970s
and the debt crisis of the 1980s fail to reach statistical significance in both models.
Economic globalization and political institutions are both positively associated
with welfare spending in model 5.4a. In model 5.4b, the interactive effect of economic
globalization and political institutions is positively associated with welfare spending and
supports hypothesis 5. The solid sloping line in figure 5.4 indicates the marginal effect of
economic globalization on welfare spending for meaningful changes in the
democratization of countries’ political institutions. 95% confidence intervals around the
line allow us to determine the conditions under which economic globalization has a
statistically significant effect on welfare spending. It is easy to see that economic
globalization has a reductive effect on welfare spending when the democratization of
political institutions is low. However, this reductive effect declines as the
democratization of political institutions increases. When the democratization score of
countries’ political institutions is greater than 6, then economic globalization no longer
has a reductive effect on welfare spending.

[Figure 5.4 about here]
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5.5. Robustness Checks: Alternate Measures of Globalization and Social Spending
As in the previous chapter, alternate measures of welfare spending and
economic globalization are used to estimate the effect of economic globalization on
welfare spending when conditional on the authority characteristics of political regimes.
Model 5.5a of Table 5.5 presents results for the interactive effect of the alternate
measures of economic globalization and political regimes on welfare spending. Previous
welfare spending is positively associated with current welfare spending. While all other
control variables fail to rise to the level of statistical significance, urbanization is
positively associated with welfare spending in model 5.5b. And while FDI is positively
associated with welfare spending in model 5.5a, its constitutive element and its
interaction with political regime fail to rise to the level of statistical significance in model
5.5b. Trade openness (the constitutive element of the interaction term) is negatively
associated with welfare spending in model 5.5b. However, since the coefficient on the
interaction term – Trade*Political Regime - is positive, this reductive effect diminishes.
In figure 5.5, the sloping line indicates the marginal effect of trade openness on welfare
spending for meaningful changes in the authority characteristics of political regimes. And
95% confidence intervals around the line allow us to determine the conditions under
which openness to trade has a statistically significant effect on welfare spending. It can
be observed from figure 5.5 that openness to trade has a reductive effect on welfare
spending when political regimes are autocratic. However, this reductive effect declines as
the authority characteristics of regimes become more democratic. When the polity score
of political regimes is greater than 4, then openness to trade no longer has a reductive
effect on welfare spending. Hypothesis 2 is also supported by the alternate measures of
welfare spending and economic globalization.
Model 5.6b of Table 5.6 presents results for the interactive effect of the alternate
measures of economic globalization and the level of countries’ electoral competition on
welfare spending. Previous welfare spending is positively associated with current welfare
spending. All other control variables fail to rise to the level of statistical significance. FDI
and its interaction with electoral competition have no statistical significant effect on
welfare spending. However, trade openness (the constitutive element of the interaction
term) is again negatively associated with welfare spending. However, since the
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coefficient on the interaction term – Trade*Electoral Competition - is positive, this
reductive effect diminishes.
In figure 5.6, the sloping line indicates the marginal effect of trade openness on
welfare spending for meaningful changes in the level of countries’ electoral competition.
And 95% confidence intervals around the line show the conditions under which economic
globalization has a statistically significant effect on welfare spending. It can be observed
from figure 5.6 that openness to trade has a significant reductive effect on welfare
spending when electoral competition is low. However, this reductive effect diminishes as
electoral competition increases. Once the percentage of votes gained by smaller parties in
parliamentary and or presidential elections is greater than 34%, then openness to trade no
longer has a significant reductive effect on welfare spending. Hypothesis 3 is supported
by the alternate measures for welfare spending and the economic globalization.
Model 5.7b of Table 5.7 presents results for the interactive effect of the alternate
measures of economic globalization and political participation on welfare spending.
Previous welfare spending is positively associated with current welfare spending. And
again, all other control variables fail to rise to the level of statistical significance. FDI and
its interaction with voter turnout have no statistically significant effect on welfare
spending. However, in model 5.7b, trade openness (the constitutive element of the
interaction term) is negatively associated with welfare spending. However, since the
coefficient on the interaction term – Trade*Voter Turnout - is positive, this reductive
effect diminishes.
In figure 5.7, the sloping line indicates the marginal effect of trade openness on
welfare spending for meaningful changes in the level of voter turnout. And the 95%
confidence intervals around the line show the conditions under which openness to trade
has a statistically significant effect on welfare spending. It can be observed from figure
5.7 that openness to trade has a significant reductive effect on welfare spending when
voter turnout is low. However, this reductive effect diminishes as voter turnout increases.
Once voter turnout is greater than 15% of the voting age population, then openness to
trade no longer has a significant reductive effect on welfare spending. Hypothesis 4 is
supported by the alternate measures for economic globalization and welfare spending.
Model 5.8b of Table 5.8 presents results for the interactive effect of the alternate
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measures of economic globalization and the index of political institutions on welfare
spending. Previous welfare spending is positively associated with current welfare
spending. In model 5.8a, both FDI and population are negatively associated with welfare
spending, while all other variables fail to rise to the level of statistical significance.
Urbanization fails to reach statistical significance in model 5.8a but is positively related
to welfare spending in model 5.8b. In model 5.8b, FDI and its interaction with domestic
political institution have no statistical significant effect on welfare spending. Trade
openness (the constitutive element of the interaction term) is negatively associated with
welfare spending. However, since the coefficient on the interaction term –
Trade*Domestic Political Institutions – is positive, this reductive effect diminishes.
In figure 5.8, the sloping line indicates the marginal effect of trade openness on
welfare spending for meaningful changes in the democratization of countries’ political
institutions. 95% confidence intervals around the line allow us to determine the
conditions under which openness to trade has a statistically significant effect on welfare
spending. It is easy to see that openness to trade has a reductive effect on welfare
spending when the democratization of political institutions is low. However, this
reductive effect declines as the democratization of political institutions increases. When
the democratization score of countries’ political institutions is greater than 11, then
openness to trade no longer has a reductive effect on welfare spending. Hypothesis 5 is
supported by the alternate measures of welfare spending and economic globalization.

5.6. Summation
The results presented in this chapter strongly suggest that domestic political
forces avert globalization’s ‘race to the bottom’ effect on social policy. The effect on
social spending from global economic integration is largely conditional on the nature of
domestic institutions that shape the political environment in which welfare policy is made.
When democratization of political institutions is low, economic globalization has a
consistently negative effect on welfare spending, an outcome that is consistent with the
predictions by efficiency theories. However, when democratization of political
institutions is high, domestic political forces will most likely avert globalization’s
proclivity to retrench the welfare state by expanding social spending.
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5.7. Tables and Figures
Table 5.1: Economic Globalization, Political Regimes and Welfare Spending
Model 5.1a
Model 5.1b
Without
With
Interaction
Interaction
Lagged Welfare Spending

0.003**
(0.001)

0.003**
(0.001)

Economic Globalization

0.002**
(0.000)

0.001**
(0.000)

Political Regime

0.004**
(0.001)

-0.002
(0.002)

Globalization *Political Regime

0.00014**
(0.000)

Urbanization

-0.001**
(0.001)

-0.001**
(0.000)

Dependency

0.102**
(0.037)

0.093*
(0.038)

Growth

-0.004**
(0.001)

-0.004**
(0.001)

Ln GDP per capita

0.033**
(0.007)

0.033**
(0.007)

Ln population

-0.005
(0.002)

-0.006*
(0.002)

Ln inflation

-0.022**
(0.004)

-0.022**
(0.004)

Oil shock (70’s)

-0.003
(0.005)

0.001
(0.005)

Debt crisis (80’s)

-0.009*
-0.007
(0.005)
(0.005)
Constant
0.091
0.135
(0.079)
(0.072)
Observations
801
801
R-Squared
0.32
0.33
Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses. **significant at 1%; *significant at 5%
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Marginal Effect of Economic Globalization on Welfare Spending
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Figure 5.1: Economic Globalization, Political Regime Type and Welfare Spending
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Dashed lines give 95% confidence interval.
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Table 5.1A
Country

Years

Polity
Score

Average Welfare
Average Level of
Spending % Total
Economic
Government Spending
Globalization
______________________________________________________________________
Algeria
1973-1976
-9
0.45
30.00
Azerbaijan 1991-1994
-3
0.42
45.40
Azerbaijan
1995-1997
-6
0.46
50.00
Azerbaijan
1998-2004
-7
0.58
61.03
Bolivia
1971-1977
-7
0.40
44.02
Bolivia
1978-1979
-4
0.45
44.50
Kazakhstan 1991-1994
-3
0.53
60.10
Kazakhstan 1995-2001
-4
0.50
64.20
Kyrgyzstan 1991-2004
-3
0.43
60.15
Panama
1969-1977
-7
0.51
68.54
Panama
1982-1983
-5
0.45
69.00
Panama
1987-1988
-8
0.53
59.82
________________________________________________________________________
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Table 5.2: Economic Globalization, Electoral Competition and Welfare Spending
Model 5.2a
Model 5.2b
Without
With
Interaction
Interaction
Lagged Welfare Spending

0.002**
(0.001)

0.002**
(0.001)

Economic Globalization

0.001
(0.000)

-0.005**
(0.001)

Electoral Competition

0.028**
(0.008)

-0.013
(0.011)

Globalization*Electoral Competition

0.001**
(0.000)

Urbanization

-0.000
(0.000)

-0.000
(0.000)

Dependency

-0.108**
(0.024)

-0.107**
(0.024)

Growth

-0.003**
(0.001)

-0.003**
(0.001)

Ln GDP per capita

0.042**
(0.009)

0.045**
(0.008)

Ln population

-0.010**
(0.003)

-0.010**
(0.003)

Ln inflation

-0.021**
(0.004)

-0.021**
(0.004)

Oil shock (70’s)

-0.008
(0.005)

-0.007
(0.005)

Debt crisis (80’s)

-0.018**
-0.017**
(0.004)
(0.004)
______________________________________________________________________________
Constant
0.137
0.285**
(0.072)
(0.075)
Observations
708
708
R-Squared
0.42
0.42
______________________________________________________________________________
Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses. **significant at 1%; *significant at 5%
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Marginal Effect of Economic Globalization on Welfare Spending
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Figure 5.2: Economic Globalization, Electoral Competition and Welfare Spending

0

10%

30%
20%
The Level of Electoral Competition
Dashed lines give 95% confidence interval.

77

40%

Table 5.3: Economic Globalization, Voter Turnout and Welfare Spending
OLS Model 5.3a
OLS Model 5.3b
Without
With
Interaction
Interaction
Lagged Welfare Spending

0.002**
(0.001)

0.002**
(0.001)

Economic Globalization

0.001*
(0.000)

-0.001
(0.001)

Voter Turnout

0.160**
(0.027)

-0.008
(0.071)

Globalization*Voter Turnout

0.003*
(0.001)

Urbanization

-0.000
(0.000)

-0.000
(0.000)

Dependency

-0.015
(0.039)

-0.005
(0.041)

Growth

-0.004**
(0.001)

-0.004**
(0.001)

Ln GDP per capita

0.047**
(0.008)

0.047**
(0.007)

Ln population

-0.007*
(0.003)

-0.008**
(0.003)

Ln inflation

-0.021**
(0.004)

-0.021**
(0.005)

Oil shock (70’s)

-0.015*
(0.007)

-0.013
(0.007)

Debt crisis (80’s)

-0.020**
-0.019**
(0.004)
(0.004)
Constant
-0.019
0.122
(0.085)
(0.099)
Observations
699
699
R-Squared
0.42
0.43
Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses. **significant at 1%;*significant at 5%
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Table 5.3.1: Economic Globalization, Voter Turnout and Welfare Spending
Results from the First Stage IV Regression
IV Model 5.3.1a IV Model 5.3.1b
Without
With
Interaction
Interaction
Underidentification test:
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic
67.48
15.01
p-value
0.00
0.00
Weak identification test:
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic

40.71

37.23

Stock-Yogi weak ID critical values test:
TSLS size of nominal bias 10%
Maximal IV size distortion 10%

34.62
19.93

36.36
19.93

Overidentification test of all instruments:
Hansen J statistic
p-value

1.59
0.21

0.31
0.58

Test for Endogeneity:
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test
10.16
5.12
p-value
0.00
0.02
________________________________________________________________________
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Table 5.3.2: Economic Globalization, Voter Turnout and Welfare Spending
IV Model 5.3.2a
IV Model 5.3.2b
Without
With
Interaction
Interaction
Lagged Welfare Spending

0.002**
(0.001)

0.002**
(0.001)

Economic Globalization

0.001**
(0.000)

-0.026*
(0.013)

Voter Turnout

0.349**
(0.099)

-2.113
(1.115)

Globalization*Voter Turnout

0.038*
(0.019)

Urbanization

-0.000
(0.000)

-0.001**
(0.000)

Dependency

0.122
(0.105)

-0.421*
(0.218)

Growth

-0.005**
(0.002)

-0.004*
(0.002)

Ln GDP per capita

0.063**
(0.015)

0.089**
(0.023)

Ln population

0.000
(0.004)

-0.021*
(0.008)

Ln inflation

-0.017**
(0.006)

-0.003
(0.007)

Oil shock (70’s)

-0.026
(0.024)

-0.004
(0.031)

Debt crisis (80’s)

-0.031**
-0.018
(0.011)
(0.013)
Constant
-0.404
1.589
(0.220)
(0.865)
Observations
546
546
R-Squared
0.44
0.24
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. **significant at 1%;*significant at 5%
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Table 5.4: Economic Globalization, Political Institutions and Welfare Spending
Model 5.4a
Model 5.4b
Without
With
Interaction
Interaction
Lagged Welfare Spending

0.003**
(0.001)

0.003**
(0.001)

Economic Globalization

0.002**
(0.000)

0.001**
(0.000)

Domestic Political Institution

0.037**
(0.007)

-0.005
(0.013)

Globalization *Political Institution

0.001**
(0.000)

Urbanization

-0.001**
(0.000)

-0.001**
(0.000)

Dependency

0.132**
(0.041)

0.112**
(0.042)

Growth

-0.004**
(0.001)

-0.004**
(0.001)

Ln GDP per capita

0.034**
(0.007)

0.035**
(0.007)

Ln population

-0.005*
(0.002)

0.007**
(0.002)

Ln inflation

-0.022**
(0.004)

-0.021**
(0.004)

Oil shock (70’s)

-0.002
(0.006)

-0.000
(0.005)

Debt crisis (80’s)

-0.010
-0.008
(0.005)
(0.005)
Constant
0.077
0.116
(0.082)
(0.074)
Observations
801
801
R-Squared
0.33
0.34
Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses. **significant at 1%; *significant at 5%
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Table 5.5: Trade, FDI, Political Regime and Welfare Spending
Model 5.5a
Without
Interaction
0.786**
(0.082)

Model 5.5b
With
Interaction
0.772**
(0.081)

Trade

-0.000
(0.000)

-3.34e-06*
(0.000)

FDI

-2.15e-06*
(0.000)

-0.000
(0.000)

Political Regime

0.000
(0.000)

-0.001
(0.001)

Lagged Welfare Spending

Trade*Political Regime

5.40e-07**
(0.000)

FDI*Political Regime

0.000
(0.000)

Urbanization

0.000
(0.000)

0.0002*
(0.000)

Dependency

0.011
(0.012)

0.015
(0.013)

Growth

0.000
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)

Ln GDP per capita

0.003
(0.003)

0.003
(0.003)

Ln population

-0.002*
(0.001)

-0.001
(0.001)

Ln inflation

-0.000
(0.001)

-0.001
(0.001)

Oil shock (70’s)

0.001
(0.003)

0.003
(0.003)

Debt crisis (80’s)

0.001
0.002
(0.002)
(0.002)
Constant
-0.002
-0.010
(0.037)
(0.039)
Observations
923
923
R-Squared
0.69
0.70
Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses. **significant at 1%; *significant at 5%
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Table 5.6: Trade, FDI, Electoral Competition and Welfare Spending

Lagged Welfare Spending

Model 5.6a
Without
Interaction
0.812**
(0.075)

Model 5.6b
With
Interaction
0.804**
(0.074)

Trade

-0.000
(0.000)

-5.93e-06**
(0.000)

FDI

-0.000
(0.000)

-0.000
(0.000)

Electoral Competition

0.000
(0.000)

-0.000
(0.000)

Trade*Electoral Competition

1.26e-07**
(0.000)

FDI*Electoral Competition

0.000
(0.000)

Urbanization

0.000
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)

Dependency

0.011
(0.013)

0.014
(0.014)

Growth

0.000
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)

Ln GDP per capita

0.003
(0.003)

0.003
(0.003)

Ln population

-0.001
(0.001)

-0.000
(0.001)

Ln inflation

-0.001
(0.001)

-0.001
(0.001)

Oil shock (70’s)

0.002
(0.003)

0.003
(0.003)

Debt crisis (80’s)

0.002
0.002
(0.002)
(0.002)
Constant
-0.018
-0.015
(0.036)
(0.035)
Observations
946
946
R-Squared
0.70
0.70
Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses. **significant at 1%; *significant at 5%
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Table 5.7: Trade, FDI, Voter Turnout and Welfare Spending

Lagged Welfare Spending

Model 5.7a
Without
Interaction
0.809**
(0.076)

Model 5.7b
With
Interaction
0.802**
(0.076)

Trade

-0.000
(0.000)

-4.13e-06**
(0.000)

FDI

-0.000
(0.000)

-0.000
(0.000)

Voter Turnout

0.000
(0.000)

-0.000
(0.000)

Trade*Voter Turnout

1.04e-07*
(0.000)

FDI*Voter Turnout

0.000
(0.000)

Urbanization

0.000
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)

Dependency

0.015
(0.014)

0.017
(0.015)

Growth

0.000
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)

Ln GDP per capita

0.003
(0.003)

0.003
(0.003)

Ln population

-0.001
(0.001)

-0.000
(0.001)

Ln inflation

-0.000
(0.001)

-0.001
(0.001)

Oil shock (70’s)

0.002
(0.003)

0.003
(0.003)

Debt crisis (80’s)

0.002
0.002
(0.002)
(0.002)
Constant
-0.022
-0.021
(0.036)
(0.036)
Observations
946
946
R-Squared
0.70
0.70
Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses. **significant at 1%; *significant at 5%
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Table 5.8: Trade, FDI, Domestic Political Institutions and Welfare Spending

Lagged Welfare Spending

Model 5.8a
Without
Interaction
0.786**
(0.082)

Model 5.8b
With
Interaction
0.775**
(0.135)

Trade

-0.000
(0.000)

-2.08e-06*
(0.000)

FDI

-2.14e-06*
(0.000)

-0.000
(0.000)

Domestic Political Institution

0.001
(0.002)

-0.006
(0.004)

Trade*Domestic
Political Institution

3.20e-06**
(0.000)

FDI*Domestic
Political Institution

-0.000
(0.000)

Urbanization

0.000
(0.000)

0.00014*
(0.000)

Dependency

0.013
(0.012)

0.015
(0.013)

Growth

0.000
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)

Ln GDP per capita

0.003
(0.003)

0.003
(0.003)

Ln population

-0.002**
(0.001)

-0.000
(0.001)

Ln inflation

-0.001
(0.001)

-0.001
(0.001)

Oil shock (70’s)

0.001
(0.003)

0.002
(0.003)

Debt crisis (80’s)

0.001
0.001
(0.002)
(0.002)
Constant
-0.002
-0.012
(0.037)
(0.040)
Observations
923
923
R-Squared
0.70
0.70
Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses. **significant at 1%; *significant at 5%
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Chapter 6
The Distribution of Welfare Compensation: Globalization, Political
Affiliation and Social Policy
The previous chapter presented evidence that the political institutional
environment that shapes the incentives and preferences of policy makers who make social
policy averts globalization’s natural proclivity to retrench the welfare state. Domestic
political actors such as labor unions and political parties shape the distribution of states’
social policy. Do the political and ideological preferences of these actors also apply the
brakes to globalization’s ‘race to the bottom’ effect on social spending? The discussion
that follows addresses this question.

6.1. Labor Unions and Social Generosity
Recent scholarship contends that globalization’s effect on states’ social spending
is conditional on the relative strength of organized labor. It is argued that the power of
organized labor is displayed when it exerts pressure on governments to increase welfare
spending by effectively lobbying the WTO to link labor standards to free trade
agreements (Hughes and Wilkinson, 1998, Wachtel, 1998, Wet, 1995, Wilkinson and
Hughes, 2000). The discussion in chapter 2 generated hypothesis 6, which stated:
Increasing levels of global economic integration are associated with an increase in
welfare spending when labor unions are strong.
Yet, as discussed in chapter 2, other scholars challenge this notion arguing instead
that global economic integration has weakened the power of organized labor to influence
states’ welfare policies. Organized labor’s weakened position is a function of the fact that
the labor movements in many countries have been transformed from being militant
organizations that once pressed for the rights of the working class, to being co-opted into
the free market priorities of transnational capitalism and increasingly see themselves as
partners to corporate capital no longer willing to press the state for welfare benefits (Gray,
2008, Gray, 2007). These counter-arguments generated hypothesis 7, which stated:
Increasing levels of global economic integration is not associated with an increase in
welfare spending regardless of the strength of labor unions.
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Table 6.1 presents the findings of the interactive effect of economic globalization
and labor unions on welfare spending. Model 6.1a presents the results with the main
explanatory variables - economic globalization and labor unions – without the interaction
term. And model 6.1b presents the main results with the interaction term.

[Table 6.1 about here]

The direction of the coefficients for most of the control variables in models 6.1a
and 6.1b are consistent with theoretical predictions that are reported in the findings of
previous research. Prior levels of welfare spending (the lagged dependent variable) are
positively associated with current levels of welfare spending. Urbanization, economic
growth, population, inflation and the debt crisis of the 1980s are all negatively associated
with welfare spending. Higher levels of economic development are positively associated
with welfare spending. The ratio of countries’ young and old dependents and the oil
shocks of the 1970s fail to reach statistical significance.
In model 6.1a, economic globalization and organized labor are positively
associated with welfare spending. While model 6.1b shows that both economic
globalization and organized labor (the constitutive elements of the interaction term) are
positively associated with welfare spending, the coefficient on the interaction term –
Economic Globalization*Labor Power – has no statistically significant effect on welfare
spending, which support hypothesis 7. In other words, this suggest that organized labor’s
effect on states’ welfare spending is not through the forces of global economic integration.
This finding lends support to the argument that economic globalization may have
weakened and co-opted labor to support the priorities of transnational capital.

6.2. Party Ideology and Social Generosity
Social democratic theories contend that economic globalization’s effect on social
spending is conditional on the nature of party politics. Governments led by leftist or
centrist political parties are more likely to support robust welfare policies than
governments led by parties to the political right (Huber and Stephens, 2001, Stephens,
2005). In chapter 2, these arguments generated hypothesis 8, which stated: Increasing
93

levels of global economic integration are associated with an increase in welfare spending
when ruling political parties are on the left.
Table 6.2 presents the findings of the interactive effect of economic globalization
and the ideology of ruling parties on welfare spending. Model 6.2a presents the results
with the main explanatory variables - economic globalization and the ideology of the
ruling party – without the interaction term. And model 6.2b presents the main results with
the interaction term.

[Table 6.2 about here]

The direction of the coefficients for most of the control variables in models 6.2a
and 6.2b are consistent with the theoretical predictions that are reported in the findings of
previous research. Prior levels of welfare spending (the lagged dependent variable) are
positively associated with current levels of welfare spending. Urbanization, economic
growth, population, inflation, the oil shock of the 1970s (in model 6.2a only) and the debt
crisis of the 1980s are all negatively associated with welfare spending. Higher levels of
economic development are positively associated with welfare spending. The ratio of
countries’ young and old dependents and the oil shocks of the 1970s (in model 6.2b only)
fail to reach statistical significance.
Economic globalization is positively associated with welfare spending in
models 6.2a and 6.2b. The ideology of the ruling political party is positively associated
with welfare spending in model 6.2a, but fails to reach statistical significance in model
6.2b. The coefficient on the interaction term – Economic Globalization*Ruling Party
Ideology - is positive. In figure 6.2, the sloping line indicates the marginal effect of
economic globalization on welfare spending for meaningful changes in the ideology of
ruling political parties. And 95% confidence intervals around the line show the conditions
under which economic globalization has a statistically significant effect on welfare
spending. Figure 6.2 shows that global economic integration increases welfare spending
regardless of political parties. While welfare expenditures are not significantly reduced
under right parties, left parties tend to be more generous in the provision of welfare
benefits. From this perspective, since social democratic theory predicted that right parties
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are more likely to slash states’ welfare spending, while left parties are expected to
significantly increase spending, hypotheses 8 is partially confirmed by the finding. A
clearer picture emerges when considering this issue from a different vantage point. In
figure 6.2a, the sloping line indicates the marginal effect of the ideology of ruling parties
on welfare spending for meaningful changes in countries’ integration into the global
economy. From this perspective, right parties have a reductive effect on welfare spending
at low levels of global economic integration. However, once left of center parties govern
and countries’ integration into the global economy exceeds a score of 45 on the KOF
index, then an ideological movement from the right to the left increases welfare spending.

6.3. Robustness Checks: Alternate Measures of Globalization and Social Spending.
As was done in the previous empirical chapters, alternate measures of social
spending and economic globalization are used to provide additional empirical test for the
study’s hypotheses. Table 6.3 presents the findings of the interactive effect of labor
unions and openness to trade and FDI on welfare spending. Model 6.3a presents the
results with the main explanatory variables - labor unions and openness to trade and FDI
– without the interaction terms. And model 6.3b presents the main results with the
interaction terms.

[Table 6.3 about here]

The direction of the coefficients for most of the control variables in models 6.3a
and 6.3b are also consistent with theoretical predictions that have been reported in
previous research. Prior levels of welfare spending (the lagged dependent variable) are
positively associated with current levels of welfare spending. Urbanization, economic
growth, population, inflation, the oil shock of the 1970s and the debt crisis of the 1980s
are all negatively associated with welfare spending. Consistent with Wagner’s Law,
higher levels of economic development is positively associated with welfare spending.
And the ratio of countries’ young and old dependents fails to reach statistical significance.
The power of organized labor has a positive effect on welfare spending in model
6.3a, but interestingly becomes negative in model 6.3b. Openness to trade is negatively
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associated with welfare spending, in models 6.3a and 6.3b. However, since the coefficient
on the interaction term – Labor Power*Trade – is positive, this reductive effect
diminishes, a finding that is consistent with hypothesis 6. In figures 6.3, the sloping line
indicates the marginal effect of trade openness on welfare spending for meaningful
changes in the Potential Labor Power index (PLP). And 95% confidence intervals around
the line show the conditions under which trade openness has a statistically significant
effect on welfare spending. It can be observed from figure 6.3 that trade openness has a
significant reductive effect on welfare spending when the power of organized labor on
the PLP index low. However, this reductive effect diminishes as the power of organized
labor increases. Once labor power is greater than 10 percentage points on the PLP index
then openness to international trade no longer has a significant reductive effect on
welfare spending.
While this analysis has shown that the effects on the welfare state that come
from global economic integration, measured in terms of the KOF globalization index are not conditional on the strength of organized labor, the effects on welfare spending
that come from openness to international trade are conditional on the power of the labor
movement. This finding seems to support the argument that organized labor can affect
welfare policy by attaching labor standards to free trade agreements, which bind
governments into making concessions for increased welfare benefits.
Table 6.4 presents the findings of the interactive effect of party ideology and
openness to trade and FDI on welfare spending. Model 6.4a presents the results with the
main explanatory variables – party ideology and openness to trade and FDI – without the
interaction terms. And model 6.4b presents the main results with the interaction terms.

[Table. 6.4 about here]

The directions of the coefficients for most of the control variables in models 6.4a
and 6.4b are consistent with the theoretical predictions that are reported in the findings of
previous research. Again, prior levels of welfare spending (the lagged dependent
variable) are positively associated with current levels of welfare spending. Urbanization,
economic growth, population, inflation, the oil shock of the 1970s and the debt crisis of
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the 1980s are all negatively associated with welfare spending. Higher levels of economic
development and the level of urbanization are positively associated with welfare
spending. The ratio of countries’ young and old dependents and FDI all fail to reach
statistical significance. While openness to trade is negatively associated with welfare
spending in models 6.4a and 6.4b, party ideology fails to reach statistical significance.
And the interactive terms Party Ideology*Trade and Party Ideology*FDI also fail to reach
statistical significance, suggesting that these alternative measures of economic
globalization do not affect states’ welfare spending via the ideology of political parties.
However, the finding presented in Table 6.2 does show that economic globalization,
broadly defined and measured by the KOF index, positively affect welfare spending
through party ideology.

6.4. Summation
The results presented in this chapter suggest that political and ideological
preferences of labor unions and political parties avert globalization’s downward pressure
on social policy. When organized labor is politically strong, economic globalization,
measured in terms of openness to trade, will have a positive effect on states’ welfare
spending. Economic globalization will increase welfare spending regardless of the
ideology of ruling political parties, although relative to right parties, left parties provide
more generous welfare benefits. The study’s cross-national empirical findings have
shown that globalization’s effect on the welfare state is conditional on the nature of
domestic political institutions and political actors. In the chapters that follow these
findings are confirmed via the comparative case studies of globalization’s effects on the
welfare state in South Korea, Chile and Spain.
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6.5. Tables and Figures
Table 6.1: Economic Globalization, Organized Labor and Welfare Spending
Model 6.1a
Model 6.1b
Without
With
Interaction
Interaction
Lagged Welfare Spending
0.003*
0.003**
(0.001)
(0.001)
Economic Globalization

0.001**
(0.000)

0.002**
(0.000)

Labor Power

0.001**
(0.000)

0.002**
(0.000)

Economic Globalization* Labor Power

-0.000
(0.000)

Urbanization

-0.001**
(0.000)

-0.001**
(0.000)

Dependency

-0.002
(0.024)

0.001
(0.024)

Growth

-0.005**
(0.001)

-0.005**
(0.001)

Ln GDP per capita

0.030**
(0.006)

0.029**
(0.006)

Ln population

-0.006**
(0.002)

-0.006**
(0.002)

Ln inflation

-0.018**
(0.005)

-0.018**
(0.003)

Oil shock (70’s)

-0.013
(0.007)

-0.014
(0.007)

Debt crisis (80’s)

-0.013*
-0.014*
(0.006)
(0.007)
Constant
0.249**
0.244**
(0.080)
(0.079)
Observations
737
737
R-Squared
0.31
0.31
Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses. **significant at 1%; *significant at 5%
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Table 6.2: Economic Globalization, Party Ideology and Welfare Spending
Model 6.2a
Model 6.2b
Without
With
Interaction
Interaction
Lagged Welfare Spending
0.002**
0.002**
(0.001)
(0.001)
Economic Globalization

0.002**
(0.000)

0.002**
(0.000)

Ruling Party Ideology

0.012**
(0.004)

-0.024
(0.013)

Globalization*Ruling Party Ideology

0.001**
(0.000)

Urbanization

-0.0005*
(0.000)

-0.0005*
(0.000)

Dependency

-0.017
(0.031)

-0.013
(0.032)

Growth

-0.004**
(0.001)

-0.004**
(0.001)

Ln GDP per capita

0.037**
(0.008)

0.033**
(0.008)

Ln population

-0.008**
(0.002)

-0.007**
(0.002)

Ln inflation

-0.015**
(0.004)

-0.015**
(0.004)

Oil shock (70’s)

-0.013*
(0.006)

-0.011
(0.006)

Debt crisis (80’s)

-0.017**
-0.014**
(0.004)
(0.004)
Constant
0.173
0.194**
(0.089)
(0.090)
Observations
717
717
R-Squared
0.34
0.35
Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses. **significant at 1%; *significant at 5%
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Table 6.3: Trade, FDI, Organized Labor and Welfare Spending
Model 10.a
Without
Interaction

Model 10.b
With
Interaction
0.003**
(0.001)

Lagged Welfare Spending

0.003**
(0.001)

Trade

-0.0005**
(0.000)

-0.001**
(0.000)

FDI

0.001
(0.002)

0.002
(0.002)

Labor Power

0.001**
(0.000)

-0.003**
(0.000)

Labor Power*Trade

0.00009**
(0.000)

Labor Power*FDI

-0.000
(0.000)

Urbanization

-0.001**
(0.000)

-0.001**
(0.000)

Dependency

-0.005
(0.028)

0.014
(0.029)

Growth

-0.004**
(0.001)

-0.005**
(0.001)

Ln GDP per capita

0.052**
(0.007)

0.063**
(0.008)

Ln population

-0.014**
(0.003)

-0.009**
(0.003)

Ln inflation

-0.023**
(0.005)

-0.025**
(0.005)

Oil shock (70’s)

-0.022**
(0.009)

-0.022*
(0.009)

Debt crisis (80’s)

-0.022*
(0.098)
0.244**
(0.098)
709

-0.023**
(0.111)
0.129
(0.111)

Constant

709
Observations
R-Squared
0.31
0.33
Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses. **significant at 1%; *significant at 5%
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Table 6.4: Party Ideology, Trade, FDI and Welfare Spending

Lagged Welfare Spending

Model 6.4a
Without
Interaction
0.003*
(0.010)

Model 6.4b
With
Interaction
0.003*
(0.001)

Trade

-0.0005**
(0.000)

-0.0005**
(0.000)

FDI

0.000
(0.002)

0.001
(0.002)

Ruling Party Ideology

0.008
(0.004)

0.007
(0.008)

Party Ideology*Trade

0.000
(0.000)

Party Ideology*FDI

-0.005
(0.000)

Urbanization

-0.0005*
(0.000)

-0.0004*
(0.000)

Dependency

-0.022
(0.030)

0.026
(0.030)

Growth

-0.004**
(0.001)

-0.004**
(0.001)

Ln GDP per capita

0.053**
(0.007)

0.051**
(0.007)

Ln population

-0.018**
(0.001)

-0.018**
(0.002)

Ln inflation

-0.024**
(0.004)

-0.024**
(0.004)

Oil shock (70’s)

-0.023**
(0.005)

-0.022**
(0.005)

Debt crisis (80’s)

-0.029**
(0.004)
0.266**
(0.087)
757

-0.029**
(0.005)
0.281**
(0.087)

Constant

757
Observations
R-Squared
0.31
0.31
Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses. **significant at 5%; *significant at 1%
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Part III
Economic Globalization and the Welfare
State in Emerging Economies with Authoritarian Political
Histories
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Chapter 7
Globalization and the Welfare State in South Korea

7.1. Introduction
The South Korean welfare state has grown over the past forty years from a system
with limited benefits into a system that is relatively comprehensive. What explains this
dynamic is the interplay between the variation of South Korea’s global economic
integration and variation in the nature of its political institutions, which was characterized
by a transition from authoritarian military rule to democratic governance.
South Korea’s military regimes used social welfare as an instrument to promote
economic growth and industrialization. The welfare state under South Korea’s military
regimes was an ideal portrayal of the developmental use of social policy. The essential
components of the corporatist consensus of South Korea’s developmental welfare state
included: trade policies that protected corporate capital from foreign competition;
corporate capital’s provision of full employment and private welfare benefits to industry
workers; and labor unions acceptance of limited welfare benefits from the state in
exchange for full employment of its members (Goodman and White, 1998, p. 17, Wade,
1990, White, 1988, Woo-Cumings, 1999). This chapter presents a discussion of how the
pressures of global economic integration and political democratization unraveled this
consensus making social policy in South Korea increasingly consistent with
compensatory approaches of the welfare state.
Many intricacies are associated with the dynamics of South Korea’s welfare state
making it desirable to present an historical overview of its evolution from
authoritarianism to democracy. This will comprise the content of the next section, to be
followed by a discussion of the corporatist consensus of South Korea’s developmental
welfare state. This is followed by a discussion of the various welfare programs under the
military regimes and the ways in which these programs were limited in coverage and
were subordinated to the priorities of industrial development. The next sections discuss
how the process of economic globalization and democratic governance unraveled the
consensus of the developmental welfare state and significantly transformed welfare
policy in South Korea. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the future challenges
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and the limitations of South Korea’s welfare state in an increasingly integrated global
economy.

7.2. Historical Overview
In 1961 a military coup d'état led by Major General Park Chung-hee effectively
ended the democratic government in South Korea’s Second Republic. After the
assassination of Park Chung-hee in 1979, popular protest against the military regime
emerged. These protests reached a climax with the coup d'état led by Chun Doo-hwan
and the establishment of martial law. In 1980, millions of people protested the military
regime’s massacre of Gwangju, which killed 207 democratic protesters. As a result of
these protests, the regime made political concessions for the transition to democracy.
When the first democratic presidential election was held in 1987, Kim Young-sam and
Kim Dae-jung, former critics of South Korea’s military regimes, ran against each other
and split the opposition vote, enabling former general Roh Tae-woo to win the election.
In 1991, Kim Young-sam’s Unification Democracy Party merged with Roh's ruling
Democratic Justice Party. And as the candidate of the ruling conservative political party
he defeated Kim Dae-jung in the 1992 presidential election. The Asian financial crisis in
1997 and the subsequent collapse of the South Korean economy eroded the electoral
credibility of the ruling conservative government and in that year ushered into office the
liberal government of Kim Dae-jung.

7.3. The Corporatist Consensus of the Developmental Welfare State
South Korea’s military regimes induced agreements on economic and social
policy among labor unions and corporate capital. There was consensus on the importance
of protecting the domestic market from international competition. Trade policies
advantaged domestic firms by encouraging exports and restricting imports. In return,
domestic firms provided full employment and private welfare benefits to workers in the
industrial sector (Robinson, 2002, 257, Wiarda, 1997). Labor unions accepted limited
welfare benefits from the state in exchange for economic growth and stable employment
(Park, 2008, Song and Hong, 2005).
Since an expansive welfare state was seen as an obstacle to economic
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development, social spending was restricted and subordinated to the priorities of
industrial development. The state’s expenditure on education and job training were
considered as investments in industrial development rather than social welfare (Goodman
and Peng, 1996, Holliday, 2000, Jones, 1993, Kwon, 2007, Kwon and Holliday, 2007).
Consequently, expenditures for education and job training accounted for 85-90% of all
social spending, while expenditures on health and social protection remained at 1% of
total government spending throughout the 1970s and 1980s (United Nations, 2007).
Expenditure on education was seen as providing a foundation for transforming South
Korea from a low-skilled labor-intensive economy to one that produced high value-added
technologies for export markets. In this regard, welfare benefits were limited to workers
in the public and industrial sectors that were critical to economic development. The state
provided generous tax-cuts and investment subsidies to encourage private firms to
provide health care and social protection benefits to their workers. 13 With the exception
of public pensions for workers in the public sector, private firms and the contributions of
their workers funded all the social insurance and pension programs (Kwon, 2007, Kwon,
1999, Kwon et al., 2009). In short, since welfare policy was subordinated to the priorities
of South Korea’s industrial development, the essential logic of the developmental welfare
state was largely consistent with efficiency theoretical explanations of states’ welfare
policies.

7.4. The Social Policies of the Military Regimes
The welfare policies of South Korea’s developmental welfare state can be
categorized into three programs. These include social insurance, which included
industrial accident insurance, national health insurance, and employment insurance;
public pensions; and public assistance (Kim, 2007, Kwon, 2007).
In 1963, the Park Chung-hee regime introduced the industrial accident insurance
program to promote economic development by facilitating corporate investments in hard
industry like construction, shipbuilding, and the machine industry. The coverage of the
13

The state also drew upon South Korea’s Confusion culture where the provision of welfare was
the responsibility of the family. See Song, Ho Keun, and Kyung Zoon Hong. (2005) Globalization
and Social Policy in South Korea. In Globalization and the Future of the Welfare State, edited by
Miguel Glatzer and Dietrich Rueschemeyer. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
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program was funded by the corporate sector and was restricted to firms that had more
than 500 employees (Kwon, 2007). Two years later, the government introduced health
insurance that only provided coverage for workers in the public sector, private schools
and those employed in the corporate sector of the economy. The state’s financial
contribution to health insurance was negligible and limited to funding the cost of
administering the program. However, since the funding for health insurance came from
the financial contributions of workers and their employers, coverage was unaffordable for
the self-employed, small businesses, and rural farmers – the most vulnerable in South
Korean society (Kim, 2007, Kwon, 2007). Similarly, the government’s unemployment
insurance program, which provided benefits to workers displaced by temporary
unemployment was only available to workers in the private sector who were critical to
the country’s economic development (Kwon, 2007, Kwon, 1999).
While the social insurance program was used to promote economic development,
public pensions were designed to consolidate the political support of the military regime
and consequently was only available to government and military personnel (Song and
Hong, 2005). By 1988 the military government introduced a national pension program
(Kim, 2007, Kwon, 2007). And similar to the national health insurance, the national
pension program was only available to those workers that were critical to South Korea’s
industrial development (Kwon, 2007, Kwon, 1999). The national pension program was
also financed by the contributions of industrial workers and private firms (Kim, 2007).
Public assistance is the only social protection program that was fully funded by
the military regime. The program provided small amounts of food, condiments, clothing,
monetary allowance or “consolation money” and subsidized heating costs for the aged.
However, the program was not universal and was restricted to the elderly whose family
members were not of a working age (Song and Hong, 2005).

7.5. Political Democratization and Economic Liberalization
The national protest against the Chun Doo-hwan military regime during the 1980s
forced the government to make several concessions for the transition to democracy.
These included the amendment of the constitution, the promotion of basic human rights
and greater freedoms to political parties, the restoration of presidential elections, the
109

introduction of local autonomy, the promotion of free speech and the extension of
amnesty to pro-democracy leader, Kim Dae-jung (Han-Gyo-Rae, 1987). In December
1987, presidential election was restored, and with the election of the conservative
government led by Kim Young Sam, the first civilian regime in 1993, the government
embarked on a number of political reforms. The political power of the state was
decentralized by giving regional jurisdictions more autonomy. The electoral system was
restructured to increase voter participation in national elections.
Political democratization was followed by international demands to liberalize
South Korea’s economy. Major trading partners, like the U.S., pressed the government to
liberalize South Korea’s trade and investment policies that protected domestic firms from
foreign competition. In response, the government liberalized its trade policy, which
effectively ended the protectionist practices of the previous military regimes. Policies that
protected the domestic market from foreign capital flows were also abandoned, while the
government’s membership to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1993 and the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1996 strengthened
domestic economic reform and deepened South Korea’s integration into the global
economy (Yang and Moon, 2005). As a result, trade expansion accounted for over 50% of
South Korea’s GDP throughout the 1990s. Capital flows into South Korea accounted for
US$538 million in 1986 and increased to US$1,473 million in 1987. These increases
continued throughout the 1990s, exceeding US$10,200 million in 1997 (Song and Hong,
2005).

7.6. The Crisis of the Developmental Welfare State
The liberalization of the South Korean economy was an abrogation of the
corporatist consensus of the developmental welfare state that was based on trade
protection. Domestic firms could no longer rely on the state to protect them from foreign
competition. In addition, facing increasing competition from foreign multinationals, they
could no longer afford to provide full employment or private welfare for the industrial
work force. Foreign competition, especially in labor-intensive industries, increased
production costs and forced many firms into bankruptcy, which increased unemployment.
With rising unemployment, labor unions would increasingly look to the state to provide a
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social safety-net (Song and Hong, 2005, Yang and Moon, 2005). 14
The response of the Kim Young Sam government was to reform the existing
developmental welfare system by incrementally expanding the government’s role in the
system. The government provided funding for job training, job security grants and
unemployment compensation through the Employment Insurance Program. Unemployed
workers from the industrial sector were eligible for unemployment benefits and job
security grants were given to domestic firms to discourage them from cutting their payrolls. The Employment Insurance Program covered unemployed workers in the private
sectors and private school teachers. And similar to the welfare policies of the previous
military regimes, the program was financed by the contributions of workers and their
employers (Kwon, 2007). The government also expanded the National Pension Program
to the self-employed and established several task force committees to study reforming
social insurance, pensions, health, housing, education, public protection and employment.
The committees included the Welfare Policy Committee for the Disabled and the Medical
Care Reform Committee, and the Committee for Social Security Policy, which was
responsible for drafting the Five-Year Welfare Development Plan (Song and Hong, 2005).
While the previous military regimes viewed welfare policy as an instrument for
industrial development, Kim Young Sam’s conservative democratic government viewed it
as a mechanism to improve the quality of life as well as an instrument to facilitate
development (Song and Hong, 2005). However, welfare reform by the Kim Young Sam
government was never comprehensive or universal in scope. The role of the state in
welfare reform was restricted to being an organizer of the system, still passing the
financial burden of welfare to private companies, social and religious organizations and
individual workers (Koh, 1998). In this respect, the welfare policies of Kim Young Sam’s
conservative government were fundamentally on the same line with those of the previous
military regimes.

7.7. The Asian Financial Crisis, the Democratic Left and the IMF
Attempts at welfare reform collapsed in face of the Asian financial crisis in 1997.
14

Rising unemployment also undermined South Korea’s family welfare system since the
unemployed could not provide for the needs of the family.
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The crisis started in Thailand with the financial collapse of the Thai baht, which was
driven in part by the financial overextension in the real estate market and the country’s
rising foreign debt. As the crisis spread, most of Southeast Asia saw slumping currencies,
devalued stock markets and a steep rise in private debt. The financial contagion also
spread to Northeast Asian countries like South Korea. Indonesia, Thailand and South
Korea were the countries the most affected by the crisis. The South Korean economy
experienced negative growth rates of 6.7 percent, unemployment rose to 7 percent in
1998, then climbing to 8.6 percent in early 1999, and real income plummeted to 9.3%
(Song and Hong, 2005, Yang and Moon, 2005).
South Korea’s electorate blamed the conservative government of Kim Young Sam
for the financial crisis and in the presidential elections in 1997 replaced the government
with the liberal government of Kim Dae-jung. The new government inherited an
economy with high levels of debt and depleted foreign exchange reserves. To restore the
financial stability of the economy the government accepted a short-term stabilization loan
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The economic reforms demanded by the
IMF included the further liberalization of trade, the privatization of public enterprises, the
tightening of monetary policy to arrest the depreciation of the currency, increases in the
interest rate to control inflation, and banking reforms to promote greater transparency, all
of which furthered the process of liberalizing the South Korean economy (Yang and
Moon, 2005). Higher interest rates, in the short-term, coupled with the further
liberalization of the economy undermined domestic investment, increased corporate
bankruptcies, unemployment, and poverty. The urban poverty rate in South Korea surged
from 7 percent in 1997 to 21 percent in 1998 (National Statistics Office, 1999, Song and
Hong, 2005).

7.8. Social Democratic Corporatism and Comprehensive Welfare Reform
The management of the economic crisis provided the liberal government with the
opportunity to fundamentally transform welfare policy from one that was largely
selective and based on industrial development to one that was more universal. In pursuing
welfare reform, the government attempted to navigate the implementation of two
conflicting policies: neoliberal economic reform to resolve the financial crisis and social
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reforms to provide adequate safety-nets to those displaced by the financial crisis.
Neoliberal economic reform threatened to impede the development of social reform, the
policy preference of labor unions and the lower classes – the main supporters of the
liberal government (Song and Hong, 2005). On the other hand, the neoliberal economic
policies of the IMF were important to stabilize the market to facilitate economic growth.
In resolving this dilemma, the government forged a social democratic corporatist
consensus among labor, capital and government regarding the importance of continuing
the process of integrating South Korea into the global economy, while developing a
comprehensive welfare system (Katzenstein, 1984, Katzenstein, 1985). The creation of
the Tripartite Commission in 1998, which included representatives from the government,
labor unions and private industry were charged with the task developing a viable
compromise to economic and social reforms (Song and Hong, 2005, Yang and Moon,
2005). Members of the commission agreed to introduce economic policies that would
facilitate the process of economic liberalization as well as introduce policies that would
establish a comprehensive social safety-net to compensate those who are displaced by the
process of global economic integration (See Table 7.1). Coupled with the political
preference of the liberal government, the financial crisis expedited the pace of economic
liberalization and facilitated the transformation of South Korea’s welfare system (Song
and Hong, 2005). The liberal government, relative to its predecessors, not only
structurally reformed South Korea’s social policy but also expanded the country’s social
welfare programs, as indicated in Table 7.2.
The liberal government extended the coverage of the Employment Insurance
Program. The program was expanded in four stages. First, to companies with ten or more
workers in January 1998; then to companies with more than five workers in march 1998;
and then to all the companies in October 1998; and finally to all the employees including
temporary workers, part-time workers, and day workers in September 2000 (Gazier and
Herrera, 2000, Yang and Moon, 2005). The duration of unemployment benefit was also
extended from 60 to 120 days (Kwon, 2007).
In 1999, the government significantly expanded the National Pension Program to
cover the entire population. Farmers, the self-employed and temporary workers were
excluded from the program in the past because it was difficult to ascertain their income.
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The reform of the National Pension Program made it possible to determine their income
by calculating the amount that they would contribute to the program based on the value
of their homes and cars. (Song and Hong, 2005, Yang and Moon, 2005).
Coverage under the Industrial Accident Insurance Program was also expanded. In
the early 1960s, the injury insurance program covered companies with more than 500
employees. Before the reform, the insurance covered 7.5 million employees in companies
with more than five workers. Small companies were excluded from the program.
However, as a result of the reform, the program covered an additional 1.6 million
employees in small companies with four or fewer workers in 2000. At present, enrollment
in the program is compulsory for any company with at least one employee. (Yang and
Moon, 2005).
A comprehensive National Health Insurance program did not exist in South Korea.
Different insurance programs administered health insurance. The Industrial Workers’
Health Insurance covered 38 percent of the population, the Public Employee Health
Insurance covered 11 percent of the population, and the Regional Health Insurance
Program covered 51 percent of the population (Song and Hong, 2005). However, since
having separate programs administer health insurance proved to be financially inefficient,
the government successfully integrated these programs into a National Health Insurance
program with universal coverage (Yang and Moon, 2005).
In addition to reforming the various social insurance programs, the government
redesigned the public assistance program and expanded its coverage. With the passage of
the National Basic Livelihood Security Law in 1998, the government introduced a
generous and comprehensive public assistance program because the existing program
only covered people who did not have family members of working age. Consequently,
many people in poverty were not eligible to receive the benefits. The new program
allowed for benefits to be extended to the poor without regard to any of the eligibility
requirements that governed the old program. 15 In addition, the new public assistance
program provided cash benefits to the poor and the disabled (Kim, 2007, Kwon, 2007).
15

The previous assistance program excluded people between the age of 18 to 64 and those who
have family members of working age. However, the new program only required that beneficiaries
take part in programs such as job training, public work projects or community services if they
were of working age (Kwon 2007).
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7.9. Limitations and Future Challenges of the Welfare State
The South Korean welfare system was fundamentally transformed from a system
with limited benefits to one where benefits have increasingly become universal. For
example, during 1997 to 2002, social welfare spending increased by 78 percent, health
care expenditures increased by 120 percent, education expenditures increased by 60
percent, and social protection expenditures increased by 49 percent (United Nations,
2007). Thus, the South Korean case lends support to the argument that states’ welfare
policy is the outcome of the conditional relationship between economic globalization and
the process of political democratization.
However, despite its transformation, South Korea’s welfare policy is not without
limitations. For example, the unemployment insurance program does not cover school
and college graduates because it is limited to the workers who have been employed for a
minimum of six months. The National Pension Program is a voluntary rather than a
mandatory system. In addition, by making the program voluntary the government
intended to appease the self-employed who saw their contributions to the program as a
type of quasi-tax. To date, approximately half of these workers have not registered for the
program (Kim, 2000, pp. 10-11, Lee, 2001, p. 6, Yang and Moon, 2005).
South Korea’s aging population is a major challenge to the future financial
sustainability of the welfare state. Demographic aging will increase the demand for social
protection benefits. While demographic aging is also occurring in other OECD countries,
the speed and scale of aging is faster in South Korea than other OECD countries. The
speed of demographic aging in South Korea is also faster than in Japan where for the last
two decades welfare policies have been adjusted to serve the social needs of the elderly.
South Korea’s demographic aging is also faster than in France and the United States (see
Table 7.3). Given this phenomenon, the number of pensioners in the future will increase
significantly and over burden the pension fund. Similarly, government health care
expenditures will increase as the number of elderly utilizing health care services increases
and the quality of medical care that they demand will also become increasingly expensive
(Kwon, 2007, pp. 8-10).
The welfare reforms that were initiated by the liberal government during the
late 1990s were based on the principle that South Korea’s welfare policies should be
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socially inclusive, economically developmental and democratically shaped. However, the
demographic aging of the South Korean society poses the greatest challenge to the future
financial sustainability of a welfare system that is based on these principles. Will the
pressures of demographic aging coupled with the pressures of economic globalization
unravel a welfare system that is socially inclusive and once again place greater emphasis
on the developmental importance of social policy? This question highlights the
continuing complexity in studying the dynamics of the welfare state in South Korea.
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7.10. Tables
Table 7.1: Key Contents of the Tripartite Commission’s “Social Compromise to
Overcome the Economic Crisis”
Management transparency
and corporate restructuring

Improvement of the corporate financial structure
More responsible and more transparent corporate governance
Promotion of business competitiveness

Enhancing labor market
flexibility

Permission for employers to dismiss workers in cases of
managerial need
Permission for the establishment of temporary work agencies

Policies to promote
employment stability and
combat unemployment

Expansion and improvement of employment insurance
Livelihood support for the unemployed
Expansion and improvement of the public employment service
Expansion of vocational training
Job creation through public works and business start-up
subsidies
Consultation and re-hiring requirements in case of redundancy
dismissals

Enhancing labor rights

Extension and consolidation
of the social security system

Permission for public servants to form workplace associations
Permission for teachers to join trade unions
Permission for trade unions to engage in political activities
Right of dismissed and unemployed workers to join trade
unions
Integration of social partners in social security steering
committees
Wage guarantee in bankruptcy cases
Extension of social insurance coverage to non-regular workers

Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2000:49) in Yang and Moon
(2005: 81)
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Table 7.2: Globalization and Social Spending
Year

Welfare Expenditure (% of GDP)
Social
Welfare
Social
Insurance
Service
Expenditure

Chun Doo-hwan Military Government
1980
0.50
--1981
0.50
--1982
0.50
--1983
0.50
--1984
0.80
0.1
-1985
0.20
0.1
-1986
0.20
0.1
2.6
1987
0.20
0.1
2.6
Roh Tae-woo Transitional Government
1988
0.20
0.1
3.2
1989
0.30
0.1
3.6
1990
0.80
0.1
3.9
1991
0.90
0.1
3.8
1992
1.00
0.1
4.2
Kim Young-sam Democratic
Government
1993
0.90
0.2
4.4
1994
0.90
0.2
4.7
1995
0.80
0.2
5.1
1996
0.90
0.2
5.3
1997
0.90
0.2
6.8
Kim Dae-jung Democratic Government
1998
1.02
0.2
6.9
1999
1.19
0.4
7.2
2000
1.60
0.5
10.2
2001
2.00
0.7
n/a
2002
2.00
0.6
n/a
Source: National Statistical Office in Song and Hong (2005:183)
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Table 7.3: The Speed of Demographic Aging
Years that the rate of
Number of years Number of years when
elderly population reach to when
elderly elderly increase from
increase
from
7% to 14% to 20% of the
7%
14%
20%
14%
of
the population
population
Korea
Japan

2000
1970

2019
1994

2026
2006

19
24

7
12

France
USA

1864
1942

1979
2013

2020
2028

115
71

41
15

Source: National Statistical Office (2001) in H.J. Kwon (2007)
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Chapter 8
Globalization and the Welfare State in Chile

8.1. Introduction
The welfare state in Chile was transformed from a system with comprehensive
benefits that was heavily funded by government revenues into one where benefits were
significantly limited and regulated by market forces. Welfare policy has recently evolved
into a quasi-comprehensive system in which state subsidies and benefits have been
expanded but guided by the logic of the private market. Like South Korea, these
dynamics are largely the result of the interplay between the variation of Chile’s
integration into the global economy and variation in the nature of its domestic political
system, which witnessed a transition from democratic governance to authoritarianism and
then the resumption of democratic practices after sixteen years of military rule.
This chapter begins with an historical overview and then highlights the ways in
which Chile’s democratic regimes, while pursuing an industrial strategy that featured
import-substitution industry (ISI), trade protection and the nationalization of key
industries, developed a comprehensive welfare state. The chapter then discusses how the
economic and political crisis of the ISI induced welfare state led to the military coup
d'état in 1973. The chapter then examines how the economic stabilization and trade
liberalization policies of the military junta globally integrated the economy and in the
process replaced Chile’s traditional welfare state with one that featured significantly
limited benefits that were regulated by the free market. This is followed by a discussion
of the restoration of democracy in Chile and the creation of a quasi-comprehensive
welfare state under conditions of greater global economic integration and the political
dominance of the Concertación regime, which is composed of a ruling coalition of centreleft political parties. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the future challenges to
Chile’s welfare state.

8.2. Historical Overview
Chile achieved independence from Spain in 1811 and by 1932 established an
electoral democracy that ended in 1973. Throughout much of this period, various
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governments attempted to reform Chile’s social and economic system by pursuing ISI,
trade protectionism, expanding the welfare state and statist policies that sought to
nationalize key industries. These statist policies were instituted following the election of
Eduardo Frei of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) in 1964. The government acquired
majority ownership of the copper industry, redistributed land, and expanded access to
education. Despite these changes Chile’s political left pressed for more radical reforms,
which in 1970 culminated with the election of Salvador Allende of the Popular Unity
party. The Allende government accelerated the reforms of the Frei administration by fully
nationalizing the copper and telecommunication industries and expanded land reform and
the welfare state. The PDC allied with Chile’s parties on the right to block the legislative
initiatives of Allende’s Popular Unity government. The ideological gridlock prevented the
government from addressing the economic depression. Unemployment and inflation
increased, while international capital flows to Chile plummeted. And as the economy
continued to deteriorate along with the indecisive outcome of the 1973 Legislative
elections, the military intervened on September 11 (Collier and Sater, 1996).
The Chilean military, led by General Augusto Pinochet, deposed the Allende
government in a violent coup and terminated democratic practices and civil liberties and
regarded the organized left as an internal enemy of the state. In 1978, General Pinochet
won a tightly controlled referendum, which institutionalized the junta’s rule. The military
regime implemented a series of neo-liberal economic reforms that liberalized trade and
investment, privatized state holdings in the economy, and dismantled the comprehensive
welfare state. In 1980, General Pinochet won another referendum that approved the new
Constitution, which called for a plebiscite in 1988. Chileans were given the opportunity
to reelect Pinochet to another 8-year term or reject him in favor of contested democratic
elections. The collapse of the economy in 1982 sparked a nationwide protest against the
military junta, which helped to galvanize opposition to Pinochet’s reelection among
Chile’s political parties. In the ensuing plebiscite, 55% of the Chilean people rejected 8
more years of military rule and called for democratic elections in 1989 (Constable and
Valenzuela, 1993, Falcoff, 1989).
Two major coalitions of parties emerged to contest the 1989 elections. These
included the center-left Coalition of Parties for Democracy, or Concertación, and the
121

center-right Democracy and Progress coalition. Patricio Aylwin, a Christian Democrat
and the candidate of the Concertación, won the presidency with 55% of the vote and the
Concertación won majorities in the Chamber of Deputies and among the elected members
of the Senate. The Concertación coalition has governed Chile continuously since the
transition to democracy. Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle was elected president in 1993, followed
by Ricardo Lagos in 1999, and recently Michelle Bachelet in 2005. While the
Concertación coalition governments maintained the neo-liberal economic policies of the
Pinochet regime, they have also implemented social programs, although at much reduced
levels than the Allende era, to reduce poverty and expand access to education and health
care (Rector, 2005).

8.3. Import-Substitution and the Welfare State
From the 1930’s to the mid-1970s, Chile’s import substitution model of industrial
development, which was promoted by the United Nations Economic Commission for
Latin America (ECLA) and at that time was adopted by governments throughout Latin
America, involved the use of discriminatory tariffs, exchange rate controls and tax
policies to help establish national industries and protect them from overseas competition.
During this period, Chile’s ISI strategy was intimately connected with its Bismarkian
social interventions to provide a comprehensive welfare state.
The logic of ISI was that since developing countries faced a declining terms of
trade with advanced industrial countries and the infancy of their industries placed them at
a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis Western transnational firms, Latin American
countries should reduce their dependence on the global economy by encouraging the
local production of industrial goods. Protectionist trade policies were, therefore, used to
help strengthen national firms to the point where they could compete with foreign
producers (Prebisch, 1959, Prebisch, 1950).
Chile’s import-competing industries supported trade protection since such policies
limited foreign competition and produce economic rents for national firms. Since 1838,
the Sociedad National de Agricultura (SNA), which represented the interests of Chile’s
landowning agricultural producers, secured legislation that imposed tariffs on agricultural
imports. And by 1897, the political clout of the Sociedad de Fomento Fabril (SFF), that
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represented the interests of Chile’s industrial manufacturers was instrumental to the
passage of Law 980, which raised tariffs on imported textiles and other manufacturing
goods (Edwards and Lederman, 1998, pp. 31-32). Labor unions supported trade
protection since it stabilized the national labor market by allowing domestic firms to
provide full employment, which in turn strengthens the labor union’s collective
bargaining power (Barrera and Valenzuela, 1986). At the end of the Allende
administration, Chile’s import tariffs averaged 105 percent and were highly dispersed
across a range of imported products where some products were subjected to nominal
tariffs of more than 700 percent. Moreover, trade was severely constrained by a battery of
quantitative restrictions. Some of these restrictions included import prohibitions of
certain products and the maintenance of a multiple exchange rate system, which further
discouraged imports (Edwards and Lederman, 1998, p. 3).
The ISI strategy also involved the nationalization of industries, especially foreign
companies that the state considered crucial to national development. Protectionist trade
policies were re-enforced by the successive nationalization policies of the Christian
Democratic and Socialist governments of Edurdo Frei and Salvador Allende. In his stateof-the-nation address in May 21, 1969, President Frei unveiled plans for the
“Chileanization” or part ownership of Chile’s copper industry, which culminated in an
agreement with Anaconda – the American copper company – for the “negotiated and
progressive” nationalization of the company’s major mines throughout the country. A
similar agreement was also negotiated with the American owned Kennecott Copper
Corporation that allowed the government’s share of the companies’ profits to increase
from 72.6 percent to 91.8 percent (Sobel, 1974, p. 22-24). In explaining his economic
policies in the months prior to his Presidential inauguration, Allende noted:

“We must recover our basic resources that are in the hands of foreign capital, especially
American – copper, iron ore, nitrates, which are in your hands, the hands of American
monopolies. Then we must nationalize the monopolies that influence the social and
economic development of the country. To this we must add a serious wide-ranging
profound agrarian reform, the nationalization of banking and state control over foreign
trade” (Sobel, 1974, p. 33).
And in the first year of Allende’s presidency, the Chilean Congress unanimously
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approved a constitutional amendment that authorized the president to fully nationalize the
copper companies of Anaconda, Kennecott and Cerro. All 158 senators and deputies who
represented every major political party in Chile voted in favor of the reform. Although 60
percent of Chile’s private banking system had already been nationalized by previous
administrations, the Allende government accelerated this trend by nationalizing the
subsidiaries of the Bank of America, the Bank of London and Citibank of New York. The
government also nationalized the U.S-owned International Telephone & Telegraph
Corporation (ITT), RCA Victor - the U.S-owned electronic corporation and the assembly
plants of General Motors Corporation (Sobel, 1974, pp. 50-51; pp. 56-57; p. 79). In 1973,
at the end of the Allende administration, the state controlled 80 percent of Chile’s
industrial production, 400 corporate enterprises and approximately 60 percent of the
country’s GNP (Collier and Sater, 1996, p. 342).
ISI was also an integral component of Chile’s welfare state. The Allende
government’s expanded control over the country’s industrial output was correlated with a
massive increase in social spending. During the period of Chile’s largest nationalization
initiatives, social spending on health care, education, housing and social assistance, for
each year form 1970-1973, more than doubled the annual average of the previous four
years (See Table. 8.1).
In the 1940’s, White Collar workers from the financial and manufacturing
industries established their own health care system – the National Medical Services for
Employees (SERMENA) that established a private provider system with private doctors.
A limited public health care system was established in 1952, with the creation of the
National Health Care Service (SNS), which only provided prenatal care and family
planning. However, by 1971, the Allende government unified the health care systems into
the Servicio Unico de Salud – a national health care system. The state built a network of
hospitals and clinics in working class neighborhoods on the outskirts of major cities and
provided care for every 44,000 inhabitants. The government also established the National
Milk Plan that provided 3,470,000 persons with a ½ liter of milk a day to reduce
malnutrition, which affected 50% of Chile’ children in 1970. Spending on education
increased primary and secondary school enrollments. Primary school enrollment
increased from an annual average of 34% during the period 1960-70 to 65% in 1971 to
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1972. Secondary school enrollment also grew at a rate of 18.2% during 1971-72 (Isreal,
1989, pp. 35-36). While Chile’s state-run Social Security system – the Servicio de Seguro
Social (SSS) was designed to serve the needs of miners, urban blue-collar and service
workers, the Allende government extended coverage to informal workers and peasants
and effectively transformed the social security system into a universal entitlement system
(Hudson, 1994, Illanes and Riesco, 2007).
The nationalization initiatives of the state were also used to provide the working
classes with employment and salary increases as well as empower the labor unions. In
1970, the Allende government signed an agreement with one of the country’s largest
unions, the Central Workers Union, which provided for the participation of workers in the
planning and the administration of state-owned and mixed corporate enterprises, the
reduction of unemployment by the provision of 180, 000 jobs and the creation of a
Central Committee on Wages and Salaries to formulate new wage and salary policies. In
negotiations with the government in 1971 for a new contract, Workers at the
Chuquicamata copper mines were given a 21.8% pay increase plus a commitment by the
Allende government to spend $3.7 million dollars during 1972 on social programs for the
town of Chuquicamata (Sobel, 1974, p. 38; p. 71).

8.4. The Economic and Political Crisis of the Welfare State
By the early 1970’s, there was growing evidence that Chile’s ISI strategy and the
welfare state that it supported was financially unsustainable. Social spending per person,
between 1920 and 1970, increased by 38%, while GNP per capita increased by only 2.3%
(Arellano, 1985, p. 414). Trade protectionism provided no incentive for domestic firms to
become efficient, but merely encouraged rent seeking behavior. In addition, the small size
of the domestic market never allowed domestic firms to reach economies of scale to be
able to compete in export markets. Consequently, overall industrial production fell even
among the nationalized industries. And the state’s social policies that increased
employment and the purchasing power of the working class coupled with the decline in
industrial production gave rise to black market activities, shortages and inflationary
pressures, which surpassed 200 percent by 1972. In addition, the falling prices for copper
(Chile’s main export) and the tripling price for imported oil plunged the balance of
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payments into deficit, which forced the devaluation of the official exchange rate from 48
Chilean escudos to the U.S. dollar to 85 escudos to the dollar. And on the black market
the currency fell from 150 to 300 escudos to the dollar (Collier and Sater, 1996, pp. 345346, Hudson, 1994, Isreal, 1989, Sobel, 1974, p. 85).
The crisis in the macro economy led to a significant decline in tax revenues,
which severely eroded the state’s ability to finance its increasingly costly social programs.
As a result of the Allende government’s expansion of the social security system, there
were 35 different pension funds and more than 150 social security programs for different
occupational groups. Since the newly incorporated participants of the program secured by
law new benefits that were denied to original participants (even when the programs of the
new participants were added to existing pension funds), the social security system
became inherently unequal and was in financial crisis by 1972. The state’s support for the
national health care program also became financially unsustainable given the fact that it
was tied to the social security system (Hudson, 1994, Mesa-Lago, 1989).
Chile’s economic crisis triggered a political crisis within Allende’s coalition
government. The Socialist being the largest party within the coalition continued to press
Allende to accelerate the economic and social policies in Chile’s transition to socialism.
The PDC members of the coalition gradually shifted to the right and became the most
important opposition to the Allende government and they actively promoted legislation
that attempted to reverse the expansive growth of the state’s acquisition of private capital.
Given the fact that the Allende government expropriated the holding of American
corporations, opposition also came from the U.S. government. The Nixon administration
pursued a two-track policy towards Allende’s government. Overtly, the administration
cut U.S. aid to Chile and blocked Chile’s request for financial assistance from the World
Bank at a time when Allende’s government needed it the most. Covertly, the Nixon
administration worked to help destabilize the government by increasing aid to Chile’s
military and opposition political groups. With the growing economic crisis and political
polarization within the Allende government, the military junta staged a coup d’état on
September 11, 1973 (Isreal, 1989, pp. 263-269, Sobel, 1974, pp. 90-91).
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8.5. Economic Liberalization and the Retrenched Welfare State
In formulating an economic strategy to arrest the economic crisis the junta relied
heavily on the advise of the Chicago Boys, a group of Chilean neo-liberal economists
who were trained at the University of Chicago under Milton Friedman and Arnold
Harberger. The economic policies that were advocated by the Chicago Boys ended
decades of ISI development in Chile and the comprehensive welfare state that it induced.
The junta’s Minister of Finance, in October 1973, stated that Chile’s “best prospects for
growth are in the opening to international competition” (Méndez, 1979, p. 63-64). The
junta’s economic policy was based on three objectives: the stabilization of the economy;
the liberalization of trade; and the privatization of state holdings (Laban and Larrain,
1995, p. 116, Silva, 1993).
The stabilization policy involved a two-part strategy. Often referred to as ‘shock
treatment’, the first part of the stabilization policy sought to eliminate inflationary
pressures by cutting the fiscal deficit by 25% within the first six months of the military
dictatorship. 16 The reduction of the fiscal deficit involved the retrenchment of public
sector jobs and across the board cuts in the social programs of the welfare state
(Friedman, 1975). Second, the stabilization policy also concentrated on arresting the
balance of payments crisis by securing external financing from international creditors. By
January 1974, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a stand-by arrangement
that allowed Chile to borrow U.S$94.8 million over 12 months to overcome the foreign
exchange deficit of its balance of payments. The Inter-American Development Bank, in
April of that year, approved a U.S$73.3 million loan to Chile, which was denied to the
Allende government in 1972. In addition, a syndicate of international commercial banks
that included Bankers Trust, Irving Trust, and First National City Bank and several
Canadian banks opened a U.S$170 million line of credit to Chile. In addition, just two
months after the coup d’état, Manufactures Hanover Trust Co. of New York extended a
U.S$44 million loan to Chile’s Central Bank and a combination of other American and
Canadian commercial banks offered Chile additional loans that totaled U.S$150 million.
For its part, the U.S. government also extended loans totaling U.S$52 million to finance
Chile’s imports of American corn and wheat (Sobel, 1974, p. 161; p. 173).
16

During this time the junta also replaced the escudo with the peso, with 1 peso = 10, 000 escudos.
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The junta’s liberalization policy dismantled the Allende government’s
differentiated tariff structure of rates between 10% and 35%. The objective was to reduce
tariffs to a uniform rate of 10% by 1979 (Edwards and Lederman, 1998, p. 4). In fact, as
shown in Table 8.2, the junta successfully implemented its trade reforms by significantly
reducing tariffs from their 1973 levels to 10% by 1979. However, this pattern was
temporarily suspended in 1982-83, when Chile experienced its worst economic crisis
since the 1930s. Table 8.5 shows that during these years the economy recorded negative
growth rates of -10.3% and -3.8% respectively. In addition to tariff reductions, the junta
also gradually reduced and eventually eliminated import prohibitions and import licenses,
which served as non-tariff barriers to trade (see Table 8.3). While trade liberalization was
incongruent with the rent seeking interests of Chile’s import competing firms, trade
reforms found strong political support among export-oriented industries that were unable
to realize economies of scale under ISI. Exporting firms in Chile’s mining and wine
industries gained from trade liberalization and the export promotion policies of the junta.
Since trade liberalization lowered the price of imported inputs of production, the reform
also benefited firms in the construction and transportation industry which participated in
several industrial strikes against the Allende government that temporarily paralyzed the
domestic economy during 1970-73 (Campero, 1991, Edwards and Lederman, 1998, p.
33).
Three months after the coup d’état the junta implemented its privatization policy
by announcing that 115 nationalized companies, including 12 that were owned by foreign
capital would be returned to their former owners. The first of these companies were 4
U.S-owned motion pictures distributors, the U.S-owned General Tire International and
Dow Chemical. Chile’s State Development Corporation announced that another 88
business and industries would also be returned to their former owners because they were
illegally expropriated by Allende’s Popular Unity government. The junta also signed an
agreement with General Motor Corporation that effectively returned ownership of the
nationalized assembly plants back to the company (Sobel, 1974, p. 162; p. 173). On
December 1974, the junta passed a decree that prohibited the state ownership of
commercial banks (Edwards and Lederman, 1998, p. 38).
The junta’s privatization policies, which also liberalized the capital markets, were
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reinforced by the repression of labor unions that aligned themselves with the Allende
government and implemented measures that severely weakened the labor movement. On
September 18, 1973, the junta issued a decree that banned the presentation of union
demands and suspended the right of union leaders to use paid working hours to address
union issues. Other decrees were issued that made it easier for private firms to fire
workers, including the firing of workers who lead, in what the junta considered an illegal
strike. The junta implemented measures that suspended previous agreements with unions
regarding salary increases, benefits and other remunerations to their members. The junta’s
anti-labor diktat also suspended unions’ rights for collective bargaining and the automatic
adjustment of pensions to compensate for inflation (Arellano, 1985, p. 415, Barrera and
Valenzuela, 1986, p. 235-236). Consequently, union membership drastically declined
from 65% of Chile’s total wage earners in 1973, the last year of the Allende government,
to less than 20% on average for the entire 1980s (Cortázar, 1997, p. 240).
As shown in Table 8.4, the neo-liberal stabilization policies that slashed the fiscal
deficit achieved their objective by drastically reducing inflation from a high of 605.9% in
1973 to 21% in 1989, the last year of military rule in Chile. Controlling inflation and the
stabilization of prices allowed Chile’s industry to achieve greater economies of scale as
they benefited from the privatization of capital markets and trade liberalization, which
effectively integrated Chile into the global economy. As a result, Chile’s annual growth
rates during the years of military rule, with the exception of 1982-83, exceeded the
growth rates of the previous democratic governments as well as its Latin American
neighbors and established the economic conditions that have sustained growth into the
transitional years under democratic rule (see Table 8.5).
The success of the junta’s neo-liberal policies in resurrecting the economy came at
the expense of Chile’s welfare state and ended five decades of continuous social spending
that was financed by public revenues. As a consequence of the junta’s stabilization
policies to reduce inflation, social spending as a proportion of GNP was reduced from
20% in the second half of the 1960s to 14% by the start of the 1980s (See Table 8.6).
Combined with the junta’s privatization policies, the allocation of education, housing and
social security was largely determined by market forces with increased participation by
the private sector.
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In terms of education reform, the junta drastically reduced expenditures on public
schools and placed the burden of administering and supporting the education system on
local municipalities and parents. Between 1980 to1990, government spending on
education was cut by 27%. Schools that were located in affluent municipalities were able
to compensate for the shortfall in government funding but schools in poor districts had no
alternative source of funding (Delannoy, 2000). Instead, in 1981, the junta introduced a
nationwide school voucher program that gave parents the choice between sending their
children to private or public schools. The program created a dynamic market for
education with more than a thousand private schools entering the market for profit, which
increased private enrollment rate from 20% to 40% by 1988 and exceeded 50% in Chile’s
urban areas. However, the market forces that were unleashed by the voucher program did
not improve education outcomes. Results from the international test scores in math and
science (TIMSS) in which Chile participated in 1970 and 1999 showed that Chile’s
ranking, relative to the other 12 countries that participated in those years, worsened
(Hsieh and Urquiola, 2002). Higher education was also market driven. Under the Allende
government university tuition had traditionally been free. However, with the reform of
higher education students were required to pay an enrollment fee. In addition, the level of
state’s funding to the universities was based on the proportion of students who entered
universities with the highest scores on the national aptitude test. Universities were forced
to compete for state funding in their effort to recruit the most qualified students. The
reform of higher education significantly reduced access to students from working class
families who could not afford university fees or whose test scores were not competitive to
be recruited by Chile’s financially strapped universities (Arellano, 1985, pp. 114-116).
The Allende government established, Servicio Unico de Salud, a national health
care system by merging SERMENA – the private health care system for white-collar
workers with SNS – the public system for blue-collar workers. The junta’s reform of
health care gave participants the option of switching to private health care institutions.
Eight percent of the participants that switched took with them 40% of the revenues of the
public health care. While privatization increased the quality of health care for the affluent
that switched, the access to quality health care service among the remaining low-income
groups suffered from a sharp decline in state funding (Collier and Sater, 1996, pp. 373130

374, Laban and Larrain, 1995, 123).
From the 1950s, the state played a major role in Chile’s low-cost housing
development and built 60% of the houses between 1960 and 1972. The junta drastically
slashed public spending on housing to less than half of its 1970 levels, which increased
Chile’s housing deficit. In addition, the junta also reduced subsidies on housing loans and
increased the participation of the private sector in the development of new homes and
municipal buildings. Housing was also allocated to income groups that met certain
savings goals, which effectively reduced poor families’ access to housing since they
could not meet the junta’s savings criteria (Hudson, 1994).
The military junta closed the previously unfunded pay-as-you-go state run
pension system in which benefits were paid directly from taxes and social security
contributions. The pay-as-you-go system was replaced by funded personal retirement
accounts that were administered by private Pension Fund Managing Corporations, often
referred to as Administradores de Fondos de Pensiones (AFPs) (Soto, 2007). Initially, the
state supervised the pension system and required that assets were deposited in the
government debt or bank deposits. However, by the mid to late 1980s, pension fund
assets have increasingly been deposited in private domestic securities and mutual funds
(Borzutzky, 2003, DuPont, 1996, Kritzer, 1996, Mitchell, 1998). The reform of the
pension system removed the share of the employer’s contribution to the pension system
by terminating the social security tax and established a mandatory contribution rate of
10% of employee’s monthly wages (Borzutzky, 2001, Borzutzky, 2003, Castiglioni,
2001). The privatization of the pension system also provided for two separate poverty
safety nets. First, workers who contributed to their personal accounts for at least 20 years
and who did not accumulate sufficient funds in their accounts to maintain a minimum
standard of living upon retirement were entitled to a government-financed “top up”
benefit called the minimum pension guarantee. Second, elders who either fail to
contribute for 20 years or were never in the system at all were entitled to a PASIS, which
was a small noncontributory means-tested benefit that was worth half the minimum
pension (Borzutzky, 2003, Kritzer, 1996, Mitchell, 1998).
While Chile’s privatized pension system has been hailed as a success and a model
for pension reform, the new system was limited in its coverage. Before the junta’s
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privatization, the coverage of the public pension system accounted for 72 percent of the
population, while the private pension system covered just 60 percent by 2000. The
problem of coverage is rooted in the structure of Chile’s labor market, which is
characterized by high levels of self-employment and an informal labor force. Among the
self-employed, who account for 28 percent of Chile’s labor force, only 4 percent were
engaged in the new pension system in 2000. Approximately, 1.5 million self-employed
workers were not enrolled in the system (Borzutzky, 2003, Mideplan, 2000). The 10%
mandatory employee contribution coupled with the nature of Chile’s labor market
reduces the incentive for low-wage workers to contribute to the privatized pension
system. As a result, only a minority from Chile’s labor force makes regular contributions
to the pension system, which reduces the likelihood that participants will accumulate
sufficient funds in their personal accounts to maintain a minimum standard of living upon
retirement. In 2006, projections that were based on the history of worker contributions
demonstrated that a large share of the pension system’s participants would indeed face
financial hardship upon retirement. And 45% of participants would also have pensions
below the minimum pension guarantee threshold and would not have met the level of
contribution required to qualify for the subsidized government benefit (Solange et al.,
2006). An additional problem with the privatized pension reforms is that the high
administrative costs, which reduce retirement benefits, also had a negative effect on the
level of participation in the system. Administrative cost that is paid to pension fund
managers reduce the rate of benefits from 12.7 percent before the reforms to 7.4 percent
after their implementation (Kay, 1997).

8.6. Democratic Transition and the Welfare State: Continuity and Change
In the 1988 plebiscite the Chilean people voted to reject 8 more years of military
rule in favor of democratic elections in 1989 that brought the Concertación coalition
government, led by Patricio Aylwin, to office. The new government continued the neoliberalization economic policies of the junta and went even further in the process of
integrating Chile into the global economy. Immediately upon taking office, the Aylwin
government reduced the uniform tariff from 15% to 11% in 1991. Unilaterally reduced,
even further, the uniform tariff from 11% to 6% from 1999 to 2003 (Bravo-Ortega, 2006,
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p. 11; p. 13). And from 1997 to 2009, various Concertación administrations have also
extended trade liberalization by negotiating a series of bilateral and multilateral free trade
agreements. Currently, Chile has signed 13 Free Trade Agreements, two Free Trade
association agreements with MERCOSUR and the European Union and five Economic
Complementation Agreements 17 (See Table 8.7).
However, while continuing and in some respects deepening the free market
policies inherited from the military junta, the Aylwin government also implemented
changes in Chile’s social welfare policies. In terms of education the government
expanded spending for elementary, secondary and post-secondary schools. Table 8.8
shows that public expenditure on education increased from U.S $940.3 million in 1990 to
U.S $3017.7 million in 2001. Moreover, pubic spending per student in primary,
secondary and post-secondary schools almost tripled the amounts spent from 1990 to
2002. Consequently, relative to the years under military rule, working class children have
greater access to public education. The dropout rate among children from low income
families have been reduced from 4%, for the first half of the 1990s, to 2% in 1997 (Cox,
2004, p. 5). There was also a marked improvement in the learning performance among
schools with different systems (municipal schools or government subsidized private
schools) and these improvements were not biased in favor of private schools. The
improvement in learning performance, access and retention rates among low-income
children were also a result of the expansion and improved forms of social assistance. The
expansion in government funded social assistance included food, health care, schoolmaterials supply and grant programs. The main support for primary education came in the
form of school meals and health care. In 2003, 867,589 primary students received school
lunches, while another 100,415 received eyeglasses and hearing aids (Cox, 2004, p. 7; pp.
12-17).
In terms of housing, the government continued the practices of the junta by
allowing private sector participation in the construction of new homes but increased
public spending on housing by 50%. The government also changed the eligibility
requirements for public housing programs to benefit low-income families and provided
17

These are agreement to establish a framework for negotiations leading to the creation of free tra
de.
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subsidies to poor neighborhoods to fund utilities. And while the government maintained
the structure of privatized heath care, it increased funding for the public health care
portions of the system that largely served the poor, especially primary care services. The
government increased the salaries of health workers in the public sector and gave more
authority to local and regional governments over the distribution of equipment and
health-care resources and provisions (Hudson, 1994).
The privatized structure of Chile’s pension system was maintained by various
Concertación administrations. The Aylwin government, however, increased the minimum
pension that was paid of what remained of the state-run pay-as-you-go system by 30%
(Hudson, 1994). In 2006, the Concertación government led by Michelle Bachelet moved
to reform the private pension system to address the problems of coverage and the low
participation among low income and the self-employed members of the labor force.
Referred to as the “reform of the reform” became law in 2008 and sought to strengthen
Chile’s private pension system. The latest reforms created a new and more generous noncontributory “solidarity pension” that replaces both the means-tested PASIS benefit and
the minimum pension guarantee that was established by the military junta. In 2012 when
the reform is fully phased in, elders with family incomes of less than 60% of the national
average will be eligible for a full solidarity pension provided that they have no
contributory pension benefit. Under the pension system that was created by the junta,
low-income workers had little incentive to contribute once they qualified for the
minimum pension guarantee. Under the new system, every additional income that is
contributed to the personal accounts will earn an extra return. The reform includes other
measures that are designed to increase participation in the system. The reforms make
participation by the self-employed mandatory. This requirement will be phased in over a
seven-year period. The reforms also seek to boost the participation of young low-income
workers by paying subsidies to their employers who offer them formal-sector jobs. The
personal retirement accounts for women will also be supplemented to compensate for
time spent as non-contributors, while providing child care at home. In addition, the new
reforms include measures that will reduce the administrative fees that are charged by
pension fund managers plus measures that will improve competition among AFPs
(Jackson et al., 2009, pp. 32-33) .
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8.7. Future Challenges of the Welfare State
There is tension between the Concertación government’s social welfare initiatives and its
commitment to deepen Chile’s integration into the global economy. This tension will
become more pronounced as Chile’s aging population increasingly demand greater
outlays in social assistance. In addition, since Chile’s economy is deeply integrated into
the global market, price fluctuations for copper and a prolonged recession in global
capital markets could undermine the financial viability of public expenditures in
education, housing and health care as well as threaten pension funds that are increasingly
invested in overseas capital markets (OECD, 1998, pp. 17-18). While the Concertación
government, in the context of maintaining its domestic economic neo-liberal agenda, has
benefited from the sustained growth of the global economy over the last two decades to
fund Chile’s social programs, the recent collapse of global financial system and the
subsequent recession in major industrial economies will most likely force the government
to retrench the quasi nature of the welfare state.
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8.8. Tables
Table 8.1: Social Spending During the Allende Government (millions U.S. dollar)
1965-69*
139.4
281.9
133.7
0.3
6.9
0.8
562.8
32.2

1970
154.2
362.0
108.6
0.7
7.8
1.9
635.2
28.9

1971
211.6
473.2
229.0
0.6
8.4
1.5
924.2
33.5

1972
247.8
524.2
228.3
0.8
10.6
0.8
1012.6
34.3

1973
237.2
354.9
220.9
0.7
5.3
0.3
828.5
21.6

Health
Education
Housing
Child Assistance
Social Assistance
Social Subsistence
TOTAL
% of total Expenditure+
*
Average
+
Excluding debt service expenses
Source: World Bank, Chile, An Economy in Transition (Washington, D.C., 1980), p. 165.
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Table 8.2: Itinerary of Import Tariff Reductions, 1973-1991
Date

Maximum
% of Items
Tariff
% of
Average
Tariff
Subject to Tariff
Mode
Items
Tariff
December 31, 1973
220
8.0
90
12.4
94.0
March 1, 1974
200
8.2
80
12.3
90.0
March 27, 1974
160
17.1
70
13.0
80.0
June 5, 1974
149
14.4
60
13.0
67.0
January 16, 1975
120
8.2
55
13.0
52.0
August 13, 1975
90
1.6
40
20.3
44.0
February 9, 1976
80
0.5
35
24.0
38.0
June 7, 1976
65
0.5
30
21.2
33.0
December 23, 1976
65
0.5
20
26.2
27.0
January 8, 1977
55
0.5
20
24.7
24.0
May 2, 1977
45
0.6
20
25.8
22.4
August 29, 1977
35
1.6
20
26.3
19.8
December 3, 1977
25
22.9
15
37.0
15.7
June 1, 1978
25
21.6
10
51.6
13.9
June 1, 1979
10
99.5
10
99.5
10.1
March 23, 1983
20
99.5
20
99.5
20.0
February 9, 1984
35
99.5
35
99.5
35.0
March 1, 1985
30
99.5
30
99.5
30.0
June 29, 1985
20
99.5
20
99.5
22.0
January 5, 1988
15
99.5
15
99.5
15.0
June 1, 1991
11
99.5
11
99.5
11.0
Source: Ffrench-Davis, Ricardo. (1987) Import Liberalization: The Chilean Experience,
1973-1982. In Military Rule in Chile: Dictatorship and Oppositions, edited by J.S
Valenzuela and A. Valenzuela. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University
Press.
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Table 8.3: The Elimination of Non-Tariff Barriers (NTB's)
Instruments

Import Prohibitions
products

The Situation in 1973:
The Number of Product
Categories Affected
187

Dates when Relaxed
and Eliminated
August 1976: Down to 6
April 1978: Down to 5

products
August 1981: All
eliminated
Prior Deposits*
granted

2,872

January 1974: Wavers
August 1976: Eliminated

Import Licenses**
2,278
January 1974: Eliminated
Source: Sebastian Edwards, and Daniel Lederman. (1998) The Political Economy of
Unilateral Trade Liberalization: The Case of Chile. In NBER Working Paper Series.
Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, p. 60.
*Required a 90-day non-interest bearing deposit at the Central Bank, which was
equivalent to 10% of the value of the imported item.
**Government approval was required prior to importation.

138

Table 8.4: Chile's Inflation, 1973-89 (% change)
1973
605.9
1974
369.2
1975
343.2
1976
197.9
1977
84.2
1978
37.2
1979
38.0
1980
31.2
1981
9.9
1982
20.7
1983
23.1
1984
23.0
1985
26.4
1986
17.4
1987
21.5
1988
12.7
1989
21.4
Source: Sebastain Edwards and Alejandra Cox Edwards, Monetarism and Liberalism:
The Chilean Experiment (University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 28; p. 213)
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Table 8.5: Chile vs. Latin America: Average Annual Growth Rates (percentages), 1965 –
2008 (Alessandri, Frei, Allende, Pinochet and Concertación Administrations)
Year

Chile
Latin America
The Alessandri Years
1961
4.8
4.3
1962
4.7
3.5
1963
6.3
7.3
1964
2.2
5.1
The Frei Years
1965
0.8
4.7
1966
11.2
4.5
1967
3.2
6.0
1968
3.6
7.1
1969
3.7
6.8
1970
2.1
6.7
The Allende Years
1971
9.0
6.8
1972
-1.2
7.0
1973
-5.6
8.3
The Pinochet Years
1974
1.0
7.0
1975
-12.9
3.8
1976
3.5
5.4
1977
9.9
4.8
1978
8.2
5.1
1979
8.3
6.5
1980
7.5
5.9
1981
5.3
1.7
1982
-10.3
-1.4
1983
-3.8
-2.5
1984
8.0
3.7
1985
7.1
2.6
1986
5.6
4.1
1987
6.6
3.4
1988
7.3
0.5
1989
10.6
0.9
The Concertación Years
Patricio Aylwin Govt.
1990
3.7
0.3
1991
8.0
4.6
1992
12.3
3.9
1993
7.0
3.7
_______________________________________________________________________
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Table 8.5: Chile vs. Latin America: Average Annual Growth Rates (percentages), 1965 –
2008 (Alessandri, Frei, Allende, Pinochet and Concertación Administrations), (continued)
Chile
Latin America
The Concertación Years
Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle Govt.
Year
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999

5.7
4.7
10.6
0.6
7.4
3.5
6.6
5.5
3.2
2.4
-0.8
0.2
Ricardo Lagos Govt.
2000
4.5
3.9
2001
3.4
0.3
2002
2.2
-0.5
2003
3.9
2.2
2004
6.0
6.1
2005
5.6
4.9
Michelle Bachelet Govt.
2006
4.6
5.6
2007
4.7
5.8
2008
3.2
4.4
________________________________________________________________________
______
Source: Data for the years 1961-1981 was adapted from Jorge Rodriguez Grossi, ed,
Perspectivas Economicas Para La Democracia: Balance y lecciones Para La Experiencia
Chilena (Santiago: Instituto Chileno de Estudios Humanisticos, 1984), p. 32. Data for the
years 1982-2008 was adapted from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators,
2009.
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Table 8.6: Government Social Spending, 1961-1981 (% GDP)
Alessandri Years
1961
1963

17.0
16.3
Frei Years

1965
1967
1969

20.0
20.1
18.7
Allende Years

1970
1971
1972

19.9
25.2
25.8

Pinochet Years
1974
17.6
1975
18.3
1977
17.4
1979
15.4
1981
14.3
Source: Adopted from, Arellano, José-Pablo. (1985) Social Policies in Chile: An Historic
al Review. Journal of Latin American Studies 17:397-418.
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Table 8.7: Chile: Trade Agreements of the Concertación Government
Bilateral Free
Free Trade
Economic Complementation+
Trade Agreements
Associations
Agreements
1997 - Canada
1996 - MERCOSUR
1993 - Bolivia
1998 - Mexico
2003 - European Union
1993 - Venezuela
1999 - Central America
1994 - Colombia
2002 - Costa Rica
1995 - Ecuador
2002 - El Salvador
1995 - Peru
#
2004 - EFTA
2004 - U.S
2004 - South Korea
2006 - Panama
2006 - China
2007 - India*
2007 - Japan
2009 - Australia
*
Trade agreement comes with safe guards.
#
EFTA countries include: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland.
Source: Adopted from McGill University’s Preferential Trade Agreement Database,
which can be accessed at http://ptas.mcgill.ca
+
Economic Complementation is an agreement to establish a framework for negotiations
leading to the creation of free trade. Information on these agreements were adopted from,
Tim Martyn, Complete Guide to Regional Trade Agreements of the Asia-Pacific. The
Australian APEC Study Center, 2001.
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Table 8.8: Public Expenditure on Education by various Concertación Administrations;
Spending per Student, by Level, 1990-2002
Public Expenditure
on Education
($US Million 2001)

Ministry of education,
spending per student
Each year, by educational level
(US$ Million 2001)

Year
Primary
Secondary Post-secondary
1990
940.3
231.8
213.8
823.3
1991
1035.5
244.8
216.5
1109.3
1992
1176.4
270.1
270.7
1111.9
1993
1328.5
302.8
296.3
1097.4
1994
1461.3
325.5
324.5
1148.0
1995
1620.2
371.0
396.3
1180.0
1996
1840.6
402.3
441.1
1240.1
1997
2017.8
443.4
494.3
1319.5
1998
2214.7
480.5
546.0
1333.0
1999
2412.3
518.7
550.0
1417.1
2000
2617.8
539.5
609.6
1374.0
2001
2788.8
582.8
623.5
1360.5
2002
3017.7
N/A
N/A
N/A
%Growth in per student spending
151.4
191.7
63.5
Source: Cristián Cox. 2004. Innovation and reform to improve the quality of primary
education: Chile (EFA Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2005, The Quality
Imperative), p. 34.
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Chapter 9
Globalization and the Welfare State in Spain
9.1. Introduction
From the autocratic regime of Francisco Franco, which pursued an ISI industrial
strategy that featured protectionist trade policies and where social benefits were
developmental in nature and limited to workers in the industrial sector, to the Socialist
government (PSOE) of Manuel Chaves González where social benefits were universal in
nature but commensurate with the government’s neo-liberal economic strategy, the
changing nature of Spain’s welfare state is largely correlated with variations in the
interaction between the country’s integration into the global economy and changes within
its domestic political system.
This chapter begins with a brief overview of Spain’s political history and then
highlights the ways in which the ISI industrial strategy of Franco’s dictatorship, unlike
Chile’s military regime but similar to South Korea’s military rulers, established a
developmental welfare state with limited social benefits. The chapter then discusses how
Franco’s ISI developmental strategy undermined economic growth and precipitated the
crisis of Spain’s developmental welfare state. The chapter then examines how the
Stabilization Plan that was adopted by Franco’s regime and continued by the transitional
government to arrest the country’s economic crisis gradually liberalized the economy,
while facilitating reforms in Spain’s social welfare policies. This is followed by a
discussion of how the restoration of democracy, especially during the leadership of the
PSOE government, deepened Spain’s integration into the global economy, significantly
expanded the country’s social welfare policies but increasingly tied this expansion to the
growth of the market economy. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how Spain’s
aging population challenges the future sustainability of the country’s social policies.

9.2. Historical Overview
Franco and the military participated in a failed coup d'état against the Popular
Front government, which led to the Spanish civil war from 1936 to 1939. During this
conflict, Franco emerged as the leader of the Nationalists against the Popular Front
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government. After winning the civil war with assistance from Hitler’s Germany and
Mussolini’s Italy, Franco dissolved the Spanish Parliament and established an autocratic
regime from 1939 until his death in 1975. And during World War II Franco permitted
Spanish volunteers – the Blue Division – to join the Nazis in the fight against the Soviet
Bolsheviks on the Eastern Front as re-payment for Germany’s support during the civil
war. In 1946, the United Nations (UN) imposed diplomatic sanctions against the Franco
regime for its support of the Axis powers and considered using economic sanctions to
promote democratization in Spain (Baklanoff, 1978, Harrison, 1985). The post-war
diplomatic isolation and the threat of economic sanctions strengthened economic
nationalism as the Franco regime’s control of foreign trade and the adoption of an ISI
development strategy induced the establishment of a developmental welfare state
(Anderson, 1970).
Before his death, Franco declared that Juan Carlos would be his successor as King.
With this declaration a constitutional monarchy was established in 1977, which oversaw
the formation of a political confederation by several centrist political parties that led to
the creation of the Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD). In the elections of June 15,
1977 the UCD received 34.4% of the vote taking 166 of the 350 seats in the Congress of
Deputies. After 38 years of dictatorship, the transitional UCD led government governed
in a coalition with rightist and leftist parties in the Congress. The UCD ruled the country
until its defeat to the PSOE in the 1982 general election in which it received only 6.7% of
the vote and 11 seats. The party’s conservative electoral base defected and gave their
support to the newly created alliance between the Democratic Popular Party (PDP) and
the Popular Alliance (AP). During its tenure in office the PSOE implemented a number
of neo-liberal economic reforms that set the stage for Spain’s entrance into the European
Economic Community (EEC). The alliance between the PDP and AP eventually led to
the establishment of the Peoples Party (PP) - the principal conservative political
opposition that defeated the PSOE in the 1996 general election.

9.3. Import-Substitution and the Developmental Welfare State
Spain’s post-war diplomatic isolation and the threat of economic sanctions against
the Franco regime reinforced the protectionist tradition that characterized Spain’s trade
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policy since the late 1800s (Oliver-Alonso and Valles, 2005, World Bank, 1963). The
threat of economic sanctions gave impetus to economic nationalism, which created the
conditions in which the ISI developmental strategy was adopted (Pittsburgh Post-Gazette,
1947). The Franco regime established the National Institute of Industry (INI) to give
incentives to domestic firms to manufacture products that would substitute for imports
(Anderson, 1970). In addition to high tariffs, import licenses and quotas were frequently
used to strengthen national firms by restricting competition from foreign importers
(Anderson, 1970, Baklanoff, 1978).
Franco’s trade policy was consistent with the logic of ISI development.
Technological inputs used in domestic industry were imported from behind high trade
barriers. The regime’s trade policies consisted of a system of multiple exchange rates, the
importation of industrial inputs, quotas and state-monopolized trade agreements. The
system of multiple exchange rates not only restricted trade but also severely discouraged
foreign investment (World Bank, 1963). Imports were limited to technological inputs
such as raw materials, semi-finished products, machinery and various chemical inputs
that were critical for domestic industrial production. Thirty-eight percent of Spain’s
imports between 1960 to 1961 consisted of industrial inputs and sixty-two percent
consisted of quotas and state-monopolized trade (Baklanoff, 1978). The composition of
trade from the 1950s to the 1970s, as shown in Table 9.1, largely reflected the economic
autarchy of the Franco regime, which would prove unsustainable with the onset of the
near collapse of the economy by the early to mid-1950s.
Given the developmental nature of Franco’s welfare state, social benefits were
limited to workers in the industrial sectors (Cousins, 1995, Gibbons, 1999). To encourage
the worker productivity, the regime introduced compulsory insurance for retirement and
health care for workers in the industrial sector (See, Table 9.2). In 1942, the regime
provided Health Insurance for low-income industrial workers and their dependants. In
1947, the Old Age and Invalid Insurance Program was introduced, which provided old
age subsidies for disabled and low-income industrial workers who were respectively over
the age of 60 and 65 years. Private sector firms’ contribution to the program was based on
a pay-as-you-go system, while public sector firms made contributions via the Regimen de
Clases Pasivas (RCP). In 1946, health care benefits covered just 30% of population
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(Cousins, 1995).

9.4. Economic Crisis, Liberalism and the Reform of the Developmental Welfare State
As a result of the adverse residual effects of the civil war and the failure of
Franco’s ISI development strategy, Spain was far more economically retarded in 1940s
than in the previous decade. By the early 1950s, the ISI model proved inadequate to
generate economic growth. Spain’s per capita GDP was barely 40 percent of the average
for Western Europe countries. The country experienced high levels of inflation, the
tripling of consumer prices and negative growth rates in some years. The ISI-induced
economic crisis, like Allende’s Chile, led to the growth of the black market and rationing
(Solsten and Meditz, 1988). Moreover, the protectionist trade policies of ISI undermined
Spain’s technological development and depleted the country’s foreign exchange reserves.
Such reserves, which were US$58 million in 1958, dropped to US$6 million by mid1959. And given the growing demands of the emerging middle class for imported food
and luxury items coupled with the regime’s restraints on foreign trade, exports collapsed
and the value of the Spanish peseta fell on the black market, all of which increased the
country’s balance of payments deficits (Oliver-Alonso and Valles, 2005, 184, Solsten and
Meditz, 1988).
To pull Spain form the economic crisis, the Franco regime adopted the
recommendations for liberal economic reforms that were advocated by a group of
developmental technocrats that included bankers, industrial executives, some academic
economists and members of the semi-secret Roman Catholic lay organization - Opus Dei
(Giner, 1986, Moreno, 2001). An important aspect of these reforms called for an overhaul
of the tax collection system, which increased tax revenues, and coupled with a program
of monetary and fiscal restraints the public sector, by 1958, were no longer experiencing
deficits but reported a surplus. In addition, Spain joined the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation
(OECD) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). These institutions
brought about significant reforms to Spain’s trade policies through a series of initiatives,
which included the introduction of a single exchange rate regime and the liberalization of
price controls and trade restrictions (Solsten and Meditz, 1988). In implementing these
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reforms, tariff rates (both nominal and effective) were significantly reduced. The average
level of tariffs declined by 21 percent from 18.7 percent in 1961 to 15.5 percent in 1970
(Baklanoff, 1978, Heston et al., 2006).
The liberal economic reforms allowed the Franco regime to avoid the possibility
of suspending its debt payments to foreign banks that held Spanish currency, and by the
end of 1959 Spain’s balance payments showed a US$100-million surplus. The reforms,
moreover, facilitated a steep increase in foreign direct investment between 1960 and 1974
that amounted to US$7.6 billion, which later contributed to the growth of the economy by
an impressive 7 percent from 1962 to 1974 (Oliver-Alonso and Valles, 2005, Solsten and
Meditz, 1988).
However, the initial effect of these reforms was deflationary and recessionary as
they significantly deteriorated real incomes and raised unemployment in the first years of
their implementation. The rise in unemployment and reduced wages led to the emigration
of approximately 500,000 Spanish workers to other West European countries in search
for employment. In a country where social policies were limited the negative effects of
the reforms on the Spanish working class induced a crisis in the developmental welfare
state. In addition, although the Franco regime outlawed collective bargaining and
organized labor unions, the frequency of strikes among industrial sector workers
drastically increased, which in turn triggered the growth of various social movements that
called for greater democratization and an expansion of the welfare state (Hipsher, 1996,
Hooper, 1986, Mangen, 2001, Ramon, 1985, Solsten and Meditz, 1988).
In response to the growing dissatisfaction among the industrial working class, the
Franco regime sought to modernize Spain’s social policies in an attempt to appease
striking workers as well as to increase the efficiency of existing social programs. There
were no attempts to transform Spain’s limited developmental welfare state into one that
provided universal access to social benefits, which was the standard for most countries in
Western Europe (Rodriguez, 1993). As shown in Table 9.2, the regime introduced
unemployment and illness insurance and social security programs that largely targeted
workers in Spain’s industrial sectors. The provision of social security benefits were based
on the occupational category of workers and the level of contributions provided by the
affiliated private and public sector firms (Cousins, 1995, Lieberman, 1982, Rodriguez,
149

1993). In addition, the regime created temporary work programs that were designed to
provide employment relief from the recessionary effects of the liberal economic reforms
(Lieberman, 1982, Mangen, 2001). Even with the attempts to modernize social policy,
welfare spending in Spain remained at 4 percent of GDP throughout the 1960s, which
was far below the standard of Western European countries (Mangen, 2001).

9.5. The Oil Crisis, the Transitional Centrist and the Developmental Welfare State
The return to democracy in Spain correlated with the quadrupling of imported oil
prices. And given the fact the Spain imported 70% of its energy, the oil price shocks of
the 1970s produced an inflationary effect on economic output. However, since the
political capital of the centrist government of Adolfo Suarez Gonzalez was largely spent
on drafting the new constitution and negotiating the terms for the transition to democracy,
the government failed to implement the necessary economic policies that would help the
country adjust to the inflationary pressures of the global economy. Consequently,
industrial productivity plummeted, which was followed by a sharp increase in wages and
consumer prices. As the economy contracted, Spain experienced a reversal in its
migration trends due to the economic recession throughout Western Europe as well as an
increased outflow of labor from the rural areas that sought diminishing job prospects in
the cities. Together, these factors contributed to the sharp increase in the country’s
unemployment. The recessionary effects of the oil price shocks and government inaction
resulted in job losses for 1.5 million workers and by 1982 – the last year of transitional
government - unemployment stood at 17 percent (Harrison, 1985, Mangen, 2001, Solsten
and Meditz, 1988).
The negotiations between the Suarez government and the political opposition
produced the - Pactos de la Moncloa (The Moncloa Pacts) in October 1977, which was a
series of agreements that defined the process of democratization. These agreements
guaranteed a free press, the right of labor unions to organize, the legalization of political
parties, the submission of the military to civilian authority, the establishment of local
government through open elections, and immunity for members of Franco’s regime for
actions taken during the dictatorship. The creation of a new constitution via a referendum
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in December 1978 formalized Spain’s transition to democracy (Oliver-Alonso and Valles,
2005).
The Moncloa Pacts also established the basic structure of Spain’s limited welfare
state during the transitional period. In terms of welfare reform, the Suarez government
was similar to the Franco regime in that it sought to improve the efficiency and the
quality of social services under the existing welfare system by restructuring the
fragmentary and duplicative ways in which agencies delivered welfare benefits (Mangen,
2001). But more importantly, the Moncloa Pacts created a framework that guided the
government’s use of social policy to compensate the industrial working class during the
economic crisis. In this regard, the government expanded unemployment benefits for
industrial workers by extending unemployment entitlements from 12 to 18 months
(McMillion, 1981, OECD, 1984). Health care coverage was also extended to selfemployed professionals and government subsidies were given to private firms as an
incentive to create industrial jobs (Baklanoff, 1978). However, the Moncloa Pacts
between the Suarez government and the political opposition made no provision for a
comprehensive reform of Franco’s developmental welfare state. Such reforms would later
emerge under conditions of greater political democratization and the deepening of
Spain’s economic integration into the European community.

9.6. Neo-Liberal Socialists, European Integration and Comprehensive Welfare Reform
When the PSOE took office in October 1982, the socialist government inherited
an economy where inflation was running at an annual rate of 16%, the trade deficit stood
at US$4 billion, the public sector experienced large deficits, and Spain’s foreign
exchange reserves were nearly depleted. But having secured an absolute majority in both
houses of the Spanish parliament, the socialist government combined its agenda for
comprehensive social reform with a neoliberal economic strategy and was able to
implement unpopular economic adjustment measures that brought the economy back into
balance (Magone, 2004, Solsten and Meditz, 1988).
To reduce the public sector deficit, the government brought the debt-ridden social
security system into better balance. The government passed its pension reform legislation
in 1985, which involved substantial cuts in benefits and saved US$600 million (Beremo
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and Gacia-Duran, 1994, p.109). And through a series of privatization initiatives the
socialist government sought to expand the role of the private sector in the economy.
These initiatives included the closing of state-run corporations that were unprofitable and
privatizing others that belonged to the state holding company INT (National Industry
Institute). In other instances, the government downsized state-owned companies in the
coal, iron and steel industries. PSOE also passed legislation that ended the state’s
monopoly of the telecommunications industry and liberalized the energy sector by
allowing the pipeline network of Repsol – the state owned Oil Company – to be used by
private competitors. In addition, PSOE slashed corporate taxes by 8 percent to improve
the competitiveness and profitability of Spanish firms (Polavieja and Richards, 2001,
Richards, 1999, pp. 167-168). The government also moved quickly to deregulate the
labor market in order to encourage private investment and make the economy more
competitive. The uniform structure of wages in an inflationary economy undermined
corporate investment since the existing rigidity of the labor market restricted the ability
of private firms to reduce their indebtedness (Beremo and Gacia-Duran, 1994, p. 108).
The neoliberal economic strategy of the socialist government also included the
liberalization of trade, which was largely driven by Spain’s entry into the European
Economic Community (EEC) (Heston, et al., 2006). The PSOE signed the Treaty of
Accession to the EEC in 1986, which reduced tariffs to zero for imports coming from
member countries of the EEC (Ferrera, 2005). The “Europeanization” of Spain was
finalized when the socialist government signed the Maastricht Treaty, which established
Spain’s membership in the European Monetary Union (Oliver-Alonso and Valles, 2005).
The neoliberal adjustment measures of the PSOE reduced the budget deficit to 5
percent in 1985. Inflation was reduced to 4.5% in 1987 and the deregulation of the labor
market contained the growth of real wages below the rate of inflation. Spain's industrial
output grew at a rate of 5.2% in 1987 and its real GDP registered a growth rate of 5.5
percent, which was the largest rate of expansion among OECD countries during that year
(Solsten and Meditz, 1988).
While the stabilization and growth of the economy provided the PSOE with the
financial basis to pursue welfare reform, European integration, which required the
comprehensive expansion of Spain’s social policies to meet European standards, provided
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the government with an external political motive to extend universal health, education
and social protection benefits (Guillen and Alvarez, 2001). The passage of the General
Health Act universalized health care services for all citizens and foreign residents in
Spain. Health care coverage increased to 99.8 percent of the population in 1991(Almeda
and Sarasa, 1996). The government also expanded unemployment benefits to 50 percent
of the unemployed, and social benefits to primary and secondary public education was
expanded to cover students between 4 and 15 years old. At the university level, the
provision of government funded scholarships allowed low-income families to have
greater access to higher education (Moreno and Arriba, 1998).
The ‘Europeanization’ of Spain brought the country’s social policies closer to the
European standard (Oliver-Alonso and Valles, 2005). During its tenure in office (19801996), the socialist government’s welfare reform expanded overall social spending from
25 percent of GDP in 1975 to 40 percent in 1996. Social protection spending increased
from 15.6 percent GDP in 1980 to 20.7 percent in 1990 (Guillen and Alvarez, 2001). The
government’s spending on pensions also increased from 8.5 percent of GDP in 1982 to
10.5 percent in 1995 (OECD, 1999), and as Table 9.3 shows, aggregate per capita social
spending on education, social security and health care increased from US$1,311 in 1975
to $US2,625 in 1996.
The Spanish case shows that the transformation of the country’s social policies
was a function of the interactive and mutually reinforcing process of the political
transformation of the state and the economic integration into the European community. In
response to the economic crisis of the 1950s and 1970s, Spain abandoned economic
nationalism as well as the developmental nature of its social policies and embraced
economic liberalization and democracy, while constructing a universal welfare state.
Notwithstanding the attempts by the Franco regime to liberalize the economy during the
1960s and the 1970s, further liberalization was largely a product of Spain’s membership
in the EEC, which required not only the consolidation of democracy but also the
comprehensive reform of the welfare state.

9.7. The Future Challenge to the Welfare State
Like most countries in the European Union, Spain’s aging population poses the
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greatest threat to the future financial viability of the welfare state, especially the pension
system. Given the fact that the country’s fertility rate is 1.2, which is the lowest in the
European community, and that 20 percent of the population in 2020 will be over sixtyfive years old, Spain faces a future of extreme demographic aging and soaring retirement
costs (European Commission, 1998, Moreno, 2001). It is estimated that in countries like
Spain, Italy, Germany and France the total burden of pension expenditures (if the current
unfunded pay-as-you-go pension system is left unchanged) is expected to rise to
approximately 90% of GDP from 2000 to 2050 (Rother et al., 2004). However, with
fewer workers to cover the rising costs of pensions, Spain’s future pension debt is
estimated to be 244 percent of GDP by 2050. This is significantly larger than its current
debt, which is 49.7 percent of GDP that is owed to creditors (Thomas, 2010, p.1). 18
A major overall of the pension system is vital to the financial sustainability of
Spain’s welfare state. Such reform may entail a combination of various options such as
establishing private pension accounts, increasing the retirement age or increasing taxes.
These options, however, will be politically costly for Spain’s policy makers. However, if
governments lack the political courage to reform how the current pension system is
funded, then Spain’s mounting pension deficits will decrease future governments’ ability
to finance social policies because the high interest payments that are accrued from such
debt will crowd out spending priorities on health care, education and social protection
programs.

18

It must be noted that the rise in immigration flows to Spain has merely delayed the impending
debt crisis of Spain’s pension system. In the short term, since immigrants tend to be young they
help finance pensions by adding to the ranks of working-age contributors. However, in the long
term immigrants also grow old, and therefore add to the ranks of retired beneficiaries.
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9.8. Tables
Table 9.1: Spain: Composition of Foreign Trade, by Product Categories, 1959 and 1973
(percentage)
Imports
Exports
1959
1973
1959
1973
Food product
7.5
14.1
57.2
29.3
Raw materials (a)
9.9
3.7
Semi-Finished Products (b)
(a+b) 68.
(a+b) 50.2
21.9
23.1
Capital Goods
19.3
27.0
3.0
23.2
Consumer manufactures
4.9
8.7
9.0
20.7
Total
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Source: Banco Central, Estudio economico (1974:118-19) tables IV-12-13; Banco de
Bilbao, Informe economico (1973:157) in Baklanoff (1978:69)
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Table 9.2: Social Policy of the Developmental Welfare State in Spain: The Franco
Regime 1939-1975
19391959

The Period of Import Substitution Industrialization and Economic
Decline

1939

Old age subsidy for low income workers over 65 years or for those with
disabilities over 60 years – consolidated in 1947 as Old Age and
Invalidity Insurance Program

1942

Health insurance for low income workers and their dependants
(coverage 30% of
population in 1946 rising to 44% by 1960)

Mid1940s

Mutual Aid Associations (providing benefits for retirement, disability,
long illness, widows and orphans and hence duplicating the insurance
programs)

19601974

The Period of Liberal Economic Reforms and Economic Growth

1961

Unemployment insurance for affiliates of retirements and illness
insurance schemes

1963

Basic Law of Social Security – a Bismarckian scheme along
occupational lines and based on contributions of the affiliates – benefits
linked to professional and
occupational categories
Non contributive pensions

1963
1972

Reform of social security – members contributions began to be linked
to real incomes

1970

Reform of education system – mandatory and free of charge 6 to 14
years, now 16 years
Source: Gullien (1992) and Cousins (1995)
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Table 9.3: Spain’s Social Spending Per Capita from 1972 and in 1997 (in constant US $)
Year
Education
Social Security
Health
Total
1972
152.3
877.2
17.3
1046.8
1973
160.7
962.3
16.5
1139.5
1974
159.9
1041.2
18.2
1219.3
1975
170.3
1121.7
20.0
1311.9
1976
182.9
1147.0
17.4
1347.2
1977
214.5
1315.5
18.5
1548.5
1978
236.1
1487.2
19.1
1742.4
1979
224.7
1604.3
23.5
1852.5
1980
235.5
1728.0
19.9
1983.4
1981
229.2
1748.0
19.4
1996.6
1982
217.7
2138.2
18.2
2374.1
1983
195.5
2195.1
18.9
2409.5
1984
218.3
1694.3
463.5
2376.1
1985
214.4
1523.1
490.9
2228.4
1986
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
1987
212.0
1513.3
519.8
2245.1
1988
242.4
1596.7
551.6
2390.7
1989
259.0
1697.8
630.0
2586.8
1990
250.1
1834.3
331.8
2416.2
1991
233.9
1909.1
304.1
2447.1
1992
229.7
2027.4
324.7
2581.7
1993
235.2
2218.6
344.4
2798.2
1994
226.0
2166.8
328.1
2720.9
1995
227.5
2140.4
303.4
2671.3
1996
201.3
2115.9
308.4
2625.5
1997
192.9
2166.0
319.9
2678.8
Source: IMF, Government Finance Statistics and International Finance Statistics, various years.
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Chapter 10
Globalization and the Welfare State: Theoretical and Policy Implications
10.1. Summary of the Main Findings
The theoretical argument of this study is that economic globalization, by default,
exerts a downward pressure on the social policies of states largely through the operations
of transnational corporations. However, since globalization’s effect on social policy is
conditional on endogenous political forces such as regime type, democratization,
electoral competition and political participation, its proclivity to retrench the welfare state
is averted by the preferences of political actors and institutions to expand social spending.
This argument found consistent empirical support via a series of cross-sectional
regressions that estimated the interactive effects of economic globalization and various
measures of domestic political institutions and affiliations for a sample of 120 countries
from 1970 to 2002.
The study’s theoretical argument was also demonstrated in the case study analyses
of South Korea, Chile and Spain, which are summarized in table 10.1. The extent to
which the social benefits of the welfare state were limited or comprehensive was
conditional on the interaction between countries’ external trade policies and the political
authority characteristics of their governments. The comparative analyses of seven
regimes in these countries showed that greater democratization, combined with trade and
financial liberalization in South Korea (under Kim Dae-jung), Chile (under the
Concertación government) and Spain (under the PSOE), produced welfare policies with
relatively comprehensive social benefits. Among the democratic regimes only Allende’s
socialist government in Chile established a comprehensive welfare system that was not
associated with economic liberalization. Among the three military dictatorships only
Spain (under Franco) and South Korea (under Park Chung-hee) adopted protectionist
trade policies that were associated with a limited welfare system. Chile (under Augusto
Pinochet) being the only exception among the military rulers whose retrenchment of the
welfare state was associated with greater economic liberalization.
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Theoretical Implications
10.2. Implications for Recent Research
The findings of this study speak to a larger theoretical debate within the
comparative public policy literature on economic globalization’s effect on the welfare
state. Recent empirical research has provided additional support for the efficiency theory
showing that economic globalization has retrenched the welfare state in developing
countries by drastically cutting social benefits to the middle classes (Rudra, 2008). Other
studies have found little evidence of globalization’s retrenchment of the welfare state in
developed countries like Great Britain, the U.S., Germany and Sweden, despite the best
efforts of conservative governments led by Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher
(Pierson, 1996, Pierson, 2001). Still other studies have found no evidence of the
supposedly shrinking welfare state in terms of program design, coverage and government
funding for maternity leave benefits and child care programs among EU and North
American welfare states (Henderson and White, 2004).
The empirical findings of these studies are likely to be artifacts of the limited
sample size, making it impossible to develop a generalizable theory of the welfare state.
A major theoretical contribution of this research is that since the empirical support of its
theory is derived from analyses of 120 developed and developing countries, there is
greater confidence in the generalizability of this study’s theory of the welfare state.
However, beyond questions of sample size, the empirical findings of this study may also
help to make sense of the evidence of recent scholarship.
The fact that recent research has shown that economic globalization exerts a
downward pressure on social spending in developing countries should come without
surprise (Rudra, 2008). Harold Wilensky developed one of the earliest theories of the
welfare state in which he associated the expansion of the welfare state with industrial
economic development, suggesting that industrial economies produce strong welfare
states (Wilensky, 1975). Theoretical insights from the ‘new institutionalism” in political
science arrive at a similar conclusion. Institutionalists argue that since developed
countries, far more than those in the developing world, have extensive administrative and
financial resources to implement social policy, they are more likely to develop expansive
welfare systems (Heclo, 1974). Not only do these arguments explain the broad social
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policy differences between rich and poor countries, but they also contextualize why
globalization’s ‘race to the bottom effect’ on social spending would be more acute among
less affluent countries.
In light of the findings of this research, globalization’s retrenchment of the
welfare state in developing countries is also explained by the fact that high levels of
democratization, electoral competition and political participation – variables that mediate
globalization’s effect on social spending – are weakly constituted into the political
landscape of countries in the developing world. Consequently, in the absence of effective
political institutions, globalization’s proclivity to retrench the welfare state will not be
averted.
Moreover, democratization of political institutions in developed countries have
traditionally reflected and protected the interests of the middle class. In these countries,
high levels of political participation and electoral competition have largely been driven
by middle class voters’ concerns about government policies that affect home ownership,
social security, taxes, health care and the education of their children. It is not surprising
that in developing countries globalization’s downward pressure on social policy will
largely disadvantage the middle class because political institutions are not sufficiently
consolidated to effectively protect their interest.

Policy Implications
10.3. The Future Direction of Social Policy
While this research has argued that reports of the welfare state’s demise at the
hand of economic globalization have been greatly exaggerated, the impending crisis of
the social security system may fundamentally change the design of an important
component of social policy. For most countries the problems of demographic aging pose
a serious threat to the financial viability of the social security system, one of the most
expensive and expansive components of the modern welfare state. Most countries
administer a pension system that is unfunded. Unfunded pensions are called pay-as-yougo because current employees pay pension contributions that are not invested on financial
markets but are immediately disbursed to the current generation of retirees. The pay-as160

you-go systems can begin paying benefits and expand benefits if the population or
productivity grows quickly. However, if the size of the contributing population shrinks,
which is the case with demographic aging, or if productivity declines, which was the case
with the global financial crisis in 2008, then the system veers into crisis. According to
recent projections for the U.S by the Social Security board of trustees, the system in 2016
will begin disbursing more money than it collects, and by 2038 the trust fund will go
bankrupt (Devroye, 2003, p. 316).
In an attempt to ‘save’ social security and provide pension benefits for an aging
population, many countries have made significant changes in the design of the program
and have replaced their unfunded pay-as-you-go systems with fully funded pension
systems. With funded systems the pension contributions of the current generation are
invested in financial markets until the accumulated capital is withdrawn after retirement
and used as retirement income. Following Chile’s example, Bolivia, El Salvador, and
Mexico have embraced pension systems where contributions are fully invested in capital
markets. Other Latin American countries like Colombia, Costa Rica, Peru and Argentina
all have mixed systems that feature funded and unfunded pension accounts (Jackson, et
al., 2009, p. 21). In the U.S., even after the financial crisis in 2008, state governments
have increasingly invested their pension funds in commodity futures, junk bonds, foreign
stocks, deeply discounted mortgage-backed securities and margin investing (Williams,
2010). Given the increasing privatization of social security will increasing global
economic integration with the potential risk of market failure threaten the future stability
of social policy? Or will potential financial gains from greater exposure to the market
compensate for market failure during economic downturns and hence strengthen the
future financial viability of the welfare state? These questions will be answered as the
global economy emerges from the current recession.
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10.4 Table
Table 10.1: Economic Globalization, Regime Type and Welfare Systems
External
Trade Policy

Regime
Type
Authoritarianism

Limited System

Comprehensive
System

Park Chung-hee (Korea)
Franco (Spain)

Protectionism
Allende (Chile)
Democracy
Pinochet (Chile)
Authoritarianism
Economic
Liberalization

Kim Dae-jung (Korea)
Concertacion (Chile)
Socialist (Spain)

Democracy
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Appendix 1: Generating Political Institution Index
The primary purpose of principal components analysis is to detect the main
structure in the relationships among variables covered with the complex dataset and to
express the patterns in the structure by emphasizing their similarities and differences
(Smith, 2002). However, the most important contribution of principal component analysis
is that this analysis allows us to compress the information in the dataset by reducing the
number of dimensions of the structure without losing much information on political
system, once we find the patterns of the structure in the dataset (STATA). Principal
component analysis finds the underlying factors, which shape the variations in the diverse
political variables. 19

TABLE 1. Unrotated Principal Component Factors of Political Institutions
Factor

Eigenvalues

Difference

Proportion

Cumulative

Factor1

2.36528

1.85239

0.7884

0.7884

Factor2

0.51290

0.39107

0.1710

0.9594

Factor3

0.12182

.

0.0406

1.0000

Political Institution Factor: The first factor principal component analysis detects
represents the democratization level, which is the best summary of the linear relationship
among the variables: as we can see in table 1, political institution factor explains

19

The correlation between two variables can be showed in a scatterplot. A regression line
can represent the simplest summary of the linear relationship between the variables. This
means that the regression line reduced the two variables to one factor, which is actually a
linear combination of the two component variables. When we extend the two-variable
case to a multiple-variable case, the basic principles are the same even though the
calculation becomes more complicated. In a multiple-variable case, we can present the
relationship as defining a space similar to using a plane in a two-variable example. In a
three- variable case, a three-dimensional scatterplot can be used, and we could fit a
regression line through the data. If the variable number is more than three, we are unable
to illustrate the data in a real space; however, the logic of linear relationship and rotation
of the axes to the regression line to maximize the variance of the detected factor remains
the same.
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approximately 79% of the variation in the domestic institutional variables. If we could
define a variable, which would approximate the institution factor, then the variable would
capture the most significant pattern among the political institution variables. As Table 1
shows, political institution variables have only one significant factor accepting the
Kaiser’s Criterion 20 and Cattell’s scree plot graph (Figure 1).

0

.5

Eigenvalues
1
1.5

2

2.5

Scree plot of eigenvalues after factor

1

1.5

2
Number

2.5

3

FIGURE: Scree Plot of Eigenvalues after Principal Component Factors of Political
Institutions

20

According to the Kaiser criterion, researchers can retain only factors with eigenvalues greater
than 1. This means we keep factors which extracts at least as much as the equivalent of one
original variable (Kaiser 1960). It is the one most widely used.
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Appendix 2: Data Sources, Measurements and Definitions
A. Government Welfare Spending
Measurement:
Welfare expenditures as a percentage of central government spending
Welfare expenditures as a percentage of GDP
Definition:
Welfare expenditures include social spending on education, health, and social security
from 1970 to 2002. The data is government final consumption expenditure by function at
current prices. (Source: National Accounts Official Country Data 21 by United Nations
Statistics Division)
B. Economic Globalization
Measurement:
Actual flows of trade and investments, and restrictions on trade and capital such as tariff
rates
Definition:
Economic globalization is defined as the long distance flows of goods, capital and
services as well as information and perceptions that accompany market exchanges.
(Dreher 2006; Dreher et al 2008) Economic globalization index ranges between 0 and
100, where higher values indicate a higher degree of globalization. (Source: KOF Index
of Globalization)
C. Political Regime Type
Measurement:
The polity represents the regime authority by scoring the authority spectrum on a 21point scale from consolidated autocracies (-10) to consolidated democracy (+10).
Definition:
Polity IV represents “concomitant qualities of democratic and autocratic authority in
governing institutions, rather than discreet and mutually exclusive forms of governance.”
This score expresses a spectrum of domestic regime that spans from fully
institutionalized autocracies through mixed, or incoherent, authority regimes (termed
anocracies) to fully institutionalized democracies.
D. Electoral Competition
Measurement:
The percentage of votes gained by the smaller parties in parliamentary and/or presidential
elections, The values Ranges from 0 to 100.
Definition:
Electoral competition represents the electoral votes shared by smaller parties. This is
calculated by subtracting from 100 the percentage of votes shared by the largest party in
parliamentary elections or by the party of the candidate who won in presidential elections.
21

The database includes details of official national accounts statistics in national currencies as
provided by the National Statistical Offices. Data is available for most of the countries, and for
the majority of countries data is available from 1970 up to the year t-1.
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Theoretically, the value may range from 0 (only one party received 100 % of votes) to
100 (each voter cast a vote for a distinct party). (Source: Vanhanen Index of
Democratization)
E. Voter Turnout
Measurement:
The percentage of the voters out of the voting age population
Both Parliamentary and Presidential Elections
Definition:
The percentage of the voting age population who actually voted in the election.
Theoretically, the value may range from 0 (no participation) to 100 (full participation).
Parliamentary and presidential election data are combined. If both elections occur in the
same year, then parliamentary data is used. Election data in the previous year is used for
years without elections. (Original Source: International Institute for Democracy and
Electoral Assistant)
F. Corporate Capital
Measurement:
Power of Corporate Capital = Institutional Openness*Economic Freedom
Corporate Market Capitalization % GDP
Definition:
The denominator measures the capitalization or the market values (as a percentage of
GDP) of domestically incorporated companies listed on countries’ stock exchanges. The
numerators’ institutional political freedom is taken from the POLITY index and
institutional economic freedom is taken from the economic freedom of the world index
(EFW). The EFW index measures the consistency of countries institutions and policies
with economic freedom. The index measures the degree of economic freedom that is
present in five major areas:
1. Size of Government: Expenditures, Taxes, and Enterprises.
2. Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights.
3. Access to Sound Money.
4. Freedom to Trade Internationally.
5. Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business.
The POLITY and EFW indices represent the political and economic environment that
corporations operate. By themselves greater political and economic freedoms may have a
positive effect on welfare spending. However, it is expected that the effect that these
freedoms have on welfare spending is diminished as a greater share of countries GDP
comes under the control of corporate capital as it is increasingly integrated into the global
economy.
G. Labor Strength
Measurement:
Potential Labor Power
Definition:
PLP = (Number of skilled workers/number of low skilled workers) x (1/surplus labor
as % of working-age population) (Source: Rudra, Potential Labor Power, 2002)
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H. Ruling Party Ideology
Measurement:
Chief executive member’s party ideology: right (-1), center oriented (0), and left (1).
Definition:
Right parties: conservative, Christian democratic, or rightwing.
Left parties: communist, socialist, social democratic, or left wing.
Center parties: centrist or when party position is best described as centrist (e.g. the party
advocates strengthening private enterprise in a social-liberal context). (Source: the
primary source of this measure is the party’s name in Wikipedia).
I. Legislative Ideology
Measurement:
The largest legislative party ideology: right (-1), center oriented (0), and left (1).
Definition:
Right parties: conservative, Christian democratic, or right wing.
Left parties: communist, socialist, social democratic, or left wing.
Center parties: centrist or when party position is best described as centrist (e.g. the party
advocates strengthening private enterprise in a social-liberal context). (Source: the
primary source of this measure is the party’s name in Wikipedia)
J. Urbanization
Measurement:
Urban population as a ratio of total population
Definition:
Urbanization is the percentage of population of areas defined as urban in each state out of
total population. (Source: Index of Power Resources, Vanhanen 2003)
K. Dependency
Measurement:
Age-dependency ratio
Definition:
“Age-dependency ratio is the number of persons over 60 years old divided by number of
persons aged 20-59. (Source: Rudra 2002)
L. Growth
Measurement:
Growth Rate of Real GDP
The growth rate of GDP at constant prices, in percent
Definition:
The difference in real GDP compared to last year, divided by the real GDP last year,
multiplied by 100. (Source: United Nations Statistics Divisions).
M. GDP per capita
Measurement:
Logged GDP per capita
Definition:
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This is the estimate of real GDP per Capita in constant US dollars at base year 2000.
(Source: Gleditsch-Expanded Trade and GDP Data)
N. Population
Measurement:
Logged size of population
Definition:
Population, thousand (Source: Penn World Table)
O. Inflation
Measurement:
Logged Inflation
Definition:
Inflation as measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator shows the
rate of price change in the economy as a whole. The GDP implicit deflator is the ratio of
GDP in current local currency to GDP in constant local currency. (Source: World
Development Indicators)
P. Oil Shock
Measurement:
Dummy 1970s
Definition:
1970s dummy represents world economic crisis due to the oil shocks
Q. Debt Crisis
Measurement:
Dummy 1980s
Definition:
1980s dummy envisions world economic crisis caused by world debt crisis in 1980s.
R. Proportional Representation
Measurement:
The coding for the PR
(0) Majoritarian or Preferential-vote
(1) Mixed-member majority or Block vote
(2) Closed-list-PR
Definition:
Following centripetal theory of democratic governance, this variable measures three
features of an electoral system: (a) district magnitude (M), (b) seat allocation rules
(majoritarian or proportional), and (c) candidate selection rules. The centripetal ideal type
is defined by M>1, proportional seat allocation rules, and party-controlled candidate
selection. This is the closed-list-PR electoral system. Other systems are ranked lower in
this coding according to their deviation from this ideal type. (Source: Gerring, Thacker,
and Moreno, Gerring et al 2005)
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S. Bicameralism
Measurement:
Dummy Bicameralism
“0” if not bicameralism
“1” if bicameralism
Definition:
This variable measures the number of chamber of each country. (Source: Johnson &
Wallack 2006 , and Comparative Welfare States Data Set, Huber et al. 2004 )
T. Trade Openness
Measurement:
Exports + Imports
GDP
Definition:
This variable measures what percent of a country’s GDP comes from trade. The larger the
percent, the more open the country’s economy is to international trade. (Source: this
indicator is adopted from the World Bank’s database World Development Indicators,
2008).
U. FDI
Measurement:
Net Inflows of foreign direct investment that is recorded in the balance of payments
financial account
Definition:
This variable captures inward investment that includes equity capital, reinvestment of
earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital. Data are in percent of GDP.
(Source: this indicator is adopted from the World Bank’s database World Development
Indicators, 2008).
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